MICHAEL TODD TAYLOR, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Affirmed and Opinion Filed December 30, 1996
 
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-95-00946-CR
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MICHAEL TODD TAYLOR, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
..............................................................
On Appeal from the 265th District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F95-73855-LR
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O P I N I O N
Before Justices Ovard, Hankinson, and Moseley
Opinion By Justice Hankinson
        The trial court convicted Michael Todd Taylor of aggravated robbery, found the allegations in one enhancement paragraph true, and assessed a sentence of confinement for forty-five years. In one point of error, appellant contends insufficient evidence supports his conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
        The grand jury indicted appellant for aggravated robbery. The indictment contained one enhancement paragraph. Without the benefit of a plea bargain agreement, appellant pleaded guilty to the offense as alleged in the indictment and true to the enhancement paragraph. At the plea hearing, the trial court admonished appellant regarding the range of possible punishment. The State then offered into evidence appellant's judicial confession and stipulation of the evidence and his plea of true to the enhancement paragraph. Both exhibits were admitted without objection. The trial court accepted appellant's guilty plea and plea of true to the enhancement paragraph and recessed the proceedings pending the preparation of a presentence investigation report.
        At the sentencing hearing, appellant testified that he had entered a plea of guilty and that he was guilty "just like as charged in the indictment." He further testified that he was a long-time drug user and requested the trial court sentence him to treatment at Cenikor. The trial court instead sentenced appellant to forty-five years confinement.
DISCUSSION
        In appellant's only point of error, he contends the evidence is insufficient to support his guilty plea under article 1.15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 1.15 requires that when, in a felony case, the defendant enters a plea and waives his right to a jury trial in open court, the State must "introduce evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15 (Vernon Supp. 1997). The evidence may be stipulated if the defendant consents in writing, in open court, to waive the appearance, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses and further consents to an oral stipulation of evidence or the introduction of documentary evidence. Id. A judicial confession, standing alone, is sufficient to sustain a conviction on a guilty plea and to satisfy the requirements of article 1.15. Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (op. on reh'g); see Pitts v. State, 916 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (judicial confession admitted into evidence, but contained in the transcript, sufficient evidence to support guilty plea).
        Appellant does not contest that his sworn judicial confession was offered and admitted at his plea hearing. Nor does he deny that he executed two documents found in the transcript entitled Waiver of Jury/Felony Plea of Guilty/Nolo Contendere/Indictment/ Information and Judicial Confession. In the first document, appellant waived his right to a jury. In the second document, appellant agreed to stipulate to the evidence in the case. Both documents contain valid judicial confessions and waive appellant's right to appearance, confrontation, and cross-examination of the witnesses.
        Appellant agrees that his signed judicial confession was admitted without objection at his plea hearing. He also agrees that, if valid, his signed judicial confession alone is sufficient to sustain his conviction. He contends, however, that the judicial confession admitted without objection at his plea hearing amounts to nothing more than a guilty plea because the record does not affirmatively show that he made his written confession and the requisite written waivers in "open court" as article 1.15 requires.
        Appellant's argument lacks merit because absent a showing to the contrary, we presume the regularity of the trial court's proceedings. Ex Parte Stacey, 709 S.W.2d 185, 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Wright v. State, 873 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1994, pet. ref'd). Appellant bears the burden to overcome this presumption. Ex parte Stacey, 709 S.W.2d at 189; Wright, 873 S.W.2d at 80. Therefore, contrary to appellant's assertion, where the record does not affirmatively reflect that procedural requirements were violated, the presumption of regularity must prevail. Wright, 873 S.W.2d at 80; Ex parte Pardun, 744 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1988, pet. ref'd) (both citing Jones v. State, 646 S.W.2d 449, 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)).
        Nothing in the record before us refutes the presumption that appellant executed his judicial confession and written waivers in open court. Both documents described above contain statements by appellant that he executed his waivers and judicial confessions in "open court." In addition, appellant executed each document on May 25, 1995..the same day the trial court accepted appellant's guilty plea. Finally, the trial court's judgment reflects that appellant waived his right to a jury trial, agreed to stipulate to the evidence, and waived his right to appearance, confrontation, and cross-examination of the witnesses in open court. All of these documents are found in the transcript.
        Appellant points us to one portion of the statement of facts that we assume he would argue affirmatively shows that he did not make his judicial confession and waivers in open court. After the trial court initially questioned and admonished appellant on the range of punishment, the following exchange occurred:
    The Court:    Now you've gone through several papers and signed several papers. I can tell looking at your handwriting you can read and write, so you were able to read through this and your lawyer explained the different legal parts?
 
    Appellant:    Yes, sir.
Nothing in this exchange affirmatively shows that appellant did not make his judicial confession and waivers in open court as recited in the signed documents. This passage only demonstrates that appellant read, and his lawyer explained, several documents to him before he signed them. Absent an affirmative showing that he did not sign these documents in open court, we must presume regularity. We therefore overrule appellant's point of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          DEBORAH G. HANKINSON
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 90
950946F.U05
 
 
File Date[12-30-96]
File Name[950946F]