DANIEL MCGRUTRIE EDWARDS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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AFFIRMED; Opinion issued October 9, 2006
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-05-01138-CR
............................
DANIEL MCGRUTRIE EDWARDS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F04-52267-WP
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OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Whittington, and Lang
Opinion By Justice Whittington
        Daniel McGrutrie Edwards appeals his conviction for the murder of Leon Chapman. After finding appellant guilty of the charged offense, the jury assessed punishment, enhanced by two prior felony convictions, at ninety-nine years' confinement. In two issues, appellant complains the trial judge erred in admitting certain evidence. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Standard of Review
        We review a trial judge's decision to admit evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. McDonald v. State, 179 S.W.3d 571, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Burden v. State, 55 S.W.3d 608, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). If the trial judge's decision was within the “bounds of reasonable disagreement,” we do not disturb the ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), petition for cert. filed, No. 06-6055 (U.S. July 19, 2006); Apolinar v. State, 155 S.W.3d 184, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Written Statement
        In his first issue, appellant contends the trial judge erred in admitting his written statement. Under this issue, appellant claims his statement was inadmissible because, at the time he made the statement, he was not mentally capable and competent to waive his Miranda   See Footnote 1  rights.
        “An inquiry into the waiver of Miranda rights 'has two distinct dimensions.'” Ripkowski v. State, 61 S.W.3d 378, 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (citing Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 (1987)). The waiver must be “voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Ripkowski, 61 S.W.3d at 384. The waiver must also be made “with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Ripkowski, 61 S.W.3d at 384. Mental deficiency, be it from intoxication, drug use, or mental illness, is a factor relevant to the second dimension but does not automatically determine the issue. Ripkowski, 61 S.W.3d at 384; Smith v. State, 779 S.W.2d 417, 429 n. 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); see Casias v. State, 452 S.W.2d 483, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Reed v. State, 59 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd).
        In this case, appellant does not challenge the first dimension, i.e., he does not claim he was intimidated, coerced, or deceived into making the statement. Rather, he argues that, due to his mental impairment, he was not fully aware of the nature of his Miranda rights and the consequences of abandoning those rights. After reviewing the record, we conclude it does not support his contentions.
        At a hearing outside the jury's presence, Detective Robert Quirk testified he interviewed appellant after he had been arrested for Chapman's murder. The detective began by informing appellant of his constitutional rights, specifically his right to have an attorney present before and during questioning, his right to terminate the interview at any time, and his right to remain silent. He also informed appellant that anything he said could be used against him. After each admonishment, Detective Quirk asked appellant whether he understood those rights. Appellant responded that he did. The detective testified he read the rights from a preprinted card and had no trouble communicating with appellant. He had appellant sign the card with the Miranda warnings. Detective Quirk asked appellant about his background, including where he grew up and went to school. According to Detective Quirk, appellant was very cooperative and was not reluctant to talk to him. He did not appear to be under the influence of any drugs or alcohol. After speaking with the detective for awhile, appellant indicated he was willing to give a written statement. Appellant told Detective Quirk he was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1985 and that he was taking Haldol shots once a month. His most recent shot was ten days before the murder. In addition, he took two medications to alleviate the side effects from the Haldol medication. Detective Quirk took down appellant's statement. The detective read the statement to appellant and told him he could make any corrections, additions, or deletions. After bringing in a civilian witness, the detective read the statement to appellant a second time. Appellant then signed the statement in front of the civilian witness and Detective Quirk.
        Thus, the record shows appellant was given his constitutionally mandated Miranda warnings and indicated he understood those warnings. He conversed rationally and without difficulty with Detective Quirk. He agreed to provide a written statement and subsequently did so. Although appellant had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and was currently being medicated with Haldol and two other drugs, he nonetheless was able to communicate and cooperate with the detective. In light of this, we conclude the trial judge was within her discretion in finding that appellant understood his rights and the effect of waiving those rights. See Ripkowski, 61 S.W.3d at 384. We overrule appellant's first issue.
        
