SEAN EARL FOSTER, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM as MODIFIED and Opinion Filed June 26, 2009
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-08-01078-CR
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SEAN EARL FOSTER, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 4
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F03-18333-UK
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OPINION
Before Justices Moseley, O'Neill, and Murphy
Opinion By Justice Murphy
        Sean Earl Foster appeals following the adjudication of his guilt for burglary of a habitation. In two points of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community supervision and adjudicating his guilt, and the judgment erroneously recited that appellant pleaded true to violating his community supervision. We affirm as modified.
I.
 
        Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to burglary of a habitation. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a) (Vernon 2003). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudicating guilt, placed appellant on six years' community supervision, and assessed a $2500 fine. The State later moved to adjudicate guilt, alleging appellant violated two conditions of community supervision. In a hearing on the motion, appellant pleaded true to one allegation and not true to the other allegation. The trial court granted the motion, adjudicated appellant guilty, and assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment.
II.
 
        In his first point of error, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community supervision and adjudicating his guilt because the requirement to report was unduly vague, and there was no evidence he tested positive for marijuana. The State responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking appellant's community supervision and adjudicating his guilt.
        Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In determining questions concerning sufficiency of the evidence in probation revocation cases, the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. An order revoking probation must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of probation. Id. at 763-64. A finding of a single violation of community supervision is sufficient to support revocation. See Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Leach v. State, 170 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref'd.). Thus, in order to prevail, appellant must successfully challenge all the findings that support the revocation order. See Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, 193-94 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978); Harris v. State, 160 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, no pet.).
        In its motion to adjudicate, the State alleged appellant violated two conditions of his community supervision, including: (1) failing to report and (2) testing positive for marijuana. Appellant pleaded true to failing to report and not true to testing positive for marijuana. Appellant's signed plea of true and stipulation of evidence that he failed to report was admitted into evidence. A plea of true, standing alone, supports revocation of community supervision. See Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). Moreover, appellant did not complain that the requirement to report was unduly vague at the time he was placed on community supervision. Thus, appellant's complaint about the reporting requirement comes too late, and has been waived as a matter of law. See Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
        We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's community supervision and adjudicating his guilt. See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763-64. We overrule appellant's first point of error.
III.
 
        In his second point of error, appellant asks us to modify the written judgment to reflect that he pleaded true to violating one condition of his community supervision and not true to the other condition. The State concedes that the trial court's written judgment should be modified to reflect appellant's plea to the allegations in the State's motion to adjudicate.
        The record shows appellant pleaded true to allegation (d), failure to report, and not true to allegation (b), testing position for marijuana. The trial court's written judgment recites appellant pleaded not true to the motion to adjudicate. Thus, the trial court's judgment is incorrect. We sustain appellant's second point of error.
        We modify the trial court's judgment to reflect appellant pleaded true to condition (d) and not true to condition (b). See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd).
        As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MARY MURPHY
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
081078F.U05