BRYAN ALBERT CARPENTER, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM and Opinion Filed October 29, 2008
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-07-01453-CR
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BRYAN ALBERT CARPENTER, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 15th Judicial District Court
Grayson County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 050282-15
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Moseley, Richter, and Francis
Opinion By Justice Richter
        Bryan Albert Carpenter was convicted of indecency with a child by contact and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. In a single issue on appeal, appellant argues the trial court erred when it refused to provide a jury instruction defining reasonable doubt. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
        In arguing the issue, appellant maintains the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) was wrongly decided. Paulson held that the reasonable doubt instruction is no longer required at the guilt-innocence stage of trial, and that the better practice is not to give the instruction at all. Id. In so holding, the Paulson court cited to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994), which stated that “the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.” Id. But according to appellant, Paulson failed to appropriately apply the requirement that the reasonable doubt concept must be accurately conveyed in the charging instrument. Appellant relies on Victor to assert an instruction was required because the jurors were confused and did not understand the significance of the reasonable doubt standard. Regardless of how we view the issue, Paulson is established precedent. As an intermediate appellate court, we lack the authority to overrule an opinion of the court of criminal appeals. State v. Delay, 208 S.W.3d 603, 607 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006) aff'd sub nom., State v. Colyandro, 223 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Because the reasonable doubt definition is disfavored, the trial court did not err in refusing to give such an instruction. Appellant's issue is overruled and the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
                                                                  
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MARTIN RICHTER
                                                          JUSTICE
 
 
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
071453F.U05