CARDEESE OMART TAYLOR, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed February 28, 2001
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-97-01963-CR
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CARDEESE OMART TAYLOR, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F97-45421-KL
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OPINION
Before Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Whittington and Campbell FN:1
Opinion By Justice Campbell
        A jury convicted Cardeese Omart Taylor of the offense of murder. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1), (2) (Vernon 1994). The jury assessed appellant's punishment at fifty years confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, and a fine of $5,000. On original submission, we abated this appeal, pursuant to appellant's fourth point of error concerning the voluntariness of an extrajudicial confession, so that the trial court could prepare and file findings of fact and conclusions of law. This Court also considered and rejected appellant's complaints that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's verdict. We concluded the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient. We received the trial court's written findings of fact and have reinstated the appeal. We now address appellant's third and fifth points of error in which he complains of the admission of the confession. We will affirm.
        Because the facts were adequately discussed in our first opinion, we will discuss only those facts necessary to the resolution of points of error three and five. In point of error three, appellant claims his confession was illegally admitted into evidence by the trial court because it was obtained as a result of an illegal detention. While appellant recognizes the viability of the objective good faith test espoused and embraced by the court of criminal appeals in Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), he argues that Dallas police detective Harshbarger, who interrogated appellant, “expressly abandoned that proper basis” (traffic warrants) for detention, and instead questioned appellant about the homicide without probable cause. Appellant seems to argue that there must be an independent basis shown for Harshbarger to justify his interrogation of appellant about the homicide, exclusive of the existence of traffic warrants, once Harshbarger's focus shifted to appellant as a homicide suspect. This argument misapprehends the objective good faith test adopted in Garcia.
        The pretext arrest doctrine has been abandoned; the validity of an arrest or stop is to be determined solely by an objective analysis of the facts surrounding the arrest or stop. Id. at 943-44. As long as an actual law violation occurs, police officials are free to enforce the laws and detain a person for that violation, regardless of the officer's subjective reasons for the detention. See United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Garcia, 827 S.W.2d at 944. An officer's subjective intent is relevant only to a credibility determination of his stated reasons for stopping or arresting an individual. Garcia, 827 S.W.2d at 944.
        On January 17, 1997, appellant was arrested on traffic warrants and questioned by Harshbarger regarding Battakian's homicide. Harshbarger freely admitted that once appellant was identified and arrested on the outstanding traffic warrants, he became the focus of an investigation into the homicide of Battakian, and, indeed, was interrogated and confessed to the killing of Battakian. This is, then, a classic fact pattern for the application of the objective good faith test. Because the validity of the traffic warrants is not at issue, the subsequent interrogation of appellant by Harshbarger was perfectly permissible under Garcia. See id. Point of error three is overruled.
        In point of error five, appellant argues that his confession should have been suppressed by the trial court because appellant was intoxicated at the time of the confession and did not exercise his free will. Appellant testified at a pretrial hearing that he had consumed a large quantity of marijuana and, along with two friends, had drunk a half gallon of cognac. He testified he did not understand the Miranda warnings, and his girlfriend testified that he was high on marijuana and seemed confused on the day he was arrested. She testified that appellant told her he signed some unknown document for the police. Harshbarger, conversely, testified that appellant did not seem to be intoxicated nor did he detect any odor of an intoxicating beverage on appellant.
        The trial court, pursuant to our abatement order, entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge found that appellant “understood the rights of which he had been advised, and . . . [he] knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived these rights.” The trial court further found the “statement was in all things made freely and voluntarily, without compulsion or persuasion and was made . . . in full knowledge of his rights and the consequences of making the statement.”
        At a hearing to suppress a confession, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given their testimony. Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The court may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness's testimony. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied 120 S. Ct. 2008 (2000). An appellate court generally does not engage in its own factual review but decides whether the trial court's fact findings are supported by the record. See Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 23. We give almost total deference to the trial court's resolution of the historical facts, especially when the resolution turns on the credibility of the witnesses. Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
        An intoxicated condition, per se, does not automatically render a confession involuntary. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 651 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 100 (1998). The question for the trial court is “whether the defendant's intoxication rendered him incapable of making an independent, informed decision to confess. Id. The State must prove the voluntariness of an accused's confession by a preponderance of the evidence. Roy v. State, 892 S.W.2d 96, 100 (Tex. App._Texarkana 1994, pet. ref'd).
        In the instant case, the trial court obviously found Harshbarger credible and appellant and his girlfriend not credible. The fact that appellant was able to read the Miranda warnings, decipher the written confession, and actually initial three changes that he made to the writing supports the trial court's findings and conclusions that the confession was freely and voluntarily given. We conclude the voluntariness issue was proven by a preponderance of the evidence, and we do not discern a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting appellant's confession into evidence. Point of error five is overruled.
        The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          CHARLES F. CAMPBELL
                                                          JUSTICE, ASSIGNED
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
 
FN:1
1 The Honorable Charles F. Campbell, Justice, Retired, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, sitting by assignment.