PAMELA GAIL BROWN, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed June 13, 2008.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-07-00099-CR
............................
PAMELA GAIL BROWN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F06-00804-PL
.............................................................
OPINION
Before Justices Wright, O'Neill, and Francis
Opinion By Justice Wright
        Pamela Gail Brown appeals her conviction for possession with intent to deliver four grams or more but less than two hundred grams of methamphetamine. After the jury found her guilty, appellant pleaded true to two enhancement paragraphs. The trial court, pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, assessed punishment at twenty-five years' confinement. In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by overruling her objection to the State's improper jury argument. We overrule appellant's issue and affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
Background
        The primary issue at trial was whether Lloyd Brown, appellant's estranged seventy-three year-old husband, consented to a search of his home. Officer Cook Wise testified that he and his partner Eric Redney   See Footnote 1  went to Brown's house based on information that appellant, who had pending arrest warrants, was there. Redney testified that when he asked permission to enter the house, Brown consented. Brown then led them inside. Both officers testified that acting on information from a person outside Brown's residence, they pried open a compartment in the bathroom and found appellant hiding with a purse at her feet. Appellant's purse contained methamphetamine, ecstasy, marijuana and $1009 in cash. In the bedroom, officers found 124.7 grams of methamphetamine, 170 grams of marijuana, used syringes, bags for packaging drugs for sale, digital scales, methamphetamine pipes, and a notebook with appellant's name on the cover containing lists of customers and amounts owing or owed.
        During the State's direct examination, Brown testified that he separated from appellant two years before her arrest. Although appellant did not live with him, she periodically occupied a back bedroom in his house. Brown also testified he did not remember if he gave officers permission to search the house. According to Brown, he let the officers into the house after they told him they had an arrest warrant. He gave them a screwdriver when they asked for one in order to access a compartment where appellant was hiding. He further explained he did not feel at any time that the police were some place where they should not have been, and that, as far as he was concerned, they had a right to arrest his wife. On cross-examination, when defense counsel asked if the police were seeking his permission to search, he replied “They had the authority to do it.” Brown also testified that he was not told he had the right to have a search warrant before allowing anyone to search his house. On re-direct, Brown reaffirmed his testimony that he did not remember if police asked for his permission to search.
        Later, Brown denied he ever gave police consent to search his residence. He said the police never asked for his consent to search and that he never gave it explaining, “I thought on a fugitive wanted [sic] that they had a right to pursue, and if they had to break down the door to do it, they can do that, whatever it took.” He went on to say that even though the police never showed him an arrest warrant or a search warrant, he led the way into his house.
Improper Jury Argument
 
        In a single issue, appellant argues the trial court erred in overruling her objection to the State's closing argument. In particular, appellant maintains the prosecutor's remarks that an arrest warrant existed was, in effect, a request that the jury find the search valid and disregard the trial court's charge, which instructed the jury that consent was necessary to find the search valid. After reviewing the record, we disagree.
        The law provides for and presumes a fair trial free from improper argument by the State. Long v. State, 823 S.W.2d 259, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Proper jury argument encompasses one of the following: (1) an answer to the opposing counsel's argument; (2) a summation of the evidence presented at trial; (3) a reasonable deduction drawn from that evidence; or (4) a plea for law enforcement. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). To determine whether a party's argument falls within one of these categories, we must consider the argument in light of the entire record and consider the remarks within the context in which they appear. Gaddis v. State, 753 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Sandoval v. State, 52 S.W.3d 851,857 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd).
 
        Here, the record shows Wise testified that, prior to appellant's arrest, he had information there were outstanding felony and misdemeanor warrants for appellant, and the State then offered the arrest warrants into evidence. Appellant did not object to admission of the warrants but said, “I believe this is being offered for record purposes only; am I right?” The State replied “Yes”, and the warrants were admitted for record purposes.
        Nevertheless, during closing argument, defense counsel argued as follows:
Okay - that's your first question, was there a search warrant? Well, there wasn't a search warrant. There was some vague reference to arrest warrants. You never saw an arrest warrant. There is no - and the Judge is not saying you should consider anything about an arrest warrant. He's saying a search warrant, was there a search warrant?
 
Defense counsel then went on to emphasize there was no warrant “from the evidence” and that Brown's consent was merely submission to police authority.
        In rebuttal, the prosecutor stated,
I wanted (sic) to address two things first. I want to talk to you about the fact that there was a valid arrest warrant for Ms. Brown. Okay. We submitted that for record purposes. We let defense counsel look at it. And if there was a problem with this arrest warrant -
 
Defense counsel objected on the grounds that the State was “asking the jury to basically base a verdict on a theory not charged by the court” and that “there is no evidence of an arrest warrant.”
        On appeal, the State contends the prosecutor's comments were proper because they were aimed at answering defense counsel's argument, namely correcting defense counsel's false statement that an arrest warrant never existed because the jury “never saw an arrest warrant.” We agree.
        It is well-settled that a prosecutor may answer the jury argument of opposing counsel provided that the response does not exceed the scope of the invitation. See Andujo v. State, 755 S.W.2d 138, 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Although appellant argues the State urged the jury to validate the search on the fact that a valid arrest warrant existed, our review of the record shows the State corrected defense counsel's misstatement that there was no arrest warrant and argued the search was valid because Brown consented to it. Thus, State's rebuttal argument was within the scope of defense counsel's invitation.
        Moreover, Wise testified regarding appellant's arrest warrants, and the trial court admitted the warrants for record purposes. Thus, the prosecutor's statement that an arrest warrant existed and was admitted “for record purposes” did not inject any new or harmful facts and was proper jury argument because it was a summation of Wise's testimony. See Howard v. State, 153 S.W.3d 382, 358 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). We overrule appellant's sole issue.
        Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          CAROLYN WRIGHT
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
070099f.u05
 
 
 
Footnote 1 Although appellant's brief refers to Redney as “Eric,” the reporter's record shows Redney's given name as “Erin.”