Autopsy Photos
        In his second issue, appellant claims the trial judge erred in admitting an enlarged color photograph of the stab wounds on Chapman's back. Appellant contends the photograph depicted “numerous, gory stab wounds” and that, in light of the gruesome nature of the photograph, the “jurors relied upon emotion” in rendering a guilty verdict. After reviewing the photograph in question, we cannot agree.
        The admissibility of a photograph lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Paredes v. State, 129 S.W.3d 530, 539 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). As a general rule, a photograph is admissible if verbal testimony regarding what is depicted in the photographs is also admissible and the probative value of the photograph is not substantially outweighed by any of the rule 403 counter-factors. Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Rule 403 of the rules of evidence favors the admissibility of relevant evidence, and the presumption is that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial. Long v. State, 823 S.W.2d 259, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). An abuse of discretion arises only when the probative value of the photographs is small and its inflammatory potential is great. Long, 823 S.W. 2 at 271.
        In determining whether the trial judge erred in admitting a certain photograph, we first consider the form, content, and context of the photograph. Erazo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 487, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Long, 823 S.W. 2 at 271-73 (holding reviewing court should consider number of exhibits offered; gruesomeness, detail, and size of photographs; whether photographs are black and white or in color; whether they are close-up; whether body is naked or clothed; and availability of other means of proof and circumstances unique to each individual case). We then consider the Montgomery   See Footnote 2  factors: (i) the probative value of the evidence, (ii) the ability of the photograph to impress the jury in some irrational yet indelible way; (iii) the time needed to develop the evidence; and (iv) the proponent's need for the evidence. Erazo, 144 S.W.3d at 492-96.
        Although appellant contends the photograph should not have been admitted because its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, we disagree. The record before this Court contains a photograph of Exhibit 30, the enlarged color photograph offered to show the stab wounds on the victim's back. Appellant objected to its admission, and the trial judge held a hearing outside the jury's presence. During the hearing, the medical examiner testified the photograph was “the best one for showing almost all of the wounds in a single picture and for being distant enough to be able to orient where [the wounds] are and to see where they are in relation [to] each other.” The medical examiner testified she had drawn a diagram of the victim's back with the wounds displayed but stated that the diagram was “not to scale” and did not “show the same features” that could be seen from the photograph-specifically the length, depth, placement, and severity of the wounds. When defense counsel asked the medical examiner whether she could testify to the severity of the wounds using the diagram she had drawn, she conceded she could. The trial judge overruled appellant's objection. Appellant now claims this ruling was error.
        The photograph at issue in this case shows the victim's nude body before the autopsy was performed. In the photograph, the body is shown face down, and there are numerous knife wounds in the victim's back. The photograph depicts the location and severity of the wounds and was probative to show that, contrary to his claim, appellant did not act in self-defense. Furthermore, the photograph was probative to show details of the wounds that were not displayed in the medical examiner's diagram. Thus, we conclude the first factor weighs in favor of the admission of this evidence.
        We likewise conclude the second factor weighs in favor of admitting this evidence. Although the photograph is explicit, it is not particularly gory or gruesome. The body and the wounds are clean. The body has no marks other than the five stab wounds. The wounds, although large, are not gaping and do not show internal organs. After reviewing the photograph, we conclude it was unlikely to impress the jury in some irrational yet indelible way.
        The hearing to determine the admissibility of this photograph occurred at the beginning of the third day. The medical examiner's testimony, including cross-examination, lasted approximately three pages; the entire hearing took four and one-half pages. The record of guilt/innocence and punishment, excluding voir dire and exhibits, totaled 259 pages. Because relatively little time was required to develop the evidence, we conclude this factor also weighs in favor of admissibility.
        Finally, the enlarged photograph showed all the wounds, without the need of introducing photographs of each individual wound. The medical examiner testified that, although she had drawn a diagram of the wounds, the photograph was more detailed and informative than was her diagram, and it allowed the jurors to view the severity of the wounds. We conclude this factor also weighs in favor of admitting the evidence. In sum, the photograph, although somewhat graphic, was not so gruesome or horrifying as to cause a juror of normal sensitivity to have difficulty rationally deciding the critical issues in this case. See Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Thus, the photograph's probative value is not outweighed by its possible prejudicial effect. We cannot conclude the trial judge abused her discretion in admitting the photograph. We overrule appellant's second issue.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MARK WHITTINGTON
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
051138F.U05
 
Footnote 1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Footnote 2 Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh'g).

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