JAMES DAVID ROBINSON, JR., Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Affirmed and Opinion Filed December 30, 1996
 
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-96-00053-CR
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JAMES DAVID ROBINSON, JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1-83296-94
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O P I N I O N
Before Justices Ovard, Hankinson, and Moseley
Opinion By Justice Hankinson
        A Plano police officer stopped James David Robinson, Jr. for speeding and arrested him pursuant to an outstanding arrest warrant issued by the City of Carrollton. Almost immediately after he was arrested, handcuffed, and seated in the arresting officer's patrol car, the police officers searched the passenger compartment of appellant's vehicle without a warrant, finding marijuana and other drug paraphernalia. Appellant was charged with possession of marijuana. Before trial, appellant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his car, claiming that the search was illegal. The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress and later accepted appellant's nolo contendere plea, convicted him of possession of marijuana, and assessed punishment at six months probation and a $200 fine. In one point of error, appellant claims that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress. Because the police officers were authorized to search the passenger compartment of appellant's automobile incident to his arrest, we overrule appellant's point of error.
Background
        On July 23, 1994, Plano police officer Robert Aldous parked his patrol car in a parking lot at the corner of Avenue K and Plano Parkway and, using his radar gun, monitored the speed of vehicles travelling near this intersection. When appellant drove past Officer Aldous's location, Officer Aldous calculated appellant's speed at 55 miles per hour in the 35 miles-per-hour speed zone. Officer Aldous pulled out of the parking lot and stopped appellant for speeding.
        Officer Aldous ran a routine check on appellant and determined an outstanding City of Carrollton warrant for appellant's arrest existed. After confirming this information with the Plano police dispatcher, Officer Aldous informed appellant that he was going to take appellant to jail pursuant to the Carrollton warrant. Appellant asked permission to leave his car in a nearby parking lot because he could not afford the fees imposed by the impound yard. Officer Aldous agreed and allowed appellant to pull his car into a nearby parking lot.         After appellant got out of his car, Officer Aldous arrested appellant, handcuffed him, and seated him in the patrol car. Either as Officer Aldous handcuffed appellant, or as he seated him in the patrol car, another Plano police officer, Sergeant A.D. Paul, Jr., arrived at the scene. After Officer Aldous secured appellant in the patrol car, Sergeant Paul asked Officer Aldous about the circumstances of appellant's arrest. Officer Aldous informed Sergeant Paul that appellant had an outstanding warrant from Carrollton, which had been confirmed through dispatch, and although originally stopped for speeding, appellant was arrested pursuant to that warrant.
        Officer Aldous then told Sergeant Paul he was going to search appellant's vehicle. He did not indicate that he believed appellant intoxicated or otherwise impaired. Sergeant Paul assisted with the search. Officer Aldous found a set of mini-scales with a clip on the side of them and rolling papers in the glove box. Underneath the car's center console, Sergeant Paul found a baggie of marijuana and a pipe coated with a burnt residue that smelled like marijuana. Officer Aldous then returned to appellant, gave him the Miranda FN:1 warnings, and asked appellant about the marijuana found in his car. Appellant told Officer Aldous that the officers had found the only baggie in the car. Officer Aldous then secured appellant's vehicle and transported him to jail.
        Appellant was charged with possession of marijuana. Before trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in his car, claiming that the officers had no probable cause to search appellant's vehicle and that the search violated appellant's constitutional and statutory rights. FN:2 Evidence obtained in violation of the United States and Texas Constitutions or laws is not admissible. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon Supp. 1997). Without giving a specific reason, the trial court denied appellant's motion. This appeal followed.
Standard of Review
        On a motion to suppress, the trial court is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight given to their testimony. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). The trial judge may accept or reject any or all of the witnesses' testimony. Johnson v. State, 864 S.W.2d 708, 713 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1993), aff'd, 912 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). We do not engage in our own factual review. Johnson, 864 S.W.2d at 713. We consider only whether the trial court improperly applied the law to the facts. See Romero, 800 S.W.2d at 543; Johnson, 864 S.W.2d at 713. In so doing, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and will reverse only if the trial court clearly abused its discretion. Dawson v. State, 868 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1993, pet. ref'd). If the evidence supports the trial court's ruling, we will not disturb that ruling. Johnson, 864 S.W.2d at 713. We will uphold the trial court's ruling on any valid theory, regardless of whether the State argued it in the trial court or on appeal. See Lewis v. State, 664 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Johnson, 864 S.W.2d at 713.
 
