DANIEL FLOWERS, Appellant v. AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK, N.A., ET AL., Appellees

AFFIRM in part, REVERSE and RENDER in part, and Opinion Filed December 12, 1996
 
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-95-00761-CV
............................
DANIEL FLOWERS, Appellant
V.
AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK, N.A., ET AL., Appellees
..............................................................
On Appeal from the County Court of Law No. 3
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. cc-92-5508-c
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O P I N I O N
Before Justices Maloney, Wright, and Burnett FN:1
Opinion By Justice Maloney
        Daniel Flowers sued Jeff Reese and Jeff Reese d/b/a Reese Automotive (collectively Reese) for misrepresentation, false statements, fraud and conversion. Flowers sued American National Bank, N.A. (the Bank), Jim Keathley, FN:2 and the State of Texas for negligence. FN:3 Flowers sued Charles Bryant, a subsequent purchaser of the vehicle, seeking to void Bryant's title to the car.
        Bryant crossclaimed against Reese for indemnity and contribution. He counterclaimed against Flowers for his failure to mitigate his damages when he learned of Bryant's good faith purchase for value. Bryant sought attorneys fees from both Reese and Flowers.
        The trial court granted the Bank's motion for summary judgment against Flowers. The trial court granted judgment for Flowers against Reese and Bryant.
        Flowers and Bryant both appeal the trial court's judgment. In three points of error, Flowers contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the Bank. In three points of error, Bryant contends the trial court erred in disregarding the jury's findings of liability, damages, and attorney's fee against Flowers; granting judgment non obstante veredicto for Flowers; and awarding Flowers a double recovery (by voiding the car's title and assessing damages for its value). In one crosspoint of error, Flowers asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to abate the trial against Reese and Bryant until he could appeal the summary judgment for the Bank.
BACKGROUND
        This lawsuit arises out of a dispute between Flowers and Reese over repairs Reese made to Flowers's 1985 Mercedes. When Flowers did not pay Reese for those repairs, Reese foreclosed his mechanic's lien on the Mercedes and sold the Mercedes to Bryant. FN:4         Flowers had financed his purchase of the Mercedes through the Bank, using the Mercedes as security for the loan. The car's certificate of title showed Flowers as the Mercedes's owner and the Bank as the first lien holder. Flowers took the Mercedes to Reese's Automotive for repair in January 1992. On February 3, 1992, while the car was at Reese's Automotive, Flowers paid off the loan from the Bank. The Bank released its lien on the face of the car's original certificate of title and gave the certificate to Flowers for filing with the Department. Flowers did not file the certificate with the Department.
        By mid-March, Flowers had neither paid Reese for his repairs to the Mercedes nor attempted to reclaim his car. Reese sought to foreclose on his mechanic's lien. Reese obtained a copy of the Mercedes's title history. The title history showed the Bank as lienholder. When Reese went to the Bank, it told him it no longer held the lien. Reese then explained to the Bank that: (1) he was a mechanic who had repaired Flowers's Mercedes; (2) Flowers had not paid for those repairs; (3) he was attempting to foreclose on his mechanic's lien; (4) the Department's records indicated that the Bank still held a lien on the Mercedes; and (5) the Department required documentation that the Bank no longer held the lien. The Bank completed an Application for Certified Copy of Texas Certificate of Title for a Motor Vehicle (a Form 34) which Reese took to the Department. The Department then issued Reese a certified copy of title showing Flowers as the Mercedes owner and the Bank as lienholder. Reese took the certified copy of title to the Bank, and the Bank released its lien on the face of the certified copy of title. Using this certified copy of title, Reese sold the Mercedes to Bryant at a foreclosure sale in early April 1992. Flowers sued to set aside the sale alleging that Reese failed to give proper notice of the foreclosure sale.
        The trial court's judgment voided Bryant's title to the car and awarded Flowers $15,000 for the value of the Mercedes, $9,600 for the loss of its use, and $7,906 in attorneys fees against Reese and Bryant. The judgment also awarded Flowers $15,000 in exemplary damages against Reese and $32,506 in prejudgment interest against both Reese and Bryant. The court directed that Bryant take nothing on his counterclaim against Flowers. FN:5
FLOWERS'S APPEAL OF AMERICAN BANK'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT
        In Flower's first, second, and third points of error, he contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for American Bank. Specifically, in his second point of error, he argues the Bank had a duty not to authorize Reese to obtain a certified copy of title to the Mercedes and not to release the lien on the title when the Bank knew that Reese was attempting to enforce a mechanic's lien. In his third point of error, he argues that fact questions exist on the Bank's negligence and whether that negligence proximately caused Flowers's damage. In his first point of error, he argues that fact questions exist on the Bank's tortious interference with the Flowers-Reese contract.
1. Standard of Review
        The standard of review for summary judgment is well established. See Black v. Victoria Lloyds Ins. Co., 797 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Tex. 1990); Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). To establish its right to summary judgment, the defendant as movant must disprove at least one element of each theory pleaded by the plaintiff. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 679 (Tex. 1979); Traylor v. Cascade Ins. Co., 836 S.W.2d 292, 294 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1992, no writ).
        The summary judgment rule provides a method of summarily ending a case that involves a question of law and no material fact issues. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). It eliminates patently unmeritorious claims and untenable defenses. Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 416, 252 S.W.2d 929, 931 (1952). Summary judgment is not meant to deprive a party of its day in court. Gulbenkian, 151 Tex. at 416, 252 S.W.2d at 931; Ross v. Texas One Partnership, 796 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1990), writ denied per curiam, 806 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. 1991).
        Ambiguous evidence gives rise to genuine issues of fact. See Parker v. Yen, 823 S.W.2d 359, 365 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1991, no writ). A fact is established as a matter of law if ordinary minds cannot differ on the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence. Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Marine Contractors & Supply, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex. 1982); Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654, 657-58 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1992, no writ). Conflicting evidence gives rise to genuine issues of fact. Randall v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 752 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam).
        We consider only the grounds expressly set forth in the motion for summary judgment and the issues of fact expressly set forth in the response thereto. McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341-43 (Tex. 1993). However, the nonmovant's failure to respond cannot supply by default the summary judgment proof necessary to establish movant's entitlement to judgment. Id. at 343. If the court's summary judgment order does not specify the grounds relied upon for its ruling, we affirm if any of the theories advanced are meritorious. Hicks v. Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 789 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1990, writ denied).
 
