WILLIAM JAY THORPE, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed September 16, 2009.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-08-01145-CR
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WILLIAM JAY THORPE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 336th Judicial District Court
Grayson County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 056750-336
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OPINION
Before Justices Moseley, FitzGerald, and Lang-Miers
Opinion By Justice Moseley
        A jury convicted William Jay Thorpe of possession of cocaine in an amount of less than one gram and assessed punishment, enhanced by two prior felony convictions, at twelve years' imprisonment and a $2500 fine. In two points of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's verdict. We affirm.
Applicable Law
 
        In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and assume the trier of fact resolved conflicts in the testimony, weighed the evidence, and drew reasonable inferences in a manner that supports the verdict. See Rollerson v. State, 227 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). It is not necessary that every fact point directly and independently to an accused's guilt, but it is enough if the conclusion is warranted by the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
        In a factual sufficiency review, an appellate court views all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the fact-finder's verdict of guilt was rationally justified. See Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 282 (2007); see also Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 87 (2007). Unless the record clearly reveals a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact-finder's determination concerning what weight to be given to contradictory testimony. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
        The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally and knowingly possessed cocaine in an amount less than one gram. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(a), (b) (Vernon 2003). To do so, the State had to prove appellant exercised actual care, control, or management over the cocaine and knew it was contraband. See Taylor v. State, 106 S.W.3d 827, 830 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). The control over the contraband need not be exclusive, but can be jointly exercised by more than one person. See id. at 831. Links between appellant and the contraband may be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence. See Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). However, no set formula of facts exists to dictate a finding of links sufficient to support an inference of knowing possession. See Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 830. It is the logical force of the evidence, and not the number of links, that supports a fact-finder's verdict. See Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Evidence Presented
 
        On October 9, 2007, several Sherman police officers set up surveillance on traffic around a hotel known for drug activity. In the past, the officers had made many drug arrests at the hotel, and on one occasion found an operational methamphetamine laboratory inside the hotel. The officers intended to stop vehicles that committed any traffic violations after leaving the hotel. Officer Talmidge Rhew testified he had made five or six traffic stops on vehicles leaving the hotel that evening. At about 10:00 p.m., Rhew initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle appellant was driving after hearing an officer's radio broadcast that appellant had failed to signal a lane change. Rhew also observed appellant make a U-turn at an intersection, which violated a city ordinance. When Rhew activated his emergency lights to pull appellant over, appellant continued driving for several blocks. Rhew could see appellant and a female in the front passenger seat moving around inside the vehicle. At one point, appellant stuck his left arm out of the driver's side window and made gestures. Appellant eventually stopped.
        As Rhew approached the driver's side of the vehicle, two other officers approached the passenger side. Rhew testified appellant seemed to be very nervous as he got out of the vehicle. Rhew saw several open containers of alcohol inside appellant's car. While Rhew talked with appellant, another officer talked with the passenger. The other officer had the passenger pull her bra out away from her skin because some drug users hide their drugs there. When the woman complied with the officer's request, a napkin fell to the ground. The napkin contained a glass pipe with residue inside. The officer showed Rhew the pipe and stated the passenger admitted she had smoked crack cocaine earlier that day, the last time being around 4:30 p.m. The passenger also stated she had been with appellant all day. While Rhew continued talking with appellant, the other officer searched appellant's vehicle. The officer found a second glass pipe that contained residue wrapped in a napkin in the center console. Later analysis showed each glass pipe contained less than one gram of cocaine. Rhew handcuffed appellant and put him in the patrol car's back seat. Rhew asked the passenger if the pipe found in the center console belonged to her. She denied owning the second pipe and said, “[Y]ou found my pipe. It was the one in my bra.” Rhew put the passenger in the back seat of his patrol car and transported her and appellant to the county jail. Rhew testified appellant claimed ownership of the vehicle, stating he had recently purchased it and did not have insurance on it yet. A DVD recording of the traffic stop and transport to the jail was played for the jury. Rhew admitted that his written report did not recite that the passenger stated she had been with appellant all day.
        Officer Brandon Toney testified he and a partner responded to Rhew's radio broadcast that a vehicle he tried to pull over would not stop. Toney arrived at the traffic stop as Rhew was getting appellant out of the vehicle. Toney approached the passenger side and told the female passenger to get out of the vehicle. The passenger appeared to be intoxicated. Toney testified his partner asked the passenger to pull her bra away from her body without exposing herself because that is a common place for women to hide drugs. When she complied, a paper napkin fell from her bra to the ground. The napkin was wrapped around a glass crack pipe with residue inside it. The passenger also had two cigarette lighters in her pockets. Toney searched appellant's vehicle and found several open containers of alcoholic beverages on the back floorboard area and another napkin in the center console that was between the driver's and passenger's seats. Toney unrolled the napkin and found a second glass crack pipe with residue inside it. Toney testified the passenger said the pipe found in her bra belonged to her, but the pipe found inside the vehicle did not. Rhew transported appellant and the passenger to the jail, and appellant's vehicle was towed because appellant was uninsured.         Appellant did not present any evidence during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial.
Discussion
 
        Appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient because he had no knowledge that cocaine was in the center console of his vehicle, he was not alone in the vehicle, and he did not have care, custody, control, or management of the cocaine. Appellant asserts that because the passenger had drugs and paraphernalia in her exclusive possession, the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. The State responds that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's verdict.
        The evidence presented shows several links between appellant and the cocaine. Appellant's vehicle was seen leaving a known drug trafficking area; appellant failed to stop his vehicle when Rhew activated his flashing lights and was seen moving around inside the vehicle before he eventually stopped; a glass crack pipe was found on the passenger's person and a second glass crack pipe was found in the center console in close proximity to and accessible by appellant; appellant admitted he owned the vehicle where the cocaine was found; and appellant and the passenger had been together all day. Taken together, the links are sufficient to connect appellant to the cocaine. See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 166; Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 830.
        It was the jury's function to resolve any conflicts in the evidence, and the jury was free to accept or reject any and all of the evidence presented by either side. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979); Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
        Viewing all of the evidence under the proper standard, we conclude it is legally and factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction. See Roberts, 220 S.W.3d at 524; Lane, 151 S.W.3d at 191-92; Porter, 873 S.W.2d at 732. We overrule appellant's two points of error.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
        
 
                                                          
                                                          JIM MOSELEY
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
081145F.U05