EX PARTE GLEN EDWARD DECKARD

AFFIRM; Opinion Filed June 19, 2009.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-08-01555-CR
............................
EX PARTE GLEN EDWARD DECKARD
.............................................................
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 6
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 006-81843-07
.............................................................
OPINION
Before Justices Wright, Bridges, and Francis
Opinion by Justice Wright
 
        Glen Edward Decker appeals the trial court's order denying him the relief sought in his post- conviction application for writ of habeas corpus. In his sole issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by denying him habeas corpus relief because the evidence established appellant's guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. We affirm the trial court's order.
Background
 
        On June 1, 2007, appellant pleaded guilty to the Class B misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated with an open container of alcohol. Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, the trial court assessed appellant's punishment at ninety days' confinement in jail, probated for fifteen months, and a $500 fine. On August 14, 2007, appellant had an administrative law hearing regarding the suspension of his driver's license. The administrative law judge denied the Texas Department of Public Safety's (DPS) motion to suspend appellant's driver's license, making a finding that based on the language of the amended version of the statute upon which the DPS relied, the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop appellant for committing a traffic violation.
        On April 14, 2008, appellant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from his DWI conviction and community supervision. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072 (Vernon 2005) (habeas corpus procedure in community supervision case). In the application, appellant asserted his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, which rendered appellant's guilty plea to the DWI charge involuntary. Appellant specifically complained trial counsel failed to investigate the validity of the traffic stop.
        Attached to the application were the affidavits of both appellant and his father James Deckard. Appellant's affidavit stated he and his father met with defense counsel on one occasion and appellant explained the circumstances of his arrest. Counsel explained he would investigate everything appellant told him and research the law. Counsel further told appellant and his father that appellant would receive probation rather than jail, and explained the requirements of probation as: paying a fine, doing a DWI class, and performing community service for a year. Appellant's affidavit further states he expressed concern about travel restrictions and his father asked if appellant would be able to drink. Counsel responded that there would be no problem as long as appellant “drank no more than one beer per hour.” Appellant stated his court case was rescheduled because counsel had not had the opportunity to investigate the facts or research the law. Appellant further stated he and counsel reviewed the videotape of the DWI arrest together, counsel told appellant that based on the videotape, appellant could either take the State's offer on a guilty plea or appellant had a very good chance of going to jail for ninety days. Appellant stated he told counsel his sobriety was not the issue, only the validity of the stop. However, based on counsel's assertions, appellant decided to plead guilty to the DWI charge. In August 2007, appellant received notice that the administrative court had reinstated his license after having found the officer did not have “probable cause” to make the traffic stop. Appellant stated in his affidavit that had he known he had a legal option of challenging the traffic stop, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have gone to trial.
        James Deckard's affidavit stated he was with appellant when they visited counsel. Appellant explained what happened when he was arrested and made it clear that he had not squealed his tires or thrown gravel on the officer's patrol car. Appellant said he had a fiancée in Mexico, and counsel “made it very clear that [appellant] would be able to travel to Mexico and even be able to drink as long as he had no more than one beer per hour.”
        Defense counsel filed an affidavit, which was attached to the State's response to appellant's application for writ of habeas corpus. Counsel stated that at the initial consultation on March 7, 2007, appellant said that on the night of the arrest, he had one beer before he left his house and two beers and two or three shots of liquor at Chili's restaurant. He was stopped in a Walgreen's parking lot near Chili's and the officer said he stopped appellant for spraying gravel on the officer's car when appellant pulled out of Chili's parking lot. The officer had appellant perform field sobriety tests and arrested appellant for DWI. Appellant did not tell counsel that the officer's report was incorrect. In fact, they did not have the report at that time. Counsel was able to obtain a copy of the report on April 26, 2007, and he sent a copy to appellant. At the March 7, 2007 meeting, counsel informed appellant that he would investigate the facts and any possible defense. Counsel further said he would obtain the best possible plea bargain offer for appellant, and then they would discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the plea bargain offer, the evidence against appellant, and come to a decision as to how to proceed in the case. They also discussed the range of punishment, but there was no discussion of the specific ramifications of a probated sentence at that meeting. Moreover, appellant and counsel did not discuss whether appellant could travel to Mexico if he was on probation. And counsel stated that appellant “has (apparently) confused [the] discussion about the breath test device with the idea that [counsel] told [appellant] that he would be able to 'drink one drink per hour' while he was on probation.” Counsel further stated that each time they appeared in court, he and appellant discussed his case and the results of the discovery requests and investigations. Plea bargain negotiations were conducted and the State reduced its offer at least once. However, due to the very high breath test results of .234 and .244, the requirement that appellant consume no alcohol was always part of the offer and was present in the offer appellant chose to accept. Further, counsel stated, appellant chose to plead guilty due to the expense and probable outcome of a contested trial.
 