2. Negligence
 
        In his second point of error, Flowers argues that, even though his contractual relationship with the Bank ended on payment of the loan and the Bank's return of the title, the Bank owed him the "duty of not doing anything which would harm [Flowers]." Specifically, Flowers contends that the Bank had a duty to safeguard his automobile's title documents and not deliver them to anyone but him. He further maintains he was harmed when the Bank released its lien and delivered a certified copy of the Mercedes's title to Reese. He also argues that the Bank had no authority to sign the Form 34 because it no longer held a lien on the Mercedes.
        In his third point of error, Flowers argues that fact questions exist on whether the Bank's negligence was the proximate cause of his damages.
a. Applicable Law
        To establish negligence, a plaintiff must show: (1) a duty to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) damages proximately caused by the breach. Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990). Whether a legal duty exists is a question of law for the court. Fort Bend County Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. 1991).
        "[A]ccompanying every contract is a common law duty to perform with care, skill, reasonable expedience[,] and faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, and a negligent failure to observe any of these conditions is a tort as well as a breach of contract." Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. 1988) (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck, 146 Tex. 153, 157, 204 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex. 1947)). A duty of good faith and fair dealing does not arise in every contract or business transaction. English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983); Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 779 S.W.2d 893, 902 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989), aff'd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds, 811 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1991). A duty of good faith arises only in special relationships marked by shared trust or an imbalance of power. Federal Dep. Ins. Corp. v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d 706, 708-09 (Tex. 1990). A debtor-creditor relationship does not impose a duty of good faith and fair dealing on the lender. Id. at 709; Baskin v. Mortgage & Trust, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied). Neither does it create a fiduciary relationship. See Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 252-53 (Tex. 1962); Winston v. Lake Jackson Bank, 574 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Tex. Civ. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ).
b. Application of Law to Facts
        The trial court did not specify the grounds on which it granted summary judgment. The Bank's motion for summary judgment alleged that: (1) under Article 6687-1, Section 33(a) of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, only an owner designated in a certificate of title can transfer ownership of an automobile; (2) the Bank owed no duty to Flowers because a normal creditor-debtor relationship does not impose special duties; (3) if any duty did exist, the Bank did not breach that duty; and (4) any damage Flowers incurred was not proximately caused by the Bank. Flowers did not respond to American Bank's motion for summary judgment.
        The Bank's summary judgment evidence showed that on February 3, 1992, Flowers had paid all outstanding loans secured by the Mercedes, and the Bank had released its lien on the face of the original title and returned the title to Flowers. On March 20, 1992, at Reese's request, the Bank signed the Form 34 and, later that same day, it released its lien on the face of a certified copy of certificate of title provided by Reese. The Bank included copies of the March 20, 1992 application and certified copy of title and an affidavit of Glen R. Kinnibrugh, supervisor of the Dallas regional office of the Department. Kinnibrugh stated that the Department allowed title to the Mercedes to be transferred out of Flowers's name "based upon Reese allegedly meeting the standards and procedures established by the Department and by Texas law." Kinnibrugh further stated "[b]ased on the records of the Department, American Bank had no involvement in this process except to document that it had no lien [on] the automobile."
        The summary judgment evidence establishes that the Bank and Flowers previously had a debtor-creditor relationship. A debtor-creditor relationship imposes no duties on the lender under a negligence cause of action. Thus, the Bank owed no duty to Flowers as a matter of law. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for the Bank on Flowers's negligence claim. We overrule Flowers's second point of error.
        Because the Bank owed no duty to Flowers, we need not consider Flowers's third point of error. See Tex. R. App. P. 90(a).
3. Tortious Interference with Contract
        In Flowers's first point of error, he contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because a question of fact exists on whether the Bank interfered with the Flowers-Reese contract when it signed the Form 34. The Bank responds that Flowers did not plead a tortious interference with a contract cause of action.
        A plaintiff's petition must provide fair and adequate notice of the facts which are the basis for his claim sufficient to enable the opposing party to prepare a defense. Ross, 796 S.W.2d at 212. The only live pleading was Flowers' fifth amended original petition. This pleading alleged that the Bank was liable to Flowers because:
    A.    [The] "Bank's" conduct permitted "Reese" to obtain the title.
 
