HAROLD RAY LEWIS, M.D., Appellant v. JACK FOXWORTH, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT FOR WALTER L. FOXWORTH AND WARREN H. FOXWORTH, Appellees

AFFIRMED; Opinion issued February 16, 2007
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-06-00452-CV
............................
HAROLD RAY LEWIS, M.D., Appellant
V.
JACK FOXWORTH, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT FOR
WALTER L. FOXWORTH AND WARREN H. FOXWORTH, Appellees
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 191st Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 03-02550-J
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Whittington, Moseley, and O'Neill
Opinion By Justice Whittington
        Harold Ray Lewis, M.D. appeals the trial court's order enforcing a final judgment. In a single issue, Lewis contends the trial judge erred in denying Lewis's motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the trial court's order.
        The Foxworths as seller and Lewis as buyer executed a contract for the sale of land in Grayson County. See Lewis v. Foxworth, 170 S.W.3d 900, 901 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). When Lewis failed to close on the sale by the date specified in the contract, the Foxworths sent Lewis a letter offering to extend the closing date six days. Lewis, 170 S.W.3d at 901-02. In the letter, the Foxworths informed Lewis that if “he failed to tender the remaining funds by that time, they would exercise their right to recover the earnest money and terminate the agreement.” Lewis, 170 S.W.3d at 902. Despite several attempts by the Foxworths to reach him, Lewis did not respond. Lewis, 170 S.W.3d at 902. In March 2003, the Foxworths sued Lewis in Dallas County for breach of contract, seeking to recover the $50,000 in earnest money as damages. In November 2003, Lewis filed a lis pendens on the property in Grayson County. The Dallas County case proceeded to a jury trial following which the trial judge entered judgment in favor of the Foxworths. This Court affirmed the trial court's judgment on appeal. Lewis, 170 S.W.3d at 904. After the mandate issued, the Foxworths filed a motion to enforce the judgment. The trial judge granted the motion and ordered the title company to release the $50,000 in earnest money to the Foxworths. Lewis appeals.
        In his sole issue, Lewis claims the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case and “the underlying judgment is void and unenforceable.” In support of his argument, Lewis contends the local action doctrine mandates this case be tried in Grayson County because the property is located in Grayson County and because Lewis filed a lis pendens in Grayson County.
        “Jurisdiction” deals with the power of a court to determine an action involving a particular subject matter as between the parties and render a certain judgment. See Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. 2000); Nat'l Life Co. v. Rice, 140 Tex. 315, 320, 167 S.W.2d 1021, 1024 (1943). A district court has jurisdiction in a case because the particular claim raised in the case is within its constitutional jurisdiction or because jurisdiction has been mandated by the Legislature. Dubai Petroleum, 12 S.W.3d at 75; see Tex. Const. art. V, § 8 (jurisdiction of district court “consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.”). We presume all claims “fall within the jurisdiction of the district court unless the Legislature or Congress has provided that they must be heard elsewhere.” Dubai Petroleum, 12 S.W.3d at 75. Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case and cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or estoppel at any stage of a proceeding. See Tex. Ass'n. of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993); In re Powers, 974 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding). Moreover, a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is fundamental error which an appellate court must review anytime it appears. See Tex. Ass'n. of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443.
        The Foxworths sued Lewis for breach of contract, seeking monetary damages of $50,000, pre- and post-judgment interest, and attorney's fees. The Dallas district court has jurisdiction to determine a breach of contract case. See Dubai, 12 S.W.3d at 75 (Texas district courts are courts of general jurisdiction and have “subject matter jurisdiction unless a showing can be made to the contrary”); Burtch v. Burtch, 972 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.) (district court had jurisdiction because case was a contract action at law for damages exceeding $500).
        Lewis cites no law for the proposition that the Dallas District Court did not have jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim. Rather, he argues jurisdiction is proper in Grayson County because the local action doctrine applies and the suit “hinges on issues specific to the Property.” In support of this argument, Lewis cites Greenpeace, Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 133 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied) and section 12.007 of the property code. Section 12.007, entitled “Lis Pendens,” provides that a party may file a lis pendens in “an eminent domain proceeding or during pendency of an action involving title to real property, the establishment of an interest in real property, or the enforcement of an encumbrance against real property.” Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 12.007 (Vernon 2004). As we previously noted, this case is a breach of contract case resulting from Lewis's failure to perform under the contract of sale. Neither party sought specific performance of the contract; the Foxworths sought only the earnest money as contract damages. The pleadings did not raise and the parties did not litigate an issue of eminent domain, action involving title to real property, the establishment of an interest in real property, or the enforcement of an encumbrance against real property. Therefore, section 12.007 does not apply to this case.
        Furthermore, Lewis's reliance on this Court's holding in Greenpeace is misplaced. The local action doctrine discussed in Greenpeace mandates this case be tried in Dallas County. See Greenpeace, 133 S.W.3d at 809 (“[I]f the crux of the action does not hinge on resolution of issues specific to the land, but upon conduct of the person, then the cause should be deemed transitory.”). Because the issue in the case below was Lewis's breach of contract and not an interest or ownership in property, we conclude the Dallas District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. We overrule Lewis's sole issue.
        We affirm the trial court's order.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MARK WHITTINGTON
                                                          JUSTICE
 
060452F.P05