Dalton Loyd Williams v. Rissie Owens, Chairman, Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles--Appeal from 39th District Court of Stonewall County

Opinion filed August 9, 2007

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals

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   No. 11-06-00184-CV

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   DALTON LOYD WILLIAMS, Appellant

V.

RISSIE OWENS, CHAIRMAN, TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, Appellee

On Appeal from the 39th District Court

Stonewall County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 4413

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Dalton Loyd Williams filed in the trial court a pro se petition for writ of mandamus against Rissie Owens, the Chair of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles. Appellant=s claims related to the revocation of his parole. In his petition, appellant claimed that his parole revocation hearing violated the provisions of the Texas Open Meetings Act. See Tex. Gov=t Code Ann. '' 551.001-.146 (Vernon 2004). Appellant sought mandamus relief under Section 551.142 of the Open Meetings Act. For relief, appellant requested that the trial court nullify his parole revocation, reinstate his parole, and immediately release him from the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Appellee moved the trial court to dismiss appellant=s claims as frivolous and malicious. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.003(a)(2), (b) (Vernon 2002). The trial court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this cause. Based on this finding, the trial court concluded that appellant=s claims had no arguable basis in law or in fact and that, therefore, appellant=s claims were frivolous and malicious. The trial court entered an order dismissing appellant=s claims. We affirm.

Appellant presents two issues for review. In his first issue, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his suit. In his second issue, he addresses the merits of his contention that his parole revocation hearing violated the provisions of the Open Meetings Act.

Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code applies to in forma pauperis suits by inmates. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ch.14 (Vernon 2002). Under Chapter 14, the trial court has broad discretion to dismiss a lawsuit as frivolous and malicious. Section 14.003(a)(2); Moore v. Zeller, 153 S.W.3d 262, 263 (Tex. App.CBeaumont 2004, pet. denied); Retzlaff v. Tex. Dep=t of Criminal Justice, 94 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). In determining whether a claim is frivolous or malicious, a trial court may consider whether (1) the claim=s realistic chance of ultimate success is slight, (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or in fact, (3) it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of the claim, or (4) the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts. Section 14.003(b)(1)-(4). We review a trial court=s dismissal of a suit pursuant to Chapter 14 under an abuse of discretion standard. Moore, 153 S.W.3d at 263.

Appellant=s claims in his petition for writ of mandamus in this cause arose from alleged irregularities and illegalities in his parole revocation proceedings. Appellant stated the following in his petition:

In Case No. 1488, 39th Judicial District Court, Stonewall County, Texas, DALTON LOYD WILLIAMS VS. STATE OF TEXAS, petitioner did present a habeas corpus action claiming that his 1986 parole was revoked in violation of due process of law and he was denied a public parole revocation hearing. However, the District Court declined to address the claims due to a prior abuse of writ ruling in WR-5,413-35, Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, thus, the said issue has not been heard and ruled upon by any court and judicially resolved in accordance to law.

Thus, appellant acknowledged that he had previously attempted to file a habeas corpus proceeding based on the same allegations.

Appellant=s claims in this cause relate to the revocation of his 1986 parole. Appellant=s 1986 parole related to a life sentence that he received in connection with an offense he committed in 1974. Appellant committed the offense and other offenses in Texas after escaping from prison in Colorado. See Williams v. Price, No. 92-1291, 1993 WL 261931, *1 (10th Cir. June 29, 1993). In 1986, appellant was released on parole from the Texas Department of Criminal Justice B Institutional Division. At that time, pursuant to a detainer, appellant was returned to Colorado to resume serving his Colorado sentences. See Williams, 1993 WL 261931, at *1. Appellant was incarcerated in Colorado until April 2003, when he returned to Texas and started supervised parole. On February 18, 2004, appellant was convicted of felony possession of cocaine. The Board of Pardons and Paroles sought to revoke appellant=s parole, and on April 1, 2004, a hearing officer for the Board of Pardons and Paroles conducted a revocation hearing. The hearing officer recommended that appellant=s parole be revoked. On April 14, 2004, the Board of Pardons and Paroles revoked appellant=s parole.

In his petition for writ of mandamus in this cause, appellant alleged that the April 1, 2004 parole revocation hearing violated the Open Meetings Act. Appellant requested the trial court to reinstate his parole. A petition for writ of mandamus is not the proper vehicle for challenging irregularities in the proceedings leading to a parole revocation. Rather, a person alleging irregularities occurring during the proceedings leading to a parole revocation should raise those issues by way of a post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus under Article 11.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07 (Vernon 2005); Bd. of Pardons & Paroles v. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Dist., 910 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The Court of Criminal Appeals retains the exclusive authority to grant relief in such a proceeding. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 910 S.W.2d at 484. Because a writ of habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for setting aside a parole revocation, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to grant appellant the relief requested in his petition for writ of mandamus in this cause.

The trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over appellant=s claims. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that appellant=s claims had no arguable basis in law or in fact and in dismissing appellant=s claims as frivolous and malicious. We overrule appellant=s first issue. Based on our disposition of appellant=s first issue, we need not address his second issue.

We affirm the trial court=s order of dismissal.

PER CURIAM

August 9, 2007

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Strange, J.