MARY NEALON COTTON, Appellant v. JOHN T. NEALON, JR., Appellee

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AFFIRM and Opinion Filed January 24, 1996
 
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-95-00001-CV
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MARY NEALON COTTON, Appellant
V.
JOHN T. NEALON, JR., Appellee
..............................................................
On Appeal from the 255th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 91-15160-S
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O P I N I O N
Before Justices Chapman, Devany, and Wright
Opinion By Justice Wright
        Mary Nealon Cotton (Cotten) appeal's the trial court's modification of her child support obligations. In two points of error she asserts (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's modification because there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings regarding her earning potential and (2) the trial court erred in denying her motion to disqualify opposing counsel. We overrule Cotten's points of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
        Cotten and Robert T. Nealon, Jr. (Nealon), were divorced in 1992. Nealon and Cotten had four children. The agreed decree of divorce provided that Nealon and Cotten were to provide support for the children during their periods of possession. The children resided primarily with Nealon. Nealon sought modification of Cotten's child support obligations in August of 1993.
        The case was first tried before a master. The master found that Cotten had $1996 in resources available to her per month. The master recommended that Cotten pay $830 in child support per month. Cotten appealed the master's findings to the trial court.
        The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Nealon's request for modification on September 12, 1994. In addition to testimony, documentary evidence was submitted during the hearing. The trial court disclosed its findings and the terms of its judgment on September 15, 1994. The trial court entered the order modifying Cotten's child support obligations on September 27, 1994. The trial court found that the children's circumstances had materially changed and that Cotten was intentionally underemployed. The trial court concluded that Cotten had earning potential of at least $2083.33 per month and that she should pay child support in the amount of $735 per month.
        On September 21, 1994, Cotten filed an "Emergency Motion for Disqualification of Counsel for Petitioner." Cotten predicated her motion to disqualify on the assertion that the attorney who represented her in the original divorce proceeding joined the firm representing Nealon in the modification proceeding in early 1994. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Cotten's motion to disqualify on December 8, 1994. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court indicated that it was taking the matter under advisement. There is nothing in the record indicating that the trial court ever ruled on the motion to disqualify.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
        In her first point of error, Cotten asserts the evidence was insufficient to support he trial court's finding with respect to her earning capacity. Cotten argues that because there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding with respect to her earning capacity, the order modifying her child support obligations is erroneous.
 
A. Applicable Law
        An appellant who wishes to assert no evidence or insufficient evidence points must bring a complete statement of facts before the appellant court. Rowlett v. Colortek, Inc., 741 S.W.2d 206, 207-08 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, writ denied). In the absence of a complete or agreed statement of facts, including all trial exhibits, an appellant cannot discharge his burden when challenging jury findings under no evidence or insufficient evidence points. See Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex. 1968) (per curiam); Rowlett, 741 S.W.2d at 208. In the absence of a complete or agreed statement of facts, an appellate court will presume that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings. See Schafer v. Conner, 813 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex. 1991); Englander Co., 806 S.W.2d at 806; Bayoud v. Bayoud, 797 S.W.2d 304, 313 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1990, writ denied). It is the appealing party's duty to be sure that everything necessary for the appeal is filed with the appellate court. Tex. R. App. P. 50(d); Bayoud, 797 S.W.2d at 313.
 
B. Application of Law to Facts
        Cotten has not brought forward the documentary exhibits admitted into evidence at trial. Therefore, we must presume the evidence supported the trial court's findings. We overrule Cotten's first point of error.
DISQUALIFICATION OF NEALON'S ATTORNEY
        In her second point of error, Cotten asserts the trial court erred in denying her motion to disqualify Nealon's attorney. In order to preserve an appellate complaint, the complaining party must "obtain a ruling upon the party's request, objection or motion." Tex. R. App. P. 52(a); see Cadle Co. v. Estate of Weaver, 897 S.W.2d 814, 816-17 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1994, writ denied), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2002 (1995). There is nothing in the record showing that the trial court ruled on Cotten's motion to disqualify. Nothing is presented for review. We overrule Cotten's second point of error.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          CAROLYN WRIGHT
                                                          JUSTICE
 
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 90
 
 
 
File Date[01-23-96]
File Name[950001F]

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