MICHAEL DAVID MORRIS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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AFFIRM; Opinion issued October 31, 2008
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-07-01387-CR
............................
MICHAEL DAVID MORRIS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 416-80198-06
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OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Whittington, and O'Neill
Opinion By Justice Whittington
        Michael David Morris appeals his conviction for indecency with a child younger than 17 years of age and not his spouse. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(1) (Vernon 2003). After the jury found appellant guilty, the trial judge assessed punishment at twenty years' confinement. In a single issue, appellant claims the trial judge abused his discretion in allowing a witness to testify about the profile and common characteristics of sex offenders. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
        In his sole issue, appellant claims the trial judge erred in allowing Gerald Burke, an investigator with the Collin County Sheriff's Office, to testify about the common characteristics and profiles of sex offenders. Appellant contends Burke was not qualified as an expert witness and, therefore, the trial judge should not have allowed his testimony.   See Footnote 1  For the reasons that follow, we conclude appellant's complaints lack merit.
        To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must make a timely, specific objection in the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Harrison v. State, 187 S.W.3d 429, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Heidelberg v. State, 144 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The failure to object can waive even an error involving constitutional rights. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). When the prosecutor began questioning Burke about his experiences interviewing child molesters, appellant objected “as to relevancy and speculation as to what is common or what he sees.” The judge overruled appellant's objection. Thereafter, appellant did not raise any further objections to Burke's testimony. Because appellant did not object in the trial court to Burke's testimony on the ground that Burke had not been properly qualified as an expert witness, he has waived this issue on appeal. We overrule appellant's sole issue.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MARK WHITTINGTON
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
071387F.U05
 
Footnote 1 Appellant states Burke's “unqualified, speculative and irrelevant testimony 'crossed the line' and invaded the exclusive province of the jury.” Appellant does not cite any law nor does he analyze his claim that Burke's testimony was irrelevant or speculative. He likewise fails to cite authority supporting his claim and fails to explain how Burke's testimony invaded the jury's province Thus, to the extent he raises these issue, we conclude they are inadequately briefed. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1; Garcia v. State, 887 S.W.2d 862, 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (“We will not brief appellant's case for him.”).

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