GREGORY ALLEN KOHLER, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Affirmed and Opinion Filed December 13, 1996
 
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-95-01565-CR
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GREGORY ALLEN KOHLER, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
..............................................................
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F94-34050-TL
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O P I N I O N
Before Justices Ovard, Hankinson, and Moseley
Opinion By Justice Hankinson
        Appellant Gregory Allen Kohler was indicted for stealing a tractor from James Trahan Jared. The trial court deferred his adjudication on the charged theft offense and ordered, as a probation condition, that appellant pay $5,000.00 in restitution to Steve Kenney, the individual to whom appellant sold the stolen tractor. Appellant challenges the restitution order. In a sole point of error, appellant claims that because Kenney knowingly purchased stolen property he was not a victim and therefore the trial court lacked power to order restitution to Kenney. Because we have no jurisdiction to review this complaint, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
        Although an immediate appeal may be taken from an order deferring adjudication, that right to appeal is limited to matters that the trial court allows, pretrial motions, and jurisdictional defects. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 44.01(j), 44.02 (Vernon Supp. 1997); Watson v. State, 924 S.W.2d 711, 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Dillehey v. State, 815 S.W.2d 623, 625-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Appellant's point of error does not raise any of these appealable matters. The trial court has not given appellant permission to file this appeal. Nor does this appeal concern a jurisdictional defect.
        Appellant, by filing his Memorandum of Law in Aid of Sentencing, apparently attempts to characterize the trial court's decision to impose restitution as a pretrial ruling. We first note that the trial court did not rule on appellant's memorandum before the plea hearing. However, even if it had, the trial court's decision to impose restitution does not qualify as an appealable pretrial ruling under article 44.01(j). In Dillehey v. State, 815 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), the court of criminal appeals quoted legislative history explaining the definition of an appealable pretrial ruling:
    A person can appeal . . . [when] there has been a legitimate pretrial issue where they've discussed, where the court has ruled on the admissibility of some evidence or some other matter that either or both parties feels may have been dispositive of the case.
Id. at 625 (quoting Senator Washington); see also Watson, 924 S.W.2d at 715 n.1 (Clinton, J., dissenting). We conclude that because the restitution ruling does not address the admissibility of evidence or some other dispositive issue, but rather was merely one condition of probation that the State and appellant bargained over and upon which they could not agree, it does not constitute an appealable pretrial motion pursuant to Dillehey.
        We DISMISS this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          DEBORAH G. HANKINSON
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 90
951565F.U05
 
 
File Date[12-13-96]
File Name[951565F]