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
 
        In reviewing the trial judge's decision to grant or deny habeas corpus relief, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the trial judge's ruling. Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d 804, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We will uphold the trial court's ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Id. In conducting our review, we afford almost total deference to the judge's determination of the historical facts that are supported by the record, especially when the fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. We afford the same amount of deference to the trial judge's application of the law to the facts, if the resolution of the ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. If the resolution of the ultimate questions turns on an application of legal standards, we review the determination de novo. Id.
        To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that a reasonable probability exists that the results of the proceeding would have been different but for the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). In the context of a claim the defendant's guilty plea was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show: (1) counsel's advice was outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases; and (2) that, but for counsel's erroneous advice, there is reasonable probability the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Ex parte Moody, 991 S.W.2d 856, 857-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Accordingly, allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Analysis
 
        Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying habeas corpus relief because the uncontroverted evidence contained in the affidavits submitted by appellant and his father established that defense counsel failed to conduct any research or investigation into the validity of the traffic stop that resulted in appellant's arrest. The State responds that the trial court was not required to believe the self-serving statements contained in the affidavits, and appellant failed to establish his guilty plea was involuntary. We agree with the State.
        The record reflects that appellant was admonished of the consequences of his guilty plea. In response to the judge's inquiry, appellant responded that he had had enough time to talk to his attorney about the case and his rights. The judge also asked appellant, “Are you sure you're ready to give up alcohol for 15 months?” Appellant responded, “Yes, sir.” There was conflicting evidence as to what steps trial counsel took to investigate the circumstances surrounding appellant's arrest. The trial judge, as fact finder, had the sole responsibility of resolving the conflicts in that evidence, and he resolved them against appellant. We must defer to the trial court's resolution of those historical facts, particularly when they are based on credibility determinations. See Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d at 819. Moreover, the trial court was not required to believe the self-serving statements contained in the affidavits of appellant and his father, even if uncontroverted. See Reissig v. State, 929 S.W.2d 109, 113 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd); Messer v. State, 757 S.W.2d 820, 828 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd).
        Additionally, the fact that the administrative judge found at the license suspension hearing that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop appellant was not dispositive of the criminal proceedings. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.048(a), (b) (Vernon 1999); State v. Brabson, 976 S.W.2d 182, 185-86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The State would not have been precluded from relitigating either the factual or legal bases of that issue in the criminal proceedings, see Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.048(a)(2), (3); Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 185-86, and nothing in the record established the trial court would have granted a motion to suppress.
        Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, we conclude appellant has not established either that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that there is a reasonable probably that but for counsel's deficiencies, appellant would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted upon going to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 58- 59; Ex parte Moody, 991 S.W.2d at 857-58. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the relief appellant sought in his application for writ of habeas corpus. We resolve appellant's sole issue against him.         We affirm the trial court's order denying appellant the relief sought in his application for writ of habeas corpus.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          CAROLYN WRIGHT
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
081555F.U05