MICHAEL RUNNINGWOLF, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (Dissenting)

                                                                             

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

               IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

                                           OF TEXAS

 

                                                                             

                                                               NO. PD-0997-10

 

 

                                         MICHAEL RUNNINGWOLF, Appellant

 

                                                                             v.

 

                                                        THE STATE OF TEXAS

 

                 ON APPELLANT=S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

                                   FROM THE SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS

                                                             FLOYD COUNTY

 

Keller, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion.

 

The offense of simulating legal process proscribes the act of recklessly causing the delivery of Aany document that simulates a summons, complaint, judgment, or other court process.@[1]  In conducting a sufficiency of the evidence analysis in this case, the court of appeals did not apply any overarching standard of what constitutes simulating legal process.[2]  Rather, the lower court simply catalogued a number of similarities between the documents appellant produced and legitimate court documents.[3] 

The Court now adds to the list of factors, saying that an appellate court may consider Awhether a similarly situated reasonable person receiving the document would believe it was legal process.@[4]  But the court of appeals did not consider how a reasonable person would view the document, and it is not apparent to me that a reasonable person would perceive this document as legal process.[5]  I would adopt the reasonable person construct articulated by the Court and remand this cause to the court of appeals to reconsider the sufficiency of the evidence under that standard.  Because the Court does not do so, I respectfully dissent.

Filed: March 7, 2012

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[1]  Tex. Penal Code ' 32.48.

[2]  See Runningwolfv. State, 317 S.W.3d 829, 836-38 (Tex. App.BAmarillo 2010).

[3]  Id.  The court of appeals explained that the document contained Aa wealth of declarations and maxims seemingly designed to undermine the validity of the custody arrangement through state courts and to persuade the named Defendants to recognize the supremacy of the ecclesiastical court.@  Id. at 836.  Among other things, the court of appeals pointed out that the document had a bold-faced heading with the name of the court, an official seal, a pronouncement of authority, a list of persons named as Ademandants@ and others named as defendants, a demand for compliance, a statement that a default judgment had been granted, and eight counts against the defendants using such terms as Acontempt@ and Aconspiracy.@  Id.  As the Court=s opinion explains, the court of appeals developed Aa nonexhaustive list of relevant factors to determine whether a document simulates legal process.@ Court=s op. at 9.  

[4]  Court=s op. at 9.  Although the statutory language would seem broader than such a reasonable person standard, this standard could function as a legitimate narrowing construction needed to prevent the statute from being unconstitutionally vague as applied to certain cases. See Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (narrowing construction can be used to avoid a constitutional violation). 

[5]  A copy of the document is attached to this opinion.  The Court says that appellant intended that the recipient submit to the authority of the document.  But in delivering this document, it appears that appellant intended to procure submission to the authority God, not the Law.