STEFFANIE LYNN TRASK, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed September 2, 2009.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-08-00848-CR
No. 05-08-00849-CR
No. 05-08-00850-CR
No. 05-08-00851-CR
No. 05-08-00852-CR
...........................
STEFFANIE LYNN TRASK, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 6
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F06-89611-UX, F06-89647-UX, F07-35210-WX, F07-41092-WX, F07-41093-WX
 
.............................................................
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Lang and Lang-Miers
Opinion By Justice Lang
 
        Appellant, Steffanie Lynn Trask, waived a jury and pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree felony arson, one count of second degree felony identity theft, and two counts of state jail felony identity theft. The trial court heard evidence as to punishment and sentenced Trask to concurrent sentences of ten years' imprisonment and a $5000 fine for each arson count, twenty years' imprisonment for second degree felony identity theft, and two years' imprisonment for each count of state jail felony identity theft.         In five issues, Trask contends that the trial court abused its discretion and violated the objectives of the Texas Penal Code by sentencing her to a prison term, rather than sending her to a drug rehabilitation center and placing her on probation, because the sentence was not necessary to prevent the recurrence of any criminal behavior. Because all dispositive issues are well settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
 
        On May 9, 2008, Trask pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree felony arson. It was alleged she started a fire with intent to destroy a motor vehicle while knowing that the vehicle had located within it property belonging to another. She also pleaded guilty to second degree felony identity theft allegedly committed by possessing ten or more, but less than fifty pieces of fraudulent identifying information. In addition, she pleaded guilty to two counts of state jail felony identity theft allegedly committed by possessing less than five pieces of fraudulent identifying information.
        The trial court sentenced Trask to ten years' confinement plus a $5000 fine for each arson count, twenty years' confinement for second degree identity theft, and two years' confinement for each count of state jail felony identity theft. All sentences were to run concurrently. Timely notice of appeal was filed.
II. ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN SENTENCING
 
        Trask argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing her to twenty years in prison instead of probation and enrollment in a drug rehabilitation program because she is a “good candidate for probation with treatment” and that “sending [her] to prison . . . will not result in any benefit to [her] or society.” The State responds that Trask did not preserve this issue for appeal because she did not object to her sentence at trial, file a motion for new trial, or otherwise make her complaint known to the trial court. The State also responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Trask because it imposed a punishment within the legislatively prescribed range, which is not an abuse of discretion by definition.
A. Standard of Review
 
        An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision as to punishment under an abuse of discretion standard. See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). As long as a sentence is within the range of punishment prescribed by the legislature in a valid statute, the punishment is not excessive nor is it an abuse of discretion, and therefore should not be overturned on appeal. See id.; Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 724 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
 
B. Applicable Law
 
        In order to preserve an issue for appeal, a party must present to the trial court a timely request, motion, or objection, state the specific grounds therefore, and obtain a ruling that appears in the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Where a party does not object to his or her sentence when it is announced or raise the complaint in a post-trial motion, the party has not preserved the issue for appellate review. Castaneda, 135 S.W.3d at 723.
        In the Texas Penal Code, the range of punishment for a second degree felony is from two to twenty years' imprisonment with a maximum fine of $10,000. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33 (Vernon 2003). For a state jail felony, the range of punishment is from 180 days to two years' imprisonment. Id. § 12.35. Arson is a second degree felony if a person sets a fire with the intent to destroy a vehicle “knowing that it has located within it property belonging to another.” Id. § 28.02. Identity theft is a second degree felony if the fraudulent identification items possessed is ten or more, but less than fifty, but it is a state jail felony if the number of items possessed is less than five. Id. § 32.51.         Furthermore, as long as there is some evidence in the record to support the punishment decision that the trial court made, the decision should not be overturned. See Jackson, 680 S.W.2d at 814 (holding trial court abused discretion when there was no evidence of offense or for punishment, no information about defendant, and no plea bargain).
C. Application of the Law to the Facts
 
        Trask did not object to her sentence when it was announced, nor did she file a post-trial motion to raise the complaint before the trial court. Accordingly, Trask failed to preserve her complaint for appellate review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Castaneda, 135 S.W.3d at 723.
        Even had Trask preserved her issue for appeal, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because it set punishment within the range permitted by statute. The trial court found Trask guilty of two counts of state jail felony identity theft and sentenced her to two years' confinement on each count. This sentence is within the statutorily prescribed range of 180 days to two years' confinement for a state jail felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.35, 32.51.
        The trial court also found Trask guilty of second degree identity theft and sentenced her to twenty years' confinement. Additionally, the court found Trask guilty of two counts of second degree arson and sentenced her to ten years' confinement and two $5000 fines. The sentences for these second degree felonies are within the statutorily prescribed range of two to twenty years' confinement with a maximum fine of $10,000. See id. § 12.33.
        Moreover, the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to base its ruling. See Jackson, 680 S.W.2d at 814. Here, the trial court heard testimony from state and defense witnesses, including testimony about the damage that Trask caused to other people by fraudulently using their identification, Trask's methamphetamine addiction, her bipolar disorder, and her previous failed attempts at self-rehabilitation. Additionally, the trial court considered thirty-one exhibits, including pictures of the cars that Trask set on fire and copies of the fraudulent identification she used. The trial court also heard mitigating testimony regarding Trask's desire for rehabilitation, as well as her divorce and eventual loss of custody of her children, her brother's death, and her sister's rape and subsequent diagnosis of HIV, which allegedly contributed to Trask's drug use. Her mother also testified that Trask was “a good student” and “obedient.” For the foregoing reasons, we decide against Trask on her sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
 
        The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          DOUGLAS S. LANG
                                                          JUSTICE
 
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
080848F.U05