MARKEL SORRELLS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed September 13, 2007.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-07-00308-CR
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MARKEL SORRELLS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 6
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F06-01058-MX
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OPINION
Before Justices Whittington, Bridges, and Lang-Miers
Opinion By Justice Lang-Miers
        Markel Sorrells waived a jury and pleaded not guilty to injury to an elderly individual. After finding appellant guilty and an enhancement paragraph true, the trial court assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment. In two issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
 
        Appellant lived in Katherine Perkins's home for about eight months prior to the day he was arrested for injuring Perkins. Perkins, who was seventy-eight years old at that time, exhibited the beginning stages of Alzheimer's disease. At trial, Perkins testified appellant often used “loud language” with her, took her car when she did not want him to, and ordered her around. Perkins testified that on May 11, 2006, appellant pulled her out of a truck. When the prosecutor asked Perkins if appellant had hurt her, Perkins said, “[i]t been a long time ago. It didn't hurt me, I don't think.” Later, when the prosecutor asked Perkins whether it hurt when appellant pulled her out of the truck, Perkins said, “[u]h-huh, it hurt.”
        Carolyn Fasasi lived next door to Perkins for thirty years. Fasasi testified she observed many interactions between appellant and Perkins, and classified those interactions as “bad.” During the time appellant lived with Perkins, he moved his girlfriend into Perkins's house. Fasasi testified that on May 11, 2006, she saw Perkins sitting in a truck. A social worker stood outside the truck with her back next to Perkins. That same social worker had previously been to Fasasi's home where they talked about Perkins. Fasasi testified appellant went to the truck, reached under the social worker's arm, and pulled Perkins out of the truck. Appellant then pulled Perkins through the front gate and yard and into the house. Fasasi said appellant pulled Perkins “like a puppy,” and that appellant exerted “some force” to make Perkins go where appellant wanted her to go. After appellant led Perkins into the house, the social worker called the police. When police officers arrived, they took Perkins into a separate room because “[h]e was so controlling of her that she couldn't speak for herself.”
        Patricia Wiler, a social worker with Adult Protective Services investigates adult abuse cases involving physical, verbal, or monetary abuse. Wiler testified she was assigned an ongoing case involving Perkins as an alleged victim of verbal and financial abuse. Wiler interviewed Perkins, her neighbors, friends, former employer, and appellant's mother as part of her investigation. On May 11, 2006, Wiler went to Perkins's home to ask specific questions about her financial affairs. When no one answered the front door, Wiler went to the back door, which was closer to Perkins's bedroom, but no one answered that door either. Wiler later found out that appellant's girlfriend was in the house with Perkins at that time. As Wiler walked back to her truck, she saw appellant walking up the street. Appellant volunteered to go inside and get Perkins. When Perkins came to the door, appellant was standing close by. Wiler asked Perkins to come out to her truck so they could talk privately. Perkins agreed, accompanying Wiler to the truck. When appellant noticed they were going to the truck, he said, “[n]o, you're not taking her anywhere.” Wiler told appellant she was only going to the truck to talk privately. Wiler continued walking towards the truck with Perkins.
        After Wiler helped Perkins get into the front passenger seat, she tried to close and lock the door before appellant got there. Appellant yelled for Perkins to get out of the truck and told her she could not go anywhere as he walked through the front yard and out the gate. Wiler said, “[n]o, I am going to sit here and talk with her. I need to ask her some questions.” Wiler stood with her back against the passenger seat. Appellant reached under Wiler's arm and pulled Perkins out of the truck. Wiler testified the truck is large like a Ford F150 and had a step to help passengers get in and out of the seat. When appellant “yanked” Perkins out of the truck, Perkins “bounced” onto the ground with her feet. Perkins made a “noise” that indicated to Wiler she was hurt. Appellant pulled Perkins “like you do a dog that doesn't want to move” to the gate, through the front yard, and into the house. Wiler testified she believed appellant was keeping Perkins away from anyone who could ask her questions about her finances. Wiler called the police. When police arrived, Wiler went inside the house with them. Wiler testified she heard Perkins complain that her wrist was sore or hurt and that she wanted appellant to leave her house.
        Frederick Patterson, one of the officers who responded to a family violence call at Perkins's residence, testified that when he got inside the residence, Perkins appeared to be afraid. Perkins told Patterson she was outside speaking to the social worker and appellant pulled her out of the truck and into the house. When Patterson asked Perkins if appellant caused her any injury, Perkins said, “[o]f course it did.” Perkins told Patterson she felt pain and she did not want appellant in her house anymore. Patterson testified that after speaking with his supervisor about the situation, and because Perkins seemed in fear of appellant and wanted him gone from her house, he arrested appellant and took him to jail.
        Appellant denied he intended to injure Perkins or that Perkins sustained bodily injury. Appellant testified he knew Perkins for twenty-five years and used to be her paperboy. Because Perkins needed someone to help her drive to doctor appointments and other errands, appellant moved into her house. During the last few months that appellant lived with Perkins, she became more confused and fearful that social workers would put her in a nursing home. On May 11, 2006, appellant saw Wiler in the driveway. Wiler asked for Perkins, and appellant went in the house to get her. Appellant testified Perkins knew Wiler was at the door, but she did not want to talk to Wiler. Appellant told Perkins she needed to stand up to Wiler. Perkins went outside while appellant stayed in the house. Then appellant saw Wiler “loading” Perkins into a truck. Wiler appeared to be blocking Perkins so she could not get out of the truck. Appellant shouted to Perkins that she did not have to go with Wiler and to get out of the truck if she wanted to get out. When appellant got to the truck, he reached out his hand to assist Perkins, then he helped Perkins walk through the front gate and yard and into the house. Wiler and the next-door neighbor called the police. Appellant testified he thought Wiler was trying to take Perkins to a nursing home and Perkins did not want to go, and that he never had any bodily contact with Perkins. Appellant testified he did not use money from Perkins's trust fund or bank line-of-credit because he had a job: he sold “bootleg” CD's even though he knew it was illegal to do so.
Applicable Law
 
