BERTRAN THOMAS BADER III, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed March 23, 2007.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-06-00733-CR
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BERTRAN THOMAS BADER III, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the County Criminal Court of Appeals No. 1
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. MC04-R0011-D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Moseley, Francis, and Mazzant
Opinion By Justice Moseley
        Bertran Thomas Bader III was convicted of running a stop sign and fined $200 plus court costs by the City of Farmer's Branch municipal court. Bader appealed to the County Criminal Court of Appeals No. 1, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. Bader now appeals to this court. The briefs filed by Bader and the State in the County Criminal Court of Appeals No. 1 are before us. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 30.00027(b)(1) (Vernon 2004). In his brief Bader asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash because the language of the complaint failed to track the statute, the complaint failed to allege that the intersection had been designated as a stop intersection, and the complaint failed to properly allege an offense. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties; thus we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
        A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss a charging instrument will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See State v. Cabello, 981 S.W.2d 444, 445 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to guiding principles or rules. Lyles v. State, 850 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
        Article 45.019 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure sets out the requisites of a complaint. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 45.019 (Vernon 2006). The purpose of such a complaint is to appraise the accused of the facts surrounding the offense with which he is charged so that he may prepare a defense. Chapa v. State, 420 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Article 45.019 provides that a complaint shall be sufficient, without regard to form, if it substantially satisfies the following requirements: (1) it must be in writing; (2) it must commence “In the name and by the authority of the State of Texas”; (3) it must state the names of the accused, if known, and if not known, must include a reasonably definite description of the accused; (4) it must show that the accused has committed some offense against the laws of the state, or state that the affiant has good reason to believe and does believe that the accused has committed an offense against the law of this state; (5) it must state the date the offense was committed as definitely as the affiant is able to provide; (6) it must bear the signature or mark of the affiant; and (7) it must conclude with the words “Against the peace and dignity of the State” and, if the offense charged is an offense only under a municipal ordinance, it may also conclude with the words “Contrary to the said ordinance”. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 45.019. The requisites of a complaint or an affidavit to support a prosecution under an information are not as stringent as the requirements of a complaint or affidavit for a search warrant. Rose v. State, 799 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no pet.).         Bader's three arguments all contend the complaint did not meet the fourth requirement of Article 45.019. In connection with that requirement, the complaint alleged Bader
 
did . . . unlawfully operate a motor vehicle on a public roadway, to-wit: ROSSER ROAD AT ITS INTERSECTION WITH CLUBWAY LANE and such location was controlled by a stop sign to regulate the intersection traffic and defendant did drive, propel and operate and did attempt to drive, propel and operate said vehicle into and across the said street intersection without stopping or coming to a complete stop at the said stop sign . . . .
 
        Section 544.010 provides that an operator of a vehicle approaching an intersection with a stop sign shall stop “[u]nless directed to proceed by a police officer or traffic-control signal. . . .” See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.010 (Vernon 1999). Bader's first contention is that the complaint failed to allege a negation of this possibility, which he contends is the same as the failure to allege an essential element of an offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07 (22) (D) (Vernon Supp. 2006); Lopez v State, 846, S.W.2d 90 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref'd). Although Bader's motion to quash asserted the complaint failed to track the above language from the statute, he did not raise he argument he makes here prior to the commencement of the trial on the merits. Thus he has waived his right to complain of this issue on appeal. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 45.019(f).
        Second, Bader argues the complaint failed to allege that the intersection was designated as a stop intersection by the Texas Transportation Commission. Section 544.010(a) provides that “the operator of a vehicle or streetcar approaching an intersection with a stop sign shall stop as provided in Subsection (c).” Because the complaint tracks the statutory language of the penal law under which Bader is charged, it is sufficient. See Ross v. State, 802 S.W.2d 308, 314 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no pet.).
        Finally, Bader argues that by the use of the phrase “at the stop sign” the complaint fails to constitute an offense under state law. Section 544.010(c) requires an operator approaching an intersection with a stop sign to stop before entering the crosswalk, or, if no crosswalk, at a clearly marked stop line, or, if no stop line, at the place nearest the intersecting roadway where the operator has a view of approaching traffic. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.010(c). A complaint must state facts sufficient to show the commission of an offense charged, but the same particularity is not required as is necessary in an indictment or information. See Vallejo v. State, 408 S.W.2d 113, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966). We conclude the complaint is sufficient to inform Bader in plain and intelligible words of the offense of running a stop sign. See Martin v. State, 13 S.W.3d 133, 140 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.). We resolve Bader's issue against him.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          JIM MOSELEY
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
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