    B.    By having the title in his possession on March 20, 1992, "Reese" was able to claim ownership of the Mercedes without following the requirements of the Property Code.
 
    C.    [Flowers] located the Mercedes at "Reese's" office on April 12, 1992, but could not repossess his car because an employee of "Reese" had the title in his possession.
 
        D.    "Reese" did not complete and file the questionnaire for the Department of Transportation until August 16, 1992.
 
        E.    "Reese" failed to notify [Flowers] of a public sale.
 
        F.    The receipt certified copy of title is dated April 22, 1992. [Flowers] signed the lien card received on April 23, 1992.
 
        G.    The questionnaire shows sale on April 1, 1992.
 
        H.    Form 34 shows that the applicant, "Bank," wants the Department of Transportation to deliver the title to "Reese."
We conclude Flowers's live pleading alleges only a negligence cause of action against the Bank. Because Flowers's live pleading at the time of summary judgment did not allege that the Bank tortiously interfered with the contract between Flowers and Reese, the trial court could not have erred in granting the Bank's summary judgment motion on a tortious interference claim. We overrule Flowers's first point of error.
 
BRYANT'S APPEAL OF THE JUDGMENT NON OBSTANTE VEREDICTO (JNOV)
        In his first point of error, Bryant argues the trial court erred in disregarding the jury's findings against Flowers's on whether Bryant was a good-faith purchaser (jury issue number six); damages (jury issue number seven); and attorney's fees (jury issue number nine), and entering a JNOV for Flowers and against Bryant. In his second point of error, Bryant argues that if the Court sustains his first point of error, then he is entitled to attorney's fees as the prevailing party. He also contends the uncontroverted evidence supports the jury's award of attorney's fees. Alternatively, Bryant contends in his third point of error that if we overrule his first point of error, the trial court erred as a matter of law in awarding Flowers double recovery. Bryant argues that the trial court, by voiding Bryant's title to the Mercedes and awarding Flowers damages for the Mercedes's value and loss of the car's use for a two year period, allowed Flowers a double recovery.
1. Standard of Review
        When we review a JNOV, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was rendered and indulge every reasonable inference in that party's favor. Dallas Market Ctr. v. The Swing, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 838, 843 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1989, no writ). A trial court properly enters a JNOV when (1) the evidence is conclusive and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or (2) a legal principle precludes recovery. See Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 227-28 (Tex. 1990) (evidence conclusive); John Masek Corp. v. Davis, 848 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (evidence conclusive, and principle of law). We uphold a JNOV when the evidence is legally insufficient to establish an asserted proposition of fact. Dallas Market Ctr., 775 S.W.2d at 843.
        A trial court may disregard an immaterial jury finding and enter judgment on the remaining findings. Dewberry v. McBride, 634 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1982, no writ). A jury finding is immaterial when the trial court should not have submitted the question to the jury and the jury's finding does not apply to the case. Brown v. Armstrong, 713 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A trial court may disregard a jury finding when other jury findings render it immaterial. Watson v. Nortex Wholesale Nursery, Inc, 830 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1992, writ denied).
2. Applicable Law
 