        In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 191-92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The fact- finder is the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. Harvey v. State, 135 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
        In a factual sufficiency review, an appellate court views all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the fact-finder's verdict of guilt was rationally justified. See Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see also Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Unless the record clearly reveals a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact-finder's determination concerning what weight to be given to contradictory testimony. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
        To obtain a conviction for injury to an elderly individual, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence caused bodily injury to Katherine Perkins, a person who was sixty-five years of age or older. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.04(a)(3), (c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2006). “Bodily injury” means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. See id. § 1.07(a)(8).
Discussion
 
        Appellant argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient because no one testified appellant hurt Perkins or caused her bodily injury. Appellant asserts there is no evidence Perkins sustained any injury or sought medical treatment, and nothing shows appellant intentionally or knowingly injured Perkins. The State responds that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction.         There was conflicting evidence presented. Perkins testified appellant pulled her out of the truck and into the house. Perkins told officers she felt pain in her wrist. Perkins also testified appellant had been loud with her, used her car, and tried to order her around. Both Fasasi and Wiler testified appellant pulled Perkins by the arm through her front yard “like a dog” who does not want to move. Wiler also testified Perkins's neighbors and a bank official gave reports to protective services of verbal and financial abuse of Perkins by appellant. Appellant testified he was only helping Perkins get out of the truck and escorting her back into the house because he believed Wiler was going to take her to a nursing home. Appellant denied he took money from Perkins's trust fund or bank line-of-credit account.
        The fact that there may be conflicting, plausible explanations for appellant's behavior is not dispositive in light of the circumstantial evidence presented at trial. See Huntley v. State, 4 S.W.3d 813, 815 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd). As the fact-finder in this case, it was the trial judge's role to reconcile any conflicts in the evidence. See Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The fact-finder may choose to believe or disbelieve all or any part of any witness's testimony. See Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); McCray v. State, 861 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no pet.). We may not substitute our own determination for that of the fact-finder. Ortiz v. State, 93 S.W.3d 79, 87-88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 8.
        Viewing the evidence under the proper standards, we conclude it is legally and factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction for injury to an elderly individual. See Roberts, 220 S.W.3d at 524; Lane, 151 S.W.3d at 191-92; Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d at 97. We resolve appellant's issues against him.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
        
 
                                                          
                                                          ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
070308f.u05
 
 

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