In the Interest of E.C. and H.C., Children--Appeal from 118th District Court of Howard County

11th Court of Appeals

Eastland, Texas

Opinion

In the Interest of E.C. and H.C., Children

No. 11-01-00347-CV -- Appeal from Howard County

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Deborah Kaye Darnell and Christopher Erick Curtis to E.C. and H.C. pursuant to TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. ' 161.001 (Vernon Pamph. Supp. 2002). Darnell voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to all of her children, including E.C. and H.C., and is not a party to this appeal. Curtis appeals but challenges only the termination of parental rights as to H.C., Curtis=s biological daughter who was eight years old at the time of trial.[1] We affirm.

Issues Presented and Standards of Review

The natural right that exists between parents and their children is a constitutionally protected right, and termination of the parent child relationship can only be justified by the most solid and substantial reasons. Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex.1976). In order to terminate a parent=s rights under Section 161.001, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the child and that the parent committed one of the acts enumerated in Section 161.001(1).

In each of his eight issues, Curtis challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence in support of the trial court=s findings and implied findings under Section 161.001(1). Curtis does not challenge the finding that termination is in the best interest of the child. In order to determine if the evidence is legally sufficient, we must consider only the evidence and inferences tending to support the finding and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. If there is any probative evidence to support the finding, we must uphold the finding. Lucas v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, 949 S.W.2d 500, 502 (Tex.App. - Waco 1997, writ den=d); Swinney v. Mosher, 830 S.W.2d 187, 194 (Tex.App. - Fort Worth 1992, writ den=d). In order to determine if the evidence is factually sufficient to support the termination of a parent-child relationship, we will apply the heightened standard of review recently announced by the supreme court in In the Interest of C.H., a minor child, 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1000, 2001 WL 1903109 (July 3, 2002). We must determine Awhether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State=s allegations.@ In the Interest of C.H., a minor child, supra at 1005 and at *8.

Evidence Regarding Termination

In open court and in its judgment, the trial court stated that two of the enumerated reasons in Section 161.001(1) had been proved by clear and convincing evidence: that Curtis voluntarily left H.C. alone or in the possession of another without providing adequate support and remained away for a period of at least six months and that Curtis failed to support H.C. in accordance with his ability during a period of one year ending within six months of the date of the filing of the petition in this case. Section 161.001(1)(C) & (F). The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child.

The uncontroverted evidence shows that H.C. had been living in an unsuitable environment; that Curtis did not have any type of relationship with H.C.; that Curtis had never attempted to visit or contact H.C. despite being appointed H.C.=s possessory conservator in the divorce decree; that Curtis had seen H.C. a total of two times in what can only be referred to as momentary, chance meetings; and that Curtis had never paid any child support even though ordered to do so in his divorce decree. Darnell testified that she had lived in the Big Spring area most of her life, that her extended family also lived there, and that Curtis knew where they lived and could have easily contacted them. Curtis did not appear in person at trial, and Curtis=s attorney did not call any witnesses to testify. Curtis was in prison at the time of trial but refused an offer to be bench warranted. It appears that Curtis had been in prison for about one and one-half years prior to the date of trial and for several months prior to the filing of the petition to terminate.

We hold that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support a finding under Section 161.001(1)(C). See In the Interest of B.T., a child, 954 S.W.2d 44 (Tex.App. - San Antonio 1997, writ den=d). The evidence showed that Curtis voluntarily left H.C. in the possession of another without providing for the adequate support of H.C. and that he remained away for a period of at least six consecutive months. In reaching this conclusion, we did not consider any period in which Curtis was shown to be incarcerated. Curtis=s first issue is overruled. Because termination may be upheld on this ground alone, we need not address the remaining issues. TEX.R.APP.P. 47.1.

This Court=s Ruling

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

TERRY McCALL

JUSTICE

September 26, 2002

Do not publish. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.3(b).

Panel consists of: Arnot, C.J., and

Wright, J., and McCall, J.

[1]E.C. apparently is not Curtis=s biological child.