        The bona fide purchaser is shielded from the rights or equities of third parties. Thompson v. Apollo Paint & Body Shop, 768 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied). A bona fide purchaser is one who buys property in good faith for valuable consideration and without actual or imputed knowledge of outstanding claims in a third party or parties. Houston First Am. Sav. v. Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764, 769 (Tex. 1983); Houston Oil Co. of Tex. v. Hayden, 104 Tex. 175, 135 S.W. 1149, 1152 (1911); Thompson, 768 S.W.2d at 377.
3. Application of Law to Facts
        Flowers' fifth amended petition alleged that Bryant knew or should have known that Flowers was the legal owner of the Mercedes because: (1) Bryant purchased the car at a price far below its market value; and (2) Flowers told Bryant that Flowers owned the car. Flowers further alleged that Bryant could have determined that Reese had not properly claimed or proved ownership "by complying with Article 70.001, Texas Property Code." Bryant denied these allegations, asserting that he was an innocent purchaser for value without notice of Flowers's claim.
a. Jury Question Number Six
        The trial court instructed the jury that a person with voidable title can transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for value. The trial court also defined a buyer in the ordinary course of business as "a person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods, buys in the ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind." Jury question number six asked whether Bryant knew, or should have known, when he purchased the car from Reese, that Reese did not have title to the car. The jury answered, "No."
        Bryant's pleadings and the evidence put the issue addressed by jury question number six before the jury. Consequently, the jury's finding was not immaterial. Nor did any other jury findings render this issue immaterial. We conclude the trial court should have submitted the question to the jury. Therefore, the trial court could only have disregarded the issue if the evidence conclusively showed that Flowers was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, a legal principle precluded Bryant's recovery, or the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that Bryant was a bona fide purchaser.
        The evidence is undisputed that Flowers took the Mercedes to Reese's garage for repair to the damage caused by overheating. Flowers did not pay Reese for the repair. Flowers first notified Bryant of Flowers's claim to ownership of the Mercedes on April 14, 1992.
        Bryant testified that, on March 26 or 27, 1992, he went to Reese's garage. Reese showed him several cars that might be subject to a mechanic's lien foreclosure sale. Bryant told Reese he was interested in the Mercedes. Reese said that he could not sell the Mercedes for several days because he had to wait for "a number of days to make sure" the owner did not pick up his car. Bryant gave Reese a sealed bid of $4,500. Reese called Bryant on April 1 or 2, 1992 and told him that his was the high bid on the Mercedes. Bryant bought the Mercedes. Reese gave Bryant a bill of sale showing that Reese purchased the Mercedes at a mechanic's lien foreclosure sale. Bryant saw the certified copy of the Mercedes's original certificate of title that showed Flowers as original owner and the Bank's release of its lien. Reese represented the certified copy as the undisputed title to the car and told Bryant that he would handle the paperwork necessary to transfer title.
        Bryant managed an automobile parts business. He had sold automobile parts to Reese for about five years. He had concerns about the Mercedes's condition because it had overheated. While he did not know the retail value of the car, he believed its salvage value was about $4,500. Once "somebody's gotten one hot, ya just don't know how much damage was done to the rings or internal parts ya just don't know." He based his bid of $4,500 on his belief that he could sell the car for parts and not lose money if the car turned out to be "a piece of junk."
        Viewing the above evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's findings for Bryant and indulging every reasonable inference in his favor, we conclude the jury could have found that Bryant bought the Mercedes in good faith for valuable consideration and without any knowledge of Flowers's claims. As a bona fide purchaser, Bryant was shielded from the rights or equities of Flowers. The trial court erred in disregarding the jury's answer to question number six.
b. Jury Question Number Seven and Nine
        The trial court instructed the jury that Flowers could not recover for any damages that Flowers could have avoided by the exercise of reasonable diligence. It also instructed the jury that an injured party cannot recover damages that could have been avoided or that were incurred as a result of a failure to mitigate. Jury question number seven asked what sum of money would fairly and reasonably compensate Flowers for his damages, if any. The jury found that Flowers was entitled to "$0" damages.
        Jury question number nine asked what amount of money, if any, Flowers was entitled to recover for attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in this matter. The jury answered "$0".
        The jury found that Bryant was not liable to Flowers and Flowers was entitled to zero damages and attorney's fees. We have determined that the trial court erred in setting aside the jury's answer to jury question number six--Bryant as a bona-fide purchaser for value. Thus, Bryant could not possibly be liable for Flowers's damages or attorney's fees.
c. Jury Question Number Ten
        Jury question number ten asked what amount of money, if any, Bryant was entitled to recover for attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in this matter. The jury answered "$4,500."
        Texas Property Code Section 70.008 provides that the prevailing party in a lawsuit concerning possession of a motor vehicle may recover attorney's fees expended. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 70.008 (Vernon 1995); see Thompson, 768 S.W.2d at 375, 377. Because we have determined that the trial court erred in setting aside jury question number six, Bryant is the prevailing party in this lawsuit over possession of the Mercedes. We conclude that Bryant, as the prevailing party, is entitled to the $4,500 attorney's fees awarded to him by the jury. The trial court erred when it disregarded jury finding number ten awarding Bryant $4,500 attorney's fees from Flowers. We sustain Bryant's first and second points of error.
        Having sustained Bryant's first point of error, we need not address his alternative point of error.
 
