Roger Shoulders v. Pasminco Zinc, Inc.& Tennessee Second Injury Fund
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
SPECIAL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS PANEL
AT NASHVILLE
November 27, 2006 Session
RICKY SHOULDERS V. TRW COMMERCIAL STEERING DIVISION
:
Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Trousdale County
No. 03-1-D-37 James O. Bond, Judge
________________________________
No. M2006-00300-WC-R3-CV - Mailed: February 27, 2007
Filed - April 3, 2007
________________________________
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee benefits based on 54.75 percent of the
scheduled member loss of hearing in both ears. On appeal, the employer contends that the claim is
barred by the statute of limitations and that the trial court erred when it failed to allow counsel to
read portions of the plaintiff’s deposition. The employer also appeals the award being based on a
scheduled member as opposed to the body as a whole and contends that the award is not supported
by the preponderance of the evidence. Finally, the employer contends that the trial court erred in its
determination of the compensation rate. After a careful review of the record, we find no error in the
trial court’s determination that the claim met the statute of limitations. We do find that the trial court
erred in its ruling on the use of deposition testimony but find that error harmless. We find that the
trial court erred in its determination of disability attributable to a scheduled member and we have
modified that award. Finally, we find no error in the trial court’s determination of the compensation
rate. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, modified in part and remanded.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) Appeal as of Right;
Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed in Part, Modified
in Part; Remanded
J. S. (STEVE) DANIEL, Sr. J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which GARY R. WADE, J., and
DONALD P. HARRIS, Sr. J., joined.
Richard Lane Moore, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellant, TRW Commercial Steering Division.
William Joseph Butler and E. Guy Holliman, Lafayette, Tennessee, for the appellee, Ricky
Shoulders.
OPINION
I. Factual and Procedural History
Mr. Ricky Shoulders was fifty-seven years of age at the time of the trial. He had been
employed for thirty-two years by TRW Commercial Steering Division when he retired in February
2003. On January 3, 2003, Mr. Shoulders filed a complaint against TRW Commercial Steering
Division, hereinafter referred to as TRW, seeking workers’ compensation benefits as a result of
permanent hearing loss in both ears.
Mr. Shoulders had been employed for the entire length of his thirty-two-year work career
with TRW as a maintenance mechanic working on or running plant machinery. Mr. Shoulders has
a high school education and attended training furnished by TRW for four years to acquire his
mechanical journeyman’s status. He retired at the end of February 2003, not because of the hearing
loss but in order to enjoy the benefits which he had earned from his employment. He never missed
any work while employed by TRW because of his hearing loss. Mr. Shoulders had never been
disciplined as an employee and had never filed any other workers’ compensation actions although
on one occasion, he had a work-related injury to his finger but this did not result in a claim.
The work environment in which Mr. Shoulders carried on his mechanical activities was a
loud environment caused by machines producing varying degrees of noise. Mr. Shoulders testified
that in the late 1980s he perceived that he was losing hearing capability and on December 23, 1993,
he had a hearing test and bought a hearing aid for his right ear using his own funds. Recorded on
the hearing test report of December 23, 1993, was a statement indicating that Mr. Shoulders had
“twenty years-plus noise exposure.” When asked if in fact Mr. Shoulders didn’t know that the cause
of his hearing loss in 1993 and 1994 was his work at TRW he explained that “well I couldn’t say for
sure, but it was a good possibility.” He explained that he did not know how bad his hearing loss was
until he saw Heather Dooley November 2, 2002 for a hearing test. Apparently, shortly before his
retirement, Mr. Shoulders read an advertisement concerning a free hearing test at a local clinic. He
attended the clinic and his hearing was tested by Ms. Dooley. This test revealed significant hearing
loss in both ears and according to Mr. Shoulders this was the first time he realized the extent of his
hearing loss in both ears.
Dr. John R. Chauvin is Mr. Shoulders’ family physician who performed physical
examinations of Mr. Shoulders from time-to-time. During the physical examination of June 28,
2000, Mr. Shoulders complained to Dr. Chauvin that he was not hearing as well as he normally did
and that he attributed it to his work. Dr. Chauvin suggested that Mr. Shoulders check with his
employer about having a hearing test and that he might need a referral to a specialist. However, no
other action was taken by Dr. Chauvin nor does it appear that Mr. Shoulders took any further action
until the 2002 test by Ms. Dooley. Subsequent to the commencement of this litigation and during
a physical on January 12, 2005, Mr. Shoulders next discussed his hearing loss with Dr. Chauvin.
As a result, Dr. Chauvin performed a cursory test which revealed hearing loss and this resulted in
2
a referral by Dr. Chauvin to an otolaryngologist, Dr. Matthew Speyer.
Dr. Speyer first saw Mr. Shoulders January 14, 2005. Based on his examination and an
audiogram performed at his direction by Dr. Jewel Strehlau, Dr. Speyer concluded that Mr.
Shoulders demonstrated bilateral severe high frequency hearing loss with mild asymmetry caused
by exposure of industrial noise. According to Dr. Speyer, Mr. Shoulders has better hearing in his
left ear than the right. Dr. Speyer indicated that noise induced hearing loss is gradual in its nature and
described this loss as, “It’s an accumulative effect over time much like erosion if you want to
describe it as a metaphor.” Dr. Speyer concluded that Mr. Shoulders “has a right ear monaural
impairment of 26.2 percent. His left ear calculates to be a zero percent impairment based on the
manual despite having high frequency hearing loss. His binaural impairment calculates to be 4.4
percent which calculates as a whole person impairment of 2 percent” based on the AMA Guidelines
(5th Ed.). Dr. Speyer reviewed TRW’s 1983 audiogram of Mr. Shoulders and agreed that he at that
time had some demonstrated hearing loss but that loss would not have resulted in an impairment
rating. He further agreed that in subsequent years, Mr. Shoulders’ hearing diminished and this
reduction of hearing could be related to ageing or reasons other than work noise. However, in
considering all factors and the subjective report of Mr. Shoulders, the doctor concluded that more
of the factors considered supported his conclusion of work noise related hearing loss.
After this lawsuit was filed, Mr. Shoulders was examined on behalf of TRW by Dr. David
Scott Haynes, August 26, 2005. Dr. Haynes opined that Mr. Shoulders had and 18.8 percent
impairment in the left ear, 31.9 percent in the right ear, 20.9 percent for both ears, and a 7 percent
whole body impairment. This report was amended at his evidentiary deposition when counsel sought
testimony from Dr. Haynes as to an allocation of this disability between that caused by the work
environment and the ageing process. Dr. Haynes attributed 60 percent of the disability to the work
environment and 40 percent to the ageing process. Dr. Haynes had not reported any disability
associated with tinnitus in his written report although Mr. Shoulders had reported an occasional
episode of hearing something “just a little off, very seldom, back in my ear.” This experience was
limited to one ear and our review of the doctor’s testimony indicates that he considered it minimal
to Mr. Shoulders’ problems, assessing an impairment of 1 percent to the body as a whole during his
deposition for these findings at the direction of the employer’s counsel. The doctor concluded that
Mr. Shoulders had a 20.9 percent impairment for his hearing loss, 1 percent whole body impairment
for tinnitus which converted to 8 percent to the body as a whole and then attributed 60 percent of
these findings to hearing loss attributable to the work place noise and the balance to the ageing
process. Tinnitus is a noise that a person hears that’s not being truly generated externally. It is a
ringing or perception of a noise that is real to the patient but is centered in the brain. Tinnitus is not
a hearing malady but one of the brain that can result in vertigo and loss of balance. Our review of
the record indicates that Mr. Shoulders does not have balance or vertigo problems, had not
complained of tinnitus to his treating physician, Dr. Speyer, and there is no medical evidence that
establishes the causation of the tinnitus to his work activities.
The trial court accredited the testimony of Mr. Shoulders and awarded benefits for an injury
3
to the hearing in both of Mr. Shoulders’ ears, based on 54.75 percent to the scheduled member. The
court found the work-related injury to be a gradually-developing injury, the extent of which was not
discovered until shortly before the lawsuit. TRW has appealed contending that the trial court erred
in failing to find that the statute of limitations barred the claim. In this appeal they also contend that
the trial court erred in prohibiting counsel from reading into evidence excerpts of Mr. Shoulders’
deposition. TRW asserts that the trial court erred in making an award of 54.75 percent to the ears
as a “scheduled hearing loss” rather than making an award to the “body as a whole” because of the
fact that Mr. Shoulders had developed the unscheduled injury, tinnitus. TRW contends in this appeal
that the award is excessive and not supported by the preponderance of the evidence. It also asserts
that the trial court erred in making its award based on a compensation rate established in 2003 as
opposed to 1994 when Mr. Shoulders first obtained a hearing aid.
II. Standard of Review
Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial
court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance
of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2) (2005). The reviewing court is
required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance
of the evidence lies. The standard governing appellate review of the findings of fact of a trial judge
requires this “panel to examine in depth the trial court’s factual findings and conclusions.” GAF
Bldg. Materials v. George, 47 S.W.3d 430, 432 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel March 26, 2001).
When the trial court has seen the witnesses and heard the testimony, especially where issues of
credibility and the weight of testimony are involved, the appellate court must extend considerable
deference to the trial court’s factual findings. Whirlpool Corp. v. Nakhoneinh, 69 S.W.3d 164, 167
(Tenn. 2002); Townsend v. State, 826 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tenn. 1992). Our standard of review of
questions of law is de novo without a presumption of correctness. Perrin v. Gaylord Entm’t Co., 120
S.W.3d 823, 626 (Tenn. 2003). When medical testimony is presented by deposition, this Court is
able to make its own independent assessment of the medical proof to determine where the
preponderance of the evidence lies. Cleek v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 19 S.W.3d 770, 774 (Tenn.
2000); Houser v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 36 S.W.3d 68, 71 (Tenn. 2001).
III. Analysis
Statute of Limitations
In this appeal TRW insists that Mr. Shoulders’ claim is barred by the statute of limitations
because of his knowledge of hearing loss and suspicion that it was work-related as early as 1993
when he obtained a hearing examination and purchased a hearing aid for his right ear. TRW
contends Mr. Shoulders failed to give notice of his claim and did not initiate the workers’
compensation lawsuit until January 3, 2003, resulting in the claim being barred by the statute of
limitations.
4
The statute of limitations for claims and actions brought under the Tennessee Workers’
Compensation Law is controlled by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-203(a) which provided
prior to the 2004 amendment, as follows:
The right to compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Law
shall be forever barred, unless, within one (1) year after the accident
resulting in injury or death occurred, the notice required by § 50-6202 is given the employer and a claim for compensation under the
provisions of this chapter is filed with the tribunal having jurisdiction
to hear and determine the matter. . . .
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-203(a) (1999).
However, Tennessee courts have repeatedly recognized that gradually occurring injuries are
compensable as accidental injuries under the Workers’ Compensation Law. This is so even in
situations where it is difficult to ascertain the date of the injury and/or accident or event giving rise
to the injury. See Banks v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 170 S.W.3d 556, 561 (Tenn. 2005); see also
Mahoney v. NationsBank of Tennessee, N.A., 158 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Tenn. 2005). Our review of
the medical evidence presented by deposition indicates that all of the expert testimony was to the
effect that hearing loss attributable to workplace noise is a gradually-occurring injury in most cases
and that Mr. Shoulders had experienced gradual loss of hearing associated with his work around
noisy industrial machines to some degree.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-201(b) (2001) sets forth the notice requirements and
the time from which to measure the statute of limitations for gradual work-related injury. This
statute provides:
(b) In those cases where the injuries occur as the result of gradual
or cumulative events or trauma, then the injured employee or such
injured employee’s representative shall provide notice to the
employer of the injury within thirty (30) days after the employee:
(1) Knows or reasonably should know that such employee
has suffered a work-related injury that has resulted in permanent
physical impairment; or
(2) Is rendered unable to continue to perform such
employee’s normal work activities as the result of the work-related
injury and the employee knows or reasonably should know that the
injury was caused by work-related activities.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-201(b) (2003).
5
The notice requirement in the workers’ compensation statutory scheme “exists so that an
employer will have an opportunity to make a timely investigation of the facts while those facts are
still readily accessible, and to enable the employer to provide timely and proper treatment for an
injured employee.” Jones v. Sterling Last Corp., 962 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tenn. 1998). An employee
who fails to notify his employer within the thirty days after he has sustained a work-related injury
forfeits the right to workers’ compensation benefits unless the employer has actual notice of the
injury or unless the employee’s failure to notify the employer was reasonable. Tenn. Code Ann. §
55-6-201(a) (1999 & supp. 2002).
Our Court interpreted Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-201to provide that
“employees are relieved from the notice requirement until they know or reasonably should know that
their injury was caused by their work and that the injury has either impaired them permanently or
prevented them from performing normal work activities.” Banks v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 170
S.W.3d 556, 561 (Tenn. 2005)
The issue of the running of the statute of limitations in workers’ compensation claims which
are based on gradual injuries to the employee was clarified by the recent decision of Barnett v.
Earthworks Unlimited, Inc., 197 S.W.3d 716 (Tenn. 2006). In this case our court made the following
observation:
Gradually occurring injuries have been described as “a new injury
each day at work.” Lawson, 944 S.W.2d at 341 (citing Barker v.
Home-Crest Corp., 805 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. 1991)). Thus the last day
worked, regardless of the reason for leaving work, is the last day the
employee was exposed to the work activity that caused the injury.
....
In sum, we hold that the one-year statute of limitations for bringing
a claim for workers’ compensation benefits for a gradually-occurring
injury begins to run on the last day the employee worked for the
employer, unless the employee has knowledge of the existence of a
compensable, work-related injury and gives the required notice of that
injury to his or her employer, in which case the date that notice is
given is the date of the injury.
Barnett, 197 S.W.3d at 721-22.
The exception to the last work day rule mentioned in Barnett was fashioned by Bone v.
Saturn Corp., 148 S.W.3d 69, 71 (Tenn. 2004), which addressed situations in which an employee
gave notice of a gradually-occurring injury to his employer prior to missing work on account of the
injury. However, the rationale of Bone has been reconsidered and overruled. See Building Materials
Corporation d/b/a GAF Materials Corporation v. Melvin