Sarah Elizabeth Hauser v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 296th District Court of Collin County

11th Court of Appeals

Eastland, Texas

Opinion

Sarah Elizabeth Hauser

Appellant

Vs. No. 11-03-00115-CR B Appeal from Collin County

State of Texas

Appellee

This is an appeal from an order placing Sarah Elizabeth Hauser on community supervision without adjudicating her guilt. Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the offense of possession of more than 4 grams but less than 400 grams of 3,4-methylenedioxy methamphetamine (ecstasy). Pursuant to the plea bargain agreement, the trial court deferred the adjudication of guilt and placed appellant on community supervision for 3 years and assessed a $750 fine. We affirm.

In her sole issue, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to suppress the drugs recovered from her vehicle. Appellant contends that there was no state law to support her initial detention by the police officers and that the State failed to produce any evidence that probable cause existed.

In reviewing a trial court=s ruling on a motion to suppress, appellate courts must give great deference to the trial court=s findings of historical facts as long as the record supports the findings. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Cr.App.1997). We must afford the same amount of deference to the trial court=s rulings on mixed questions of law and fact, such as the issue of probable cause, if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman v. State, supra at 89. Appellate courts, however, review de novo mixed questions of law and fact not falling within the previous category. Guzman v. State, supra. When faced with a mixed question of law and fact, the critical question under Guzman is whether the ruling turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Loserth v. State, 963 S.W.2d 770, 773 (Tex.Cr.App.1998). A question turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor when the testimony of one or more witnesses, if believed, is always enough to add up to what is needed to decide the substantive issue. Loserth v. State, supra. We must view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court=s ruling and sustain the trial court=s ruling if it is reasonably correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Guzman v. State, supra.

Dallas Police Officer Russell Sanchez testified that he and his partner were dispatched on a possible burglary call to Jayson Wesley Valcik=s apartment. Valcik described the items that had been stolen from his apartment. While Officer Sanchez was present, Valcik received a phone call from appellant. Appellant was identified as a possible suspect, and Officer Sanchez was told that she was driving a white detailed in color Rav 4 SUV.

As they were leaving the apartment complex, Officer Sanchez and his partner saw a vehicle that matched the description of appellant=s vehicle. The officers stopped the vehicle. As he approached the vehicle, Officer Sanchez saw appellant sitting in the driver=s seat, a male sitting in the passenger=s seat, and several items that matched Valcik=s description of his missing property. The officers arrested appellant for theft and the passenger for public intoxication. A search of appellant=s vehicle revealed a tin can and a small purse, both of which contained several different types of narcotic items. There was also a list of names and phone numbers. Officer Sanchez also found a small packet of loose pills.

On cross examination, Officer Sanchez stated that Valcik had told the officers that the phone call was from appellant and that appellant had his property. Officer Sanchez also stated that Valcik never told him that the items were not stolen. Officer Sanchez stated that, while appellant had failed to signal as she pulled out of a parking lot, the real reason the officers stopped her was that they had reason to believe that the vehicle contained a possible suspect from a recent crime.

Valcik testified on behalf of appellant. Valcik stated that, when he got home, his apartment was empty. He called his dad and asked what should he do. Valcik followed his father=s advice and called the police. Valcik called the police a second time and said that he thought he saw someone in his apartment. Valcik remembered Officer Sanchez as one of the officers who came to his apartment. While the officers, including Officer Sanchez, were present, appellant called Valcik. Valcik told the police that appellant had his stuff and that she was going to bring it back. Valcik also told the officers that he owed her some money and that it was between appellant and him. As far as Valcik was concerned, there was no theft. Valcik also testified that appellant drove a green Rav 4.

The trial court was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses= testimony. Guzman v. State, supra. The trial court could have reasonably concluded from the testimony that the primary reason Officer Sanchez and his partner stopped appellant was that appellant=s vehicle matched the description that they had been given. Once they saw the stolen property in appellant=s car and placed her under arrest for theft, Officer Sanchez and his partner had the authority to search appellant=s vehicle incident to her arrest. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Busby v. State, 990 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Cr.App.1999). Appellant=s arguments contending that the search was a result of an invalid initial traffic stop are overruled.

Appellant also argues that the State=s failure to call Officer Sanchez=s partner or any officer who actually arrested appellant resulted in the State wholly [failing] in its burden to show that the unidentified officer had probable cause to arrest [appellant]. We disagree. The record reflects that the trial court had ample evidence to find probable cause. Officer Sanchez testified that appellant had property in her vehicle that matched Valcik=s description of his missing property. It was undisputed that the property had been removed from Valcik=s apartment without his knowledge or permission. Appellant=s arguments concerning probable cause are overruled. Appellant=s sole issue on appeal is overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

TERRY McCALL

JUSTICE

September 25, 2003

Do not publish. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Arnot, C.J., and

Wright, J., and McCall, J.