PHILLIP CHARLES MERONEY, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM; Opinion Filed March 27, 2007.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-06-00968-CR
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PHILLIP CHARLES MERONEY, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F05-32499-TM
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Wright, and FitzGerald
Opinion By Justice Morris
        In this case, Phillip Charles Meroney waived his right to a jury trial and pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen years. The trial court assessed punishment at fifty years' imprisonment. In a single issue, appellant contends his guilty plea was involuntary. We affirm the trial court's judgment. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled.
        During the plea hearing, appellant testified he understood the charges in the indictment, the punishment range for the offense, and that the judge could assess punishment anywhere within the punishment range. Appellant testified he understood the registration requirements for sex offenders, and that the only type of probation the trial judge could assess was deferred adjudication probation. Appellant testified he freely and voluntarily waived a jury trial and wanted to plead guilty. The trial judge passed the case for a presentence investigation report and sentencing.
        Appellant now argues in his sole issue that his guilty plea was involuntary because he believed he would receive deferred adjudication probation. Nothing in the record supports appellant's claims. The trial judge properly admonished appellant both orally and in writing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2006). A record showing the trial court properly admonished the defendant constitutes a prima facie showing that the defendant entered into a knowing and voluntary plea. The burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that he did not understand the consequences of the plea. Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd).
        Here, appellant failed to meet his burden. His signed judicial confession and stipulation of evidence was admitted without objection. He admitted he committed the offense and knew the complainant was underage. The fact that appellant received greater punishment than he hoped for does not render his plea involuntary. See Tovar-Torres v. State, 860 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no pet.). Having reviewed the record, we conclude appellant's guilty plea was voluntary. We resolve appellant's sole issue against him.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          JOSEPH B. MORRIS
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
060968f.u05