MARCELLOS ANTWON KEATON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Affirmed and Opinion Filed October 31, 1996
 
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-94-01761-CR
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MARCELLOS ANTWON KEATON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F93-69369-VI
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O P I N I O N
Before Justices Chapman, Whittington, and Wright
Opinion By Justice Whittington
        Marcellos Antwon Keaton appeals his conviction for burglary of a habitation. After finding appellant guilty, the trial judge sentenced him to thirty-five years' confinement and a $2000 fine. In two points of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
        On November 10, 1993, at approximately 11:10 a.m., William Sellers was standing in his kitchen when he saw two men approach and enter the home of his neighbor, Randy Murphy. According to Sellers, he noticed the men because they were "crouched low" and "moving rapidly." Moments later, Sellers saw the men leave Murphy's home carrying boxes. Suspicious of the men's activities, Sellers called the police.
        When the police arrived, they found appellant in some bushes and placed him under arrest. At the police station, appellant made a written statement indicating that he had helped a friend carry various items out of a house on the 8000 block of Sugarberry Lane. Sellers identified appellant, both on the day of the offense and at trial, as one of the men he saw enter Murphy's house.
        Randy Murphy testified that he lived on Sugarberry Lane and that he received a call on November 10, 1993 notifying him that his home had been burglarized. Murphy immediately returned to his home and discovered that certain electronic equipment was missing and that his front door had been kicked in. Murphy testified that he did not know appellant prior to November 10, 1993, and that he did not give appellant or anyone else permission to enter his home that day.
        Appellant testified on his own behalf. He admitted to being in the neighborhood on the date in question, but explained that a friend had dropped him off at a hamburger place so he could place an order. He told the woman at the restaurant to call him when the order was ready, and he left. On the way to his girlfriend's house, he stopped in some bushes to "use the restroom," and the police arrested him. Appellant testified he had not broken into Murphy's home, had not assisted anyone in removing any items from the home, and had made the statement to police only because they threatened to charge him with "ten more counts of burglary" if he did not.
        The trial judge, after hearing the evidence and arguments of counsel, convicted appellant of burglary of a habitation. After hearing evidence on punishment, the trial judge sentenced appellant to thirty-five years' confinement and a $2000 fine. This appeal followed.
LEGAL SUFFICIENCY
        In his first point of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction because there is no evidence that he entered Murphy's residence. We disagree.
        When reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1871 (1994). This standard leaves to the factfinder the responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic to ultimate facts. See Dumas v. State, 812 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). The factfinder is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979); Bonham v. State, 680 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985); Dumas, 812 S.W.2d at 615. Thus, the factfinder is free to accept or reject any or all of the evidence presented by either side. See Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
        A person commits the offense of burglary of a habitation if, with the intent to commit a felony or theft, he enters a habitation without the effective consent of the owner. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a) (Vernon 1994). Here, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction because there is no evidence that he entered Murphy's home. We disagree. William Sellers testified he saw two men enter Murphy's home. Sellers identified appellant as one of the men he saw enter the house. Based on this evidence, we conclude the trial judge, as factfinder, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant entered Murphy's home. We reject appellant's suggestion that the State was required to present fingerprint or palm print evidence before the evidence could be considered legally sufficient. We overrule appellant's first point of error.
FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY
        In his second point of error, appellant contends the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction. Appellant contends under this point that his conviction must be reversed because the "overwhelming weight of the evidence" shows that appellant did not enter Murphy's home. Again, we disagree.
        In conducting a factual sufficiency review, we examine the factfinder's weighing of the evidence. See Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). In so doing, we view all the evidence without the prism of "in the light most favorable to the prosecution." See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 134. Nevertheless, we must appropriately defer to the factfinder's findings so as to avoid substituting our judgment for that of the factfinder. See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 133, 135. The purpose of our review is only to prevent a manifestly unjust result, and we are not free to set aside a factfinder's determination merely because we feel a different result is more reasonable. See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 135. We will reverse a case for factual insufficiency only if the factfinder's determination "is against the great weight of the evidence presented at trial so as to be clearly wrong and unjust." See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 135 (emphasis in original).
        We have reviewed the record in this case and, after doing so, we conclude the trial court's determination, as factfinder, was not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. The evidence is therefore factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction. We overrule appellant's second point of error.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MARK WHITTINGTON
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 90
941761F.U05
 
 
File Date[10-31-96]
File Name[941761F]