MICHAEL L. LANGLEY, Appellant v. COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, Appellee

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AFFIRM; Opinion Filed March 21, 2006.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-05-00297-CV
............................
MICHAEL L. LANGLEY, Appellant
V.
COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 191st Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 02-7574-J
.............................................................
OPINION
Before Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Morris and Lang-Miers
Opinion By Chief Justice Thomas
        In five points of error, appellant Michael Langley challenges the trial court's order revoking his probation and suspending his license to practice law. We overrule appellant's points of error. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
        The Commission for Lawyer Discipline brought disciplinary proceedings against appellant. The parties entered into, and the trial court signed, an agreed judgment which suspended appellant's license to practice law for forty-eight months. According to the judgment, the first twelve months, March 31, 2004 through March 31, 2005, were active suspension, and the remaining thirty-six months, April 1, 2005 through March 31, 2008, were to be probated.
        On October 15, 2004, the Commission filed a motion to revoke on the basis that appellant violated the terms and conditions of probation by practicing law while on active suspension. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order revoking the disciplinary probation and imposing an active suspension for forty-eight months.
        Appellant first argues the trial court abused its discretion by not granting his motion to dismiss the Commission's motion to revoke. Appellant asserts the Commission's motion to revoke was improper because any violation of the terms of the agreed judgment occurred during his active suspension, not during the probated portion of his suspension. We disagree.
        The trial court's order provides:
 
Should the Court determine that Respondent has committed any violation of the terms and conditions of this judgment, the Court shall enter an order revoking Respondent's probation and imposing upon Respondent an actual suspension from the practice of law for the period of forty eight (48) months, with said forty-eight months to begin on or after the revocation.
 
The Commission presented evidence that appellant continued to practice law during his active suspension. Because appellant violated a term of the judgment, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking his probation and actively suspending his license. We overrule appellant's complaint.
        In the second issue, appellant asserts the trial court erred in admitting three of the Commission's exhibits at the revocation hearing. Citing Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6, appellant argues the trial court was required to exclude the Commission's exhibits because (1) they were not previously produced in response to requests for disclosure and (2) the Commission did not produce these exhibits prior to trial in violation of the trial court's pretrial order. However, there is nothing in the record to show that appellant ever propounded any discovery on the Commission. A party cannot be compelled to produce that which it has not been requested to produce. In re Lowe's Cos., Inc., 134 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, orig. proceeding). Further, the trial court's pretrial order is not in the record before us. While appellant has attached a copy of the trial court's pretrial order to his brief, we cannot consider documents attached to briefs that do not also appear in the appellate record. Ellason v. Ellason, 162 S.W.3d 883, 887 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). Because there is no evidence in the record before us that these documents were requested through discovery, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion. We overrule appellant's second point.
        Appellant next argues the trial court erred in excluding his testimony regarding his Exhibit 1. However, appellant has not cited us to the record nor does the record show that he ever offered Exhibit 1 into evidence. Moreover, appellant made no bills of exceptions, formal or informal. No offer of proof was made of the excluded evidence in any form. The excluded evidence is not in the record. Thus, appellant waived his complaint by failing to properly preserve error. See Carlile v. RLS Legal Solutions, Inc., 138 S.W.3d 403, 411 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). We overrule appellant's third issue.        
        Appellant also argues the trial court abused its discretion by changing the terms of his suspension. According to appellant, as a result of the revocation of his probation, the trial court suspended his law license from “March 31, 2004 through January 31, 2009, a period of 58 months.” Appellant asserts that this amounted to the trial court disregarding the agreed order and increasing the length of his suspension. Again, we disagree.
        The agreed order provides in part:
 
Should the Court determind that [appellant] has committed any violation of the terms and conditions of this judgment, the Court shall enter an order revoking [appellant's] probation and imposing upon [appellant] an actual suspension from the practice of law for the period of forty eight (48) months, with said forty eight months to begin on or after the date of revocation.
 
The trial court revoked appellant's probation on February 1, 2005. In the order revoking appellant's probation, the trial court specified that appellant's active suspension began on February 1, 2005 and ended forty-eight months later on January 31, 2009. Thus, the trial court did not change the terms of appellant's suspension; rather, it followed the terms of the agreed order. We overrule appellant's forth issue.
        Lastly, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive punishment. It is within the trial court's discretion to determine the punishment of a lawyer found guilty of professional misconduct. Santos v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 140 S.W.3d 397, 403 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). In determining the appropriate sanction for attorney misconduct, a trial court must consider:
 
[T]he nature and degree of misconduct for which the respondent is being disciplined, the seriousness and circumstances attending the misconduct, assurance that those who seek legal services will be insulated from unprofessional conduct, the profit to the attorney or the injury or hardship to others resulting from the misconduct, avoidance of repetition, the deterrent effect upon others, the maintenance of respect for the honor and dignity of the legal profession, and the conduct of the respondent during the course of the investigation and trial of the disciplinary action. In addition thereto, the disciplinary record of the respondent is admissible on the issue of the appropriate measure of discipline to be imposed.
 
Tex. R. Disciplinary P. 3.10. After viewing the evidence and considering the above factors, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing this suspension. Moreover, appellant agreed to the forty-eight-month suspension when he signed the agreed judgment. Consequently, appellant cannot now complain of the punishment to which he agreed. Musslewhite v. State Bar of Tex., 786 S.W.2d 437, 445 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, writ denied). We overrule appellant's final issue.
        Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
                                                          
                                                          LINDA THOMAS
                                                          CHIEF JUSTICE
 
050297f.p05        
 
 

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