LARRY DARNELL BANKS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed November 13, 2000
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-99-01382-CR
............................
LARRY DARNELL BANKS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F99-70076-PLW
.............................................................
OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Whittington, and James
Opinion By Justice Morris
        In this case, Larry Darnell Banks appeals his conviction for sexual assault. In three issues, he complains the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence at trial in violation of his right to confront the witnesses against him and in overruling his objection that a question had been asked and answered. Because we conclude appellant's complaints are without merit, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
        Appellant sexually assaulted the complainant after dragging her by the neck to a secluded location. When spotted by a police officer, appellant zipped up his pants and fled. The complainant was found crying at the scene with her pants around her ankles. At trial, appellant admitted he had engaged in sexual intercourse with the complainant, but he asserted that the intercourse was consensual.                
        In his first two issues, appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting a police officer's hearsay testimony about the complainant's recounting of the sexual assault. Even if the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony, the admission of the testimony was harmless. Admission of hearsay evidence against a criminal defendant implicates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because it denies the defendant the opportunity to confront the out-of-court declarant. Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 98 (U.S. 2000). In this case, however, appellant was able to confront the declarant at his trial. Defense counsel cross- examined the complainant twice: first, when she testified after the hearsay evidence had been admitted, and second, after the State had rested its case. Moreover, the complainant thoroughly testified about the offense. Her testimony was supported by the testimony of a witness who heard appellant's demands for sex and called the police. We conclude that any error in the admission of the statements did not contribute to appellant's conviction or punishment. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a); id. at 151. We resolve the first and second issues against appellant.
        In his third issue, appellant complains the trial court erred by admitting, over appellant's objection that the question had been asked and answered, testimony about what the complainant told the officer just after the sexual assault. We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. See Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 750 n. 2 (Tex. Crim. App.1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2008 (U.S. 2000). Here, the question about what words the complainant spoke to the officer as she pulled up her pants was asked to clarify whether the complainant said more than that appellant had choked her and taken her belongings. When the question was asked again, the officer stated that the complainant also said appellant had raped her. The question was designed to ensure that the officer's testimony about the complainant's words just after the offense was complete. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing it. We resolve appellant's third issue against him.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          JOSEPH B. MORRIS
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47