David Max Burgess, Jr. v. State of Texas--Appeal from 90th District Court of Stephens County

11th Court of Appeals

Eastland, Texas

Opinion

David Max Burgess, Jr.

Appellant

Vs. Nos. 11-00-00383-CR & 11-00-00384-CR -- Appeals from Stephens County

State of Texas

Appellee

The issue in these appeals is the propriety of orders transferring jurisdiction to the district court in Stephens County. In both cases, David Max Burgess, Jr. was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision by the 194th Judicial District Court of Dallas County. The State subsequently filed a motion to adjudicate, alleging that appellant had violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision while in Stephens County. The 194th Court entered an order transferring jurisdiction of each case to the 90th Judicial District Court of Stephens County. Subject to his motion to set aside the transfer orders, appellant pleaded true to the allegations in the motions to adjudicate. In each case, the 90th Judicial District Court convicted appellant of aggravated robbery and assessed his punishment at confinement for 18 years and a fine of $5,000. We affirm.

In his sole point of error in each case, appellant argues that the trial court erred in overruling the motion to set aside the order transferring jurisdiction because the 90th Judicial District Court of Stephens County lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate appellant=s guilt. Appellant relies upon TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 42.12, ' 10(b) & (c) (Vernon Supp. 2002), which reads as follows:

(b) After a defendant has been placed on community supervision, jurisdiction of the case may be transferred to a court of the same rank in this state having geographical jurisdiction where the defendant is residing or where a violation of the conditions of community supervision occurs. Upon transfer, the clerk of the court of original jurisdiction shall forward a transcript of such portions of the record as the transferring judge shall direct to the court accepting jurisdiction, which latter court shall thereafter proceed as if the trial and conviction had occurred in that court.

(c) Any judge of a court having geographical jurisdiction where the defendant is residing or where a violation of the conditions of community supervision occurs may issue a warrant for his arrest, but the determination of action to be taken after arrest shall be only by the judge of the court having jurisdiction of the case at the time the action is taken.

Appellant contends that the 90th Court had no jurisdiction to rule upon the motions to adjudicate because the 194th Court had jurisdiction at the time the arrest was made and, thus, was the only court having jurisdiction to determine the action to be taken after arrest. We disagree.

Article 42.12, section 10(b) permits the transfer of jurisdiction of a case in which the defendant has been placed on community supervision. Such transfer may be made to a sister court having jurisdiction in the location where the violation of a condition of community supervision occurred. The transferee court may act upon a motion to revoke or a motion to adjudicate that was filed in the transferring court. See Op. Tex. Att=y Gen. No. JM-194 (1984).

In this case, the transfer complied with the provisions of Article 42.12, section 10(b). The 194th Court originally imposed appellant=s deferred adjudication community supervision but transferred jurisdiction to the 90th Court upon the State=s filing of a motion to adjudicate which asserted that appellant had violated the terms and conditions of community supervision by committing an offense in Stephens County, a geographical region within the jurisdiction of the 90th Court.

Furthermore, Article 42.12, section 10(c) does not support appellant=s contention. At the time the 194th Court took an action by transferring the cases, it had jurisdiction; and, at the time the 90th Court took an Aaction@ by granting the State=s motions to adjudicate, it had jurisdiction by way of the transfer orders. Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not err in overruling appellant=s motion to set aside the transfer orders. Appellant=s sole point of error in each case is overruled.

The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

January 17, 2002 PER CURIAM

Do not publish. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.3(b).

Panel consists of: Arnot, C.J., and

Wright, J., and McCall, J.