MARILEIGH ANN BARTON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM; Opinion issued November 19, 2007
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-06-01577-CR
No. 05-06-01578-CR
No. 05-06-01579-CR
 
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MARILEIGH ANN BARTON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F05-58174-RJ, F05-58175-RJ, F06-18913-SJ
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Wright, and Moseley
Opinion By Justice Morris
        In these cases, Marileigh Ann Barton waived a jury and pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of less than one gram of cocaine, unlawful possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine, and aggravated assault on a public servant. We affirm the trial court's judgments. The background of the cases and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1 because the law to be applied in the cases is well settled.
        In spite of her pleas of guilty at trial, appellant contends in her sole issue on appeal that her pretrial protestations of innocence render her guilty plea “violative of Due Process.” When considering the voluntariness of a guilty plea, we must examine the entire record. See Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam). If the trial court properly admonished the defendant before a guilty plea was entered, there is a prima facie showing the plea was both knowing and voluntary. See id. Here, the records show the trial court properly admonished appellant orally and in writing in these cases. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2006); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). Moreover, during the plea hearing, appellant testified she understood the charges in the indictments, understood the punishment ranges for the offenses, and was voluntarily and freely pleading guilty to the indictments.
        The records contain several letters written by appellant to the trial court in which appellant states she is not guilty of the offenses. Appellant contends the acceptance of her guilty pleas, in the wake of her professed innocence, violated due process. But appellant did not complain about the trial court's acceptance of her guilty pleas during the proceedings or in her motions for new trial. She has therefore waived her right to raise this complaint on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). Furthermore, when the trial court acts as the fact finder in a case, it is not required to withdraw a defendant's guilty plea sua sponte and enter a plea of not guilty because no purpose would be served by doing so. See Aldrich v. State, 53 S.W.3d 460, 467 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001), aff'd, 104 S.W.3d 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). In such a case, the trial court's duty is to consider all the evidence submitted. The trial court may then find the defendant guilty as charged, guilty of a lesser-included offense, or not guilty, as the evidence requires. See id. Thus, the trial court had no duty to withdraw appellant's guilty pleas.
        Having reviewed the records, we conclude the trial court did not err in accepting appellant's guilty pleas. We resolve appellant's sole issue against her.         We affirm the trial court's judgment in each case.
 
                                                          
                                                          JOSEPH B. MORRIS
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
061577F.U05