William W. Griffin v. Walker Die Casting, Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
SPECIAL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS PANEL
AT NASHVILLE
June 28, 2010 Session
WILLIAM W. GRIFFIN v. WALKER DIE CASTING, INC., ET AL.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marshall County
No. 17,633
F. Lee Russell, Judge
No. M2009-01773-WC-R3-WC - Mailed - September 15, 2010
Filed - November 10, 2010
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been
referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sought to compel the employer to
provide a total left knee replacement surgery based upon court-approved settlement for a
work-related left knee contusion. The trial court ordered the employer to provide the knee
replacement surgery and awarded attorney’s fees to the employee. The employer has
appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by finding that the proposed surgery was causally
related to the work injury. We agree and reverse the trial court’s order.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e) (2008) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit
Court Reversed
J ON K ERRY B LACKWOOD, S R. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which W ILLIAM C.
K OCH, J R., J., and W ALTER C. K URTZ, S R. J., joined.
Christen C. Blackburn, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Walker Die Casting, Inc.
and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.
John R. White, Shelbyville, Tennessee, for the appellee, William W. Griffin.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Factual and Procedural Background
William Griffin was a tow motor driver for Walker Die Casting (hereinafter
“Walker”). On December 18, 2006, he sustained a work-related injury when he felt a pop
in his left knee while getting off the tow motor. Walker accepted the injury as and provided
Mr. Griffin with medical treatment with Dr. Jeffrey Adams, an orthopaedic surgeon. Dr.
Adams diagnosed Mr. Griffin’s injury as a left knee contusion superimposed on degenerative
joint disease. On March 29, 2007, Dr. Adams released Mr. Griffin to full duty and assigned
him a permanent anatomical impairment of 0% to the left leg as a result of the December 18,
2006, injury.
The parties subsequently agreed to a settlement based upon 1.37% permanent partial
disability to the left knee, resulting in a total payment of $1,500, which the trial court
approved on June 22, 2007. The order approving the settlement stated that Mr. Griffin would
be entitled to receive “only future medical treatment which is reasonable and necessary for
treatment of the work related injury as authorized by Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204, and which
is specifically authorized by a representative of the workers’ compensation carrier.”
After being released to full duty on March 29, 2007, Mr. Griffin continued to seek
treatment from Dr. Adams, and later Dr. Frederick Wade, for bilateral degenerative joint
disease of his knees. Mr. Griffin paid for this medical treatment through his personal health
insurance. In August or September 2007, Mr. Griffin underwent a total knee replacement
surgery for his right knee. After the surgery on his right knee, Mr. Griffin’s left knee
continued to give him trouble. On November 6, 2007, Dr. Wade noted that his left knee pain
“has been exacerbated by his rehab for his right knee replacement.” According to an August
20, 2008, medical record, Mr. Griffin told Dr. Wade that he had started working “on concrete
at a press all day” (instead of driving the tow motor) because of personnel issues and that this
new work had “aggravated his lower extremities more so.” On October 29, 2008, Dr. Wade
stated that Mr. Griffin was “standing on concrete everyday” and that “the pain [was] just
increasing.”
By March 20, 2009, Dr. Wade had recommended that Mr. Griffin have a left knee
replacement “soon.” In his note concerning that examination, Dr. Wade indicated that Mr.
Griffin could not afford the procedure but that he had been given “lifetime medical” as a
result of the 2006 contusion. Mr. Griffin decided to seek workers’ compensation coverage
for a left knee replacement. Walker denied the request.
On July 17, 2009, Mr. Griffin filed a motion requesting that Walker be ordered to
provide him with a total knee replacement pursuant to the 2007 settlement. On August 10,
2009, the trial court granted Mr. Griffin’s motion. Walker filed a motion to stay the order
pending this appeal. The trial court denied Walker’s motion to stay, and Mr. Griffin
underwent the surgery on September 18, 2009. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to Mr.
Griffin in the amount of $7,814.23.
The medical evidence in the record is limited to Mr. Griffin’s medical records from
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January 2007 through March 2009. Specifically, Mr. Griffin did not introduce any expert
medical evidence in the form of live testimony, depositions, affidavits, or C-32s. The record
contains doctors’ notes from January 4, 2007; January 25, 2007; March 1, 2007; March 29,
2007; April 12, 2007; May 24, 2007; May 31, 2007; June 7, 2007; July 19, 2007; November
6, 2007; December 6, 2007; August 20, 2008; October 29, 2008; and March 20, 2009. None
of these notes assert a causal relationship between the 2006 contusion and Mr. Griffin’s need
for a left knee replacement. In fact, after Dr. Adams released Mr. Griffin on March 29, 2007,
none of the medical records even acknowledge the contusion injury until Dr. Wade’s note
of March 20, 2009, recalls that Mr. Griffin “did have an injury to this knee” and was given
medical coverage that might help pay for the surgery. Instead, Mr. Griffin’s medical records
after March 29, 2007 refer consistently to his bilateral degenerative joint disease and left
knee osteoarthritis as the conditions necessitating treatment.