ABATEMENT
        In a single crosspoint of error, Flowers alleges the trial court erred in denying his motion to abate the trial against Reese and Bryant until appellate resolution of the validity of the Bank's summary judgment. Flowers contends that, because he alleged that the Bank, Reese, and Bryant each had caused Flowers's damages in part, it was necessary for the jury to assess the amount of damages caused by each defendant as required by sections 31.01 and 33.013 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
 
1. Applicable Law
        Appellant's argument on appeal "shall include . . . such discussion of the facts and the authorities relied upon as may be requisite to maintain the point at issue." Tex. R. App. P. 74(f). Failure to cite authority preserves nothing for review. Smith v. State, 683 S.W.2d 393, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Failure to set out the legal theory on which appellant rests his contentions presents nothing for review. Pierce v. State, 777 S.W.2d 399, 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 912 (1990); Dawson-Austin v. Austin, 920 S.W.2d 776, 782 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1996, writ requested) (op. on reh'g).
2. Application of Law to Facts
        In his brief, Flowers states that he cannot find guidelines regarding when a court should sever an interlocutory summary judgment so that judgment can become final or there can be an appeal. Because Flowers failed to cite authority for his contention that the trial court erred by failing to abate the trial against Reese and Bryant until he could appeal the Bank's summary judgment, he has presented nothing for us to review. We overrule Flowers's crosspoint of error.
        We affirm the trial court's summary judgment for the Bank. We reverse the trial court's judgment awarding damages against Bryant and voiding Bryant's title to the Mercedes. We render judgment that Flowers take nothing from Bryant and that Bryant recover $4,500 attorney's fees from Flowers.
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
                                                  FRANCES MALONEY
                                                  JUSTICE
 
 
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 90
950761F.U05
 
 
FN:1 The Honorable Joe B. Burnett, Justice, Court of Appeals, Fifth District of Texas at Dallas, Retired, sitting by assignment.
FN:2 Flowers sued Keathley as director of the Programs Title Operations office of the Texas Department of Transportation (the Department).
FN:3 Before trial, Flowers nonsuited Keathley and the State of Texas.
FN:4 Chapter 70 of the Texas Property Code establishes statutory possessory liens for repair and storage of motor vehicles. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 70.001 et seq. (Vernon 1995 & Supp. 1997). Section 70.001 provides that a worker, who, by labor, repairs a vehicle may retain possession of the vehicle until he is paid for his work. Section 70.003 provides that a garageman with whom the vehicle is left for care has a lien on the vehicle for the amount of the charges for the care. Section 70.006 provides procedures by which the holder of a lien under chapter 70 may foreclose on his lien. See First State Bank of Odessa v. Arsiaga, 804 S.W.2d 343, 344 (Tex. App.--Eastland 1991, writ denied), for a discussion of these provisions.
FN:5 Although the judgment did not dispose of Bryant's crossclaim for indemnity and contribution against Reese, Bryant does not complain of the judgment's failure to address his crossclaim. We presume finality if a trial court renders judgment following a trial on the merits, absent an order for separate trial or a reservation of claims for later disposition. See North E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 897-98 (Tex. 1966).
File Date[12-12-96]
File Name[950761F]