LERON WESLY TOTTRESS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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AFFIRMED, and Opinion Filed December 18, 1996


S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-95-00843-CR
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LERON WESLY TOTTRESS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
..............................................................
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 4
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F94-44494-TK
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OPINION PER CURIAM
Before Justices Lagarde, Kinkeade, and Maloney
        Leron Wesly Tottress appeals his conviction for indecency with a child. Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and pleaded not guilty to the offense. The trial court found appellant guilty and assessed his punishment at two years' imprisonment and a $750 fine.
        Appellant's attorney filed a brief in support of her motion to withdraw in which she concludes that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The brief presents a professional evaluation of the record showing why, in effect, there are no arguable grounds to advance. FN:1 See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Counsel delivered a copy of the brief to appellant. We advised appellant he has a right to file a pro se brief. Appellant did not file a pro se brief.
        We have reviewed the record and counsel's brief. We agree the appeal is frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal.
        We grant appellant's attorney's motion to withdraw. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

                                                          PER CURIAM

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 90
950843F.U05

FN:1 In discussing the sufficiency of the evidence, counsel applied the wrong standard of review. Counsel used the standard for sufficiency of the evidence in guilty pleas, i.e., whether the State introduced evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15 (Vernon Supp. 1997). The correct standard of review for the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial on a not-guilty plea is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979); Butler v. State, 769 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The standard for review of the factual sufficiency of the evidence requires that we review all the evidence, but not "in the light most favorable to the prosecution," and set the verdict aside only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. See Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). After reviewing the record, however, we have determined under the Jackson and Clewis standards that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient in this case.
File Date[12-17-96]
File Name[950843F]