Walker contends that the trial court erred by finding that the total knee replacement
was reasonable and necessary for treatment of the 2006 work-related contusion. Walker also
argues that the trial court erred by awarding attorney’s fees to Mr. Griffin, and that the award
was excessive. Mr. Griffin asserts that this appeal is frivolous.
Standard of Review
The standard of review of issues of fact is de novo upon the record of the trial court
accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of
evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2) (2008). Where the issues involve
expert medical testimony and all the medical proof is documentary, as in this case, the
reviewing court may draw its own conclusions about the weight and credibility of that
testimony. See Krick v. City of Lawrenceburg, 945 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tenn. 1997); Orman
v. Williams Sonoma, Inc., 803 S.W.2d 672, 676-77 (Tenn. 1991).
Analysis
“Except in the most obvious, simple and routine cases,” a claimant in a workers’
compensation case must establish by expert medical evidence the causal relationship between
the claimed injury and the employment activity, and that relationship must be established by
the preponderance of the expert medical testimony, as supplemented by the lay evidence.
Cloyd v. Hartco Flooring Co., 274 S.W.3d 638, 643 (Tenn. 2008). While absolute certainty
with respect to causation is not required, Fritts v. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 163 S.W.3d 673,
678 (Tenn. 2005), the proof of the causal connection may not be speculative, conjectural, or
uncertain, Clark v. Nashville Mach. Elevator Co., Inc., 129 S.W. 3d 42, 47 (Tenn. 2004);
Simpson v. H.D. Lee Co., 793 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tenn. 1990); Tindall v. Waring Park Ass’n,
725 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tenn. 1987).
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We conclude that Mr. Griffin failed to meet his burden of proving that the total knee
replacement was causally related to the 2006 contusion. We note that a party who relies
solely upon medical records, rather than expert medical testimony, does so at his own peril.
See Glisson v. Mohon Int’l Inc./Campbell Ray, 185 S.W.3d 348, 355 (Tenn. 2006) (“relying
on an employee’s medical records alone is a precarious–if not unwise–way to proceed in a
workers’ compensation case”). In this case, the medical records introduced into evidence do
not even purport to establish a causal relationship between the work-related contusion and
the total knee replacement surgery. None of the medical records contained in the record
either state or imply that Mr. Griffin’s need for a left knee replacement was causally related
to the 2006 contusion of his left knee. The only reference to the contusion injury after March
29, 2007, does not appear in the context of medical treatment, but as a means of financing
Mr. Griffin’s left knee replacement surgery.
Mr. Griffin argues that his own live testimony at the hearing on the motion to compel
medical benefits sufficiently supplemented the medical records to establish causation. There
is no transcript of that testimony in the record. Our Courts have “consistently held that an
award may properly be based upon medical testimony to the effect that a given incident
‘could be’ the cause of the employee’s injury, when there is also lay testimony from which
it reasonably may be inferred that the incident was in fact the cause of the injury.” Reeser
v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tenn. 1997). The limited expert medical
evidence in this fails to establish, or even suggest, that the December 2006 injury “could be”
the cause of Mr. Griffin’s subsequent need for left knee replacement surgery. In the absence
of appropriate medical evidence, Mr. Griffin’s testimony on the subject is irrelevant. The
absence of a transcript of that testimony from the record is, under the circumstances, of no
consequence.
We are mindful of both our obligation to resolve all reasonable doubts as to causation
in favor of the employee, Phillips v. A. & H Constr. Co., 134 S.W.3d 145, 150 (Tenn. 2004),
and of the presumption of correctness which attaches to the trial court’s findings, Skinner v.
CNA Ins. Co., 824 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tenn. 1992). However, even taking those factors into
account, we conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that
Mr. Griffin’s need for a left knee replacement in 2009 was causally related to the 2006 workrelated contusion. We therefore find that the trial court erred by ordering Walker to provide
the knee replacement.
In light of the foregoing findings, we also reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s
fees to Mr. Griffin. Finally, Walker having prevailed on this appeal, Mr. Griffin’s contention
that the appeal is frivolous is not well taken and is denied.
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Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for
entry of an order consistent with this opinion. Costs are taxed to William W. Griffin and his
surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.
_______________________________________
JON KERRY BLACKWOOD, SENIOR JUDGE
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