MICHAEL TYRONE CRUTCHFIELD, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Affirmed and Opinion Filed February 28, 1996
 
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-94-01654-CR
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MICHAEL TYRONE CRUTCHFIELD, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F94-57308-PJ
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O P I N I O N
Before Justices Kinkeade, James, and Wright
Opinion By Justice Kinkeade
        Michael Tyrone Crutchfield appeals his conviction for unlawful possession with intent to deliver cocaine. The trial court assessed punishment, enhanced by one prior conviction, at thirty years' confinement and a $2500 fine to be paid. In one point of error, Crutchfield contends the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction because it did not affirmatively link him to the cocaine. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
FACTS
        Dallas police officer Terrance King testified that he was part of a team that had been conducting surveillance on apartments 207, 208, and 211 at 3425 South Vernon due to reports of drug trafficking from those apartments. On July 20, 1994, King and an individual named Ricky Brooks went to apartment 211. Brooks knocked on the door, and Crutchfield admitted Brooks and King into the apartment. Brooks took cocaine from a garbage bag in the kitchen and sold King one-quarter ounce of crack cocaine for $250. Crutchfield remained in the apartment, but did not participate in the drug transaction. Later that day, King obtained a combination search and arrest warrant for apartment 211 and various individuals, including Brooks. Crutchfield was not named in the warrant.
        At about 10:00 p.m. on July 21, 1994, King and other officers executed the search warrant on apartment 211. At the time they executed the warrant, a woman, Brooks, and Crutchfield were in the living room of the apartment. Officer King found pure cocaine hidden in a garbage bag in the kitchen. Bags of cocaine were found in the living room, both on the couch and under the couch. King testified that eighty-five bags of cocaine were seized from various places throughout the apartment.
        King testified that the apartment belonged to Crutchfield. King determined this based upon the fact that: (1) there were pictures of Crutchfield with other people in the apartment; (2) Crutchfield's mail was found in the apartment; and (3) Crutchfield had the keys to the apartment.
        The laboratory report from Southwestern Institute of Forensic Sciences was admitted into evidence. It showed that the substance seized in the apartment was cocaine. The total weight of the material in the bags was 9.5 grams.
        Crutchfield testified that he moved out of the apartment in June 1994. He testified that Brooks was living in the apartment, but that he, Crutchfield, had left some of his belongings behind when he moved, including mail and pictures. He further testified that he was not at the apartment on July 20, 1994 when the drug transaction took place between Brooks and King. Crutchfield testified that he and his girlfriend were visiting Brooks, and were in the living room when the officers arrived. Crutchfield said he did not exercise care, custody, or control over the cocaine.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
        The standard of review for the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 870 (1991). The same standard is used in reviewing the sufficiency of direct and circumstantial evidence. See Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony and is free to accept or reject the testimony of any witness. Flanagan v. State, 675 S.W.2d 734, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh'g). The fact finder may draw reasonable inferences and make reasonable deductions from the evidence. Benavides v. State, 763 S.W.2d 587, 588-89 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988, pet. ref'd).
        A person commits an offense if he knowingly or intentionally possesses cocaine with intent to deliver. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.102(3)(D) (Vernon 1992); Act of May 18, 1989, 71st Leg. R.S., ch. 678, § 1, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 2230, 2935, amended by Act of May 29, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 2.02, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3705, 3705 (current version at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.112 (Vernon Supp. 1996)). To prove possession of a controlled substance, the State must show the accused: (1) exercised care, control, and management over the substance; and (2) knew the matter possessed was a controlled substance. Humason v. State, 728 S.W.2d 363, 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The evidence must establish affirmative links, beyond mere presence, between the accused and the controlled substance. Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
        Facts and circumstances which may link the accused to the contraband include: (1) the contraband was in open or plain view of the accused, Pollan v. State, 612 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981); (2) the contraband was in close proximity and readily accessible to the accused, Earvin v. State, 632 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1982, pet. ref'd); (3) the quantity of contraband found is enough to indicate the accused knew of its presence, id.; and (4) the presence of the accused in a trap or crack house, see Gabriel v. State, 842 S.W.2d 328, 332 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1992), (op on reh'g), aff'd on other grounds, 900 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The State need not establish a precise set of facts to prove possession. See Humason, 728 S.W.2d at 366-67.
         Proof of knowledge may be inferred from all of the circumstances. Castellano v. State, 810 S.W.2d 800, 807 (Tex. App.--Austin 1991, no pet.). Intent to deliver may be proved by circumstantial evidence, such as the quantity of drugs possessed, the manner of packaging, and whether there is evidence of drug transactions. Gabriel, 842 S.W.2d at 331-32; Smith v. State, 737 S.W.2d 933, 941 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, pet. ref'd).
        There was evidence that Crutchfield lived in the apartment and packages of cocaine were found throughout the apartment. See Herrera v. State, 561 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Crutchfield was in the apartment during a drug transaction on at least one occasion. Crutchfield was in the living room at the time the warrant was executed, and cocaine was found in the living room, both on the couch and under the couch. Finally, a large number of bags of cocaine was seized, and King testified that based on his experience, the cocaine was packaged for sale rather than personal use and had a street value of about $2000.
        The trial judge was the sole judge of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, and was free to accept or reject any testimony. See Flanagan, 675 S.W.2d at 746. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have found Crutchfield guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. We overrule Crutchfield's sole point of error.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
                                                          
                                                          ED KINKEADE
                                                          JUSTICE
 
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 90
941654F.U05
 
 
File Date[02-28-96]
File Name[941654F]