Dennis Floyd Marroquin v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 132nd District Court of Scurry County

Opinion filed May 24, 2007

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals

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   No. 11-06-00288-CR

__________

  DENNIS FLOYD MARROQUIN, Appellant

V.

STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 132nd District Court

Scurry County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 8958

O P I N I O N

The jury convicted Dennis Floyd Marroquin of the offense of failure to register as a sex offender and assessed his punishment at confinement for six and one-half years. We affirm.

Appellant=s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw. The motion is supported by a brief in which counsel professionally and conscientiously examines the record and applicable law and states that he has concluded that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel has briefed one potential point of error.

In the sole potential point, counsel questions the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Specifically, counsel raises the variance between the allegations in the indictment and the proof at trial. The indictment alleged that appellant as a convicted sex offender failed to notify Stephen W. Warren on or about December 25, 2004, of his new address. At trial, Lisa Tate testified that she was the sex offender registration coordinator for Scurry County, that Warren had been the coordinator before her, and that Warren had appointed her the coordinator in 1999. Tate also testified that appellant signed a pre-release notification form for sex offenders in her presence in 2003 and that he failed to notify her in December 2004 of his new address. As counsel notes, this variance is not a fatal variance, was not material, and did not prejudice appellant=s substantial rights. Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The evidence is both legally and factually sufficient. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (overruling in part Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 10-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407-08 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The potential point is overruled.

Counsel has provided appellant with a copy of the brief and advised appellant of his right to review the record and file a response to counsel=s brief. A response has not been filed. Counsel has provided appellant with a copy of the brief and advised appellant of his right to review the record and file a response to counsel=s brief. A response has not been filed. Court-appointed counsel has complied with the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); Eaden v. State, 161 S.W.3d 173 (Tex. App.CEastland 2005, no pet.).

Following the procedures outlined in Anders, we have independently reviewed the record, and we agree that the appeal is without merit. We note that counsel has the responsibility to advise appellant that he may file a petition for discretionary review by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Likewise, this court advises appellant that he may file a petition for discretionary review pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 66. Black v. State, No. 11-06-00273-CR, 2007 WL 431005 (Tex. App.CEastland Feb. 8, 2007, no pet.).

The motion to withdraw is granted, and the judgment is affirmed.

PER CURIAM

May 24, 2007

Do not publish. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Strange, J.