DEMARCIA DEONTRIC WREN, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed November 9, 2007.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-06-01642-CR
............................
DEMARCIA DEONTRIC WREN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F04-35595-M
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Richter, Francis, and Lang-Miers
Opinion By Justice Lang-Miers
        Appellant was charged with assault by causing bodily injury to a family or household member with a prior conviction for the same offense. The jury found appellant guilty and sentenced him to six years confinement. Appellant raises two issues on appeal. First, appellant argues that the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction. Second, he argues that the prosecutor's closing argument improperly bolstered the credibility of the complainant. We affirm.
 
Factual Background
 
        Appellant and his girlfriend, Vandella Dickison, lived together in an apartment. On July 30, 2004, appellant took Dickison's car and spent the night away from their apartment. When appellant returned early the next morning, he “came in drunk.” Dickison told appellant that she was going to take her car and run errands. Appellant told Dickison that she “wasn't going to leave him there by hisself [sic] and tak[e] the car and leav[e] him there with no way out.” Dickison gathered her keys, shoes, and purse. As she “went for the keys,” which were on the bar in the kitchen, appellant grabbed Dickison from behind and “hit [her] head against the bar.” Dickison grabbed a pair of scissors that were sitting on the bar “to get [appellant] off [her].” Appellant took the scissors from Dickison, cutting her hand. Dickison reached for her cell phone to call for help, but appellant took the cell phone and “threw it against the door entryway and broke it.” Dickison went to the living room and tried to use that phone to call for help, but appellant took the phone out of her hand, ripped it from the wall, and “starting hitting” Dickison with the headset. Appellant said “I already had to take this from the other women in my past” and “I ought to punch you in your face.” Dickison went to the bedroom and attempted to use the bedroom phone to call for help. Appellant followed and continued to hit her. Appellant took the headset from her, but she hit the speaker button and dialed 911. Appellant pulled Dickison by her legs. They continued to argue. Police knocked on the door in response to the 911 call.
        The responding officer, Katherine Young, testified she was dispatched to appellant's apartment because police received “a 911 hang up” and when they attempted to return the call “it was a dead line.” When Officer Young knocked on the apartment door, Dickison answered and “immediately said he beat me.” Officer Young spoke to Dickison, then observed the conditions of the apartment. Officer Young testified that “[i]t looked like there was a fight. There was stuff strewn everywhere, phones ripped from the wall, blood smears, it looked like there had been a physical fight.” Officer Young also testified that the only injury she saw on Dickison was the cut to her hand, but that there were “blood smears around every single phone.” Officer Young answered “I guess no” when asked whether Dickison “look[ed] like an individual who had been beaten,” but also testified that Dickison “was very, very afraid, visibly shaken.”
        Officer Young took a written statement from Dickison at the scene, which was admitted into evidence during appellant's trial. Several days after the assault, Dickison took pictures of bruises arising as a result of the assault.
Factual Sufficiency of the Evidence
 
        In his first issue, appellant argues that the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction because (a) in Dickison's written statement she “never said that Appellant was drunk and the only mention of any physical contact was that the Appellant had placed his hands around her neck and choked her” and (b) Officer Young “testified that, other than a cut on [Dickison's] finger, she did not observe any other injuries to [Dickison].” Appellant argues that these discrepancies “show that [Dickison] false [sic] accused the Appellant of assaulting her” because Dickison was “upset and angry over the fact that [appellant] had been out the previous night.”
A. Standard of Review
 
        In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). To reverse a case on a factual sufficiency challenge, we must be able to say, with some objective basis in the record, that the great weight and preponderance of the evidence contradicts the jury's verdict. Id. at 417. In a factual sufficiency review, we are permitted to substitute our judgment for the jury's when considering credibility and weight determinations, but only to a very limited degree. Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (factual sufficiency jurisprudence requires appellate court to afford due deference to jury's determinations), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3158 (2007). Unless the record clearly reveals a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact- finder's determination concerning what weight is to be given to contradictory testimony. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We measure the factual sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Fuller v. State, 73 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
B. Applicable Law
 
        A person commits the offense of assault if the person “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2007).
C. Analysis
 
        Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude that the evidence is factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction for assault. The evidence was not so obviously weak that appellant's conviction is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, nor does the great weight and preponderance of the evidence contradict the jury's verdict. See Marshall, 210 S.W.3d at 625 (evidence is “factually insufficient when the verdict 'seems clearly wrong or manifestly unjust' or 'against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.'”) (citing Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15). We overrule appellant's first issue.
 
The State's Closing Argument
 
        In his second issue, appellant argues that the State's closing argument “constituted error because it injected into the trial the fact that the Grand Jury 'believed' that the Appellant was guilty.”
        According to the record, during appellant's closing argument, his counsel attacked Dickison's “credibility” and “agenda” and accused her of being motivated by “[r]evenge,” “[a]nger,” or “[f]rustration.” In response, the State argued, in part:
 
To find the defendant not guilty, you would have to say that she made up this detailed and-story of random assaults and then fabricated the bruises, took the photos. You would have to say that the Officer Young made a big mistake, have to say that [Dickison] went and ruined her own property and threw her cell phone and broke it and ripped out her phone cords. You would have to believe that she-that when the officer got there, [Dickison] put on this show that she was so afraid. You would have to say all of this is just wrong, we're not going to believe her at all.
 
And at the conclusion of its closing argument, the State said,
 
Ladies and gentlemen, I told you at the beginning of this trial that it's fairly simple. You have heard some brief testimony today, but it's been detailed. [Dickison] has recounted and relived for you everything that happened that day. You could tell she wasn't enjoying it, but she's doing the right thing. I'm going to ask you to do the right thing now. The officer believed her that day. The grand jury has believed her. The District Attorneys Office is behind her.
 
Counsel for appellant objected “to the suggestion that the grand jury had a say in this,” and the trial court sustained the objection. Counsel for appellant asked the trial court to instruct the jury “to disregard that,” and the trial court responded “[t]he jury will disregard the last comment.” Counsel for appellant sought a mistrial, and the trial court overruled the request.
        On appeal, appellant generally argues that it is error for a trial court to overrule a defendant's objection to improper jury argument, and specifically argues that it was “flagrant” error for the trial court in this case “not [to] instruct the jurors to disregard the argument” because “it encouraged the jurors to consider the Grand Jury proceedings in determining the credibility of [Dickison].”   See Footnote 1  However, as quoted above, the trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to “disregard the last comment.”
         Because the record expressly contradicts appellant's argument, we overrule appellant's second issue.
 
Conclusion
 
        We overrule appellant's two issues on appeal and affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
                                                          
                                                          ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
061642f.u05
 
Footnote 1 Appellant does not argue that it was error for the trial court to deny appellant's motion for mistrial. Accordingly, we do not address that issue.