CLARENCE LARENZO GAINES, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM; Opinion issued September 12, 2008
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-07-01609-CR
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CLARENCE LARENZO GAINES, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F05-73587-KL
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Whittington, and O'Neill
Opinion By Justice Morris
        Clarence Larenzo Gaines waived a jury and pleaded guilty to sexual assault of a child. The trial court assessed punishment at fifteen years' imprisonment. Appellant now complains the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to prison. We affirm the trial court's judgment. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled.
        In a single point of error, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to a fifteen-year prison term because the sentence does not meet the penal code objective of rehabilitation nor was it necessary to prevent a likely recurrence of criminal behavior by appellant. Appellant asserts that because he testified and asked the judge to place him on probation, the trial court abused its discretion by assessing a term in prison.
        Appellant did not complain about the sentence either at the time it was imposed or in a motion for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). Even constitutional rights may be waived. Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Castaneda, 135 S.W.3d at 723. Moreover, the sentence is within the statutory punishment range for the offense. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.33 (Vernon 2003); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by assessing the fifteen-year sentence. See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). We overrule appellant's sole point of error.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          JOSEPH B. MORRIS
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
071609F.U05