Discussion
        In one point of error, appellant complains that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress. Generally, the police "may not conduct a search unless they first convince a neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to do so" and obtain a search warrant. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981). Several exceptions to the warrant requirement exist, the: (1) plain view doctrine; (2) automobile exception; (3) inventory search; and (4) search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest. Pettigrew v. State, 908 S.W.2d 563, 567 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref'd) (citing Aitch v. State, 879 S.W.2d 167, 172 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd)). Because Officer Aldous and Sergeant Paul searched appellant's vehicle without a warrant, the State had to prove the reasonableness of the search. See Russell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7, 9-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
        Appellant claims that Officer Aldous and Sergeant Paul had no authority to perform a warrantless search. Ignoring the first two exceptions to the warrant requirement, appellant argues that Officer Aldous and Sergeant Paul could not perform an inventory search because appellant's vehicle had not been impounded and, without probable cause, they could not perform a valid search incident to his arrest. The State concedes that Officer Aldous and Sergeant Paul had no power to perform an inventory search because they did not impound appellant's vehicle. See Backer v. State, 656 S.W.2d 463, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Pettigrew, 908 S.W.2d at 568. Instead, the State argues that Officer Aldous and Sergeant Paul properly searched appellant's vehicle incident to his lawful arrest, and therefore, evidence obtained in that search is admissible. We agree with the State.
        Appellant stipulated that he was arrested pursuant to a valid outstanding traffic warrant. Therefore, his arrest was lawful. See Pettigrew, 908 S.W.2d at 570. The United States Supreme Court initially recognized that a search following a lawful arrest is permitted because of the need to remove any weapons that the arrestee might attempt to use in order to resist arrest or to effect escape and the need to preserve evidence. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); Pettigrew, 908 S.W.2d at 570. According to the Chimel Court, the scope of the search must be "`strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
        Focussing on the need to adopt a uniform standard that would relieve police officers of the need to balance competing interests involved in specific circumstances, the United States Supreme Court rejected a case-by-case application of the Chimel rule to automobiles in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458-61 (1981). See Pettigrew, 908 S.W.2d at 570; State v. Garcia, 801 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1990, pet. ref'd). Instead, Belton established a "bright-line" test: "[W]hen a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident to that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. . . . The police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment." Belton, 453 U.S. at 460; Garcia, 801 S.W.2d at 141 (citing Osban v. State, 726 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App.1986)), overruled to the extent in conflict with Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)); Pettigrew, 908 S.W.2d at 570; Caro v. State, 761 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1988, pet. ref'd). A search under Belton is proper even when the arrestee has been handcuffed and placed in a police car. United States v. White, 871 F.2d 41, 43-44 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Karlin, 852 F.2d 968, 970-72 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1021 (1989); Pettigrew, 908 S.W.2d at 570; Garcia; 801 S.W.2d at 141.
        State v. Garcia, 801 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1990, pet. ref'd), supports the conclusion that Officer Aldous and Sergeant Paul properly searched appellant's vehicle. In Garcia, a police officer, Officer Dalton, stopped Garcia for a traffic violation..a suspected violation of the Texas seatbelt law. Using his mobile data terminal, Officer Dalton determined, and Garcia admitted, that his driver license had been suspended. The officer arrested Garcia for driving while his license was suspended, handcuffed him, and placed him in the patrol car. Garcia's brother, who was also in the car, asked that he be allowed to drive the car home. Because Garcia's brother's driver license had also been suspended, the officer refused this request. Officer Dalton performed an inventory search of Garcia's vehicle because he wanted to ensure the security and integrity of any items in Garcia's car..not because he had any reason to suspect he might find evidence or contraband in the car. Officer Dalton found a black .22 caliber loaded automatic pistol under the driver's seat. Garcia was charged with the offense of unlawfully carrying a handgun. Garcia challenged the propriety of Officer Dalton's warrantless search, requesting that the trial court suppress all evidence obtained in the search. The trial court granted this motion. The San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed. Although the court of appeals determined that Officer Dalton performed a proper inventory search, it also applied Belton's "bright-line" test and concluded that Officer Dalton's search of the passenger compartment, which revealed the loaded handgun, was proper for a second reason..it was incident to Garcia's contemporaneous arrest for the offense of driving while his license was suspended. Id. at 141. The court of appeals further concluded that "[t]he fact that appellee was handcuffed and placed in the police vehicle does not prevent the application of Belton's `bright-line' rule in Texas." Id.
        Applying Belton's "bright-line" rule to this case, the search of appellant's car was a lawful search incident to his contemporaneous arrest. Officer Aldous lawfully stopped appellant for a traffic violation. After Officer Aldous informed appellant that he was going to jail, appellant moved his car to a parking lot. Like the defendant in Garcia, appellant was arrested, handcuffed, and seated in the back of the patrol car. After a brief discussion, during which Officer Aldous related the circumstances of the arrest to the newly arrived Sergeant Paul, the officers immediately searched appellant's car, finding the evidence at issue here. We conclude that the rationale employed by the San Antonio Court of Appeals in Garcia applies equally to this case and that Officer Aldous's and Sergeant Paul's search of appellant's vehicle was incident to appellant's contemporaneous arrest. We therefore overrule appellant's point of error.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          DEBORAH G. HANKINSON
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 90
960053F.U05
 
FN:1          Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
FN:2          After reviewing appellant's motion to suppress and his appellate brief, we cannot determine whether he claims the search and seizure violated his federal or state constitutional rights, or both. Because our analysis is the same under either constitution, we need not resolve this issue. See Johnson v. State, 864 S.W.2d 708, 718 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1993), aff'd, 912 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
File Date[12-30-96]
File Name[960053F]