ROBERT ESCELL DODSON, II, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM and Opinion Filed October 26, 2009
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-08-01252-CR
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ROBERT ESCELL DODSON, II, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the County Criminal Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. MA06-89040-A
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OPINION
Before Justices Wright, Richter, and Fillmore
Opinion By Justice Richter
        A jury convicted Robert Escell Dodson, II of driving while intoxicated, and the trial court assessed punishment at 180 days' confinement in the county jail, probated for twenty-four months, and a $750 fine. In a single point of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Applicable Law
 
        In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and assume the trier of fact resolved conflicts in the testimony, weighed the evidence, and drew reasonable inferences in a manner that supports the verdict. See Rollerson v. State, 227 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). It is not necessary that every fact point directly and independently to an accused's guilt, but it is enough if the conclusion is warranted by the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
        To obtain a conviction for DWI, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (Vernon 2003). “Intoxicated” means not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, or a combination of two or more of those substances or any other substance into the body, or by having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. See id. § 49.01(2). Among other things, evidence of intoxication may include: (1) slurred speech; (2) bloodshot eyes; (3) the odor of alcohol on the person or on the breath; (4) an unsteady balance; and (5) a staggered gait. See Cotton v. State, 686 S.W.2d 140, 142 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). The uncorroborated testimony of an arresting officer is sufficient to prove the element of intoxication. See Annis v. State, 578 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Watkins v. State, 741 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, pet. ref'd).
Evidence Presented
 
        The jury heard testimony from Dallas police officer Lawrence Price, who stopped appellant's vehicle on November 10, 2005 after observing appellant weaving from one lane to another, without signaling, while traveling north on Interstate-35. Price testified when he asked appellant for his driver's license, a strong odor of alcoholic beverage came from inside the vehicle and on appellant's breath. Appellant also had slurred speech and bloodshot eyes. Price asked appellant to step out of the vehicle and walk to the trunk area. When he did so, appellant held onto the side of the vehicle while he walked to the trunk. When Price asked appellant if he had been drinking, appellant said, “[Y]es,” and stated that although he knew he was not to drink while taking prescription medication, he had taken prescription medication for asthma and “had a few drinks anyway.” Price, who is certified to give standardized field sobriety tests, administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test to appellant. Price testified he did not administer the walk-and-turn and one-leg stand tests to appellant because appellant refused, stating he had “bad knees.” On the HGN, Price observed six out of six clues. Price believed appellant had lost the normal use of his mental and physical faculties due to alcohol consumption with prescription medication. He arrested appellant. When Price performed an inventory search of appellant's vehicle, he found several prescription medications in appellant's name, including Campral, Buspirone, Prevacid, and Abruteral. Appellant told Price that the medication belonged to him. After a wrecker arrived on the scene, Price transported appellant to the jail's intoxilyzer room, where appellant performed the walk-and-turn test but refused to give a blood sample. Price testified appellant exhibited five out of eight clues on the walk-and-turn test. A videotape of appellant in the intoxilyzer room was played to the jury.
        The jury also heard testimony from Officer Raymond Dominguez, a certified drug recognition expert instructor and certified intoxilyzer room operator. Dominguez testified the drug “Campral” is medication an individual takes on a daily basis. When alcohol is introduced in that person's system, the medication causes a violent reaction and the person gets ill, nauseous, and vomits. The drug “Buspirone” is a central nervous system depressant and an anti-anxiety medication. Both medications are clearly labeled with the warning not to take them with alcohol.
        Appellant did not present any evidence during the trial.
 
Discussion
 
        Appellant now contends the evidence is legally insufficient because the State failed to prove the offense occurred on the date alleged in the information. Appellant asserts that because the evidence established that the offense occurred in November 2005 and not November 2006, the date alleged in the information, the evidence is insufficient. The State responds that the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant's conviction for DWI “on or about” the date alleged in the information.
        Typically, the date alleged in the indictment or information is an approximation that allows the State to prosecute a defendant for acts occurring within the limitations period. See Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The “on or about” language of an information allows the State to prove a date other than the one alleged in the information as long as the date is anterior to the presentment of the information and within the statute of limitations period. Id. Where an information alleges that some relevant event transpired “on or about” a particular date, the accused is put on notice to prepare proof that the event happened at any time within the limitations period. Addicks v. State, 15 S.W.3d 608, 612 (Tex. App.-Hous. [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd).
        The record shows the information was filed on January 18, 2007, which is within the two- year statutory limitations period for the offense. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 12.02 (Vernon 2005). The information recites the offense occurred “on or about November 10, 2006.” The evidence presented at trial shows the offense occurred on November 10, 2005, which is “on or about” the date recited in the information. Because the date alleged in the information is within the two-year statutory limitations period for the offense, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant's DWI conviction. Vodochodsky, 158 S.W.3d at 509; Sledge, 953 S.W.2d at 256. We overrule appellant's sole point of error.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MARTIN RICHTER
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
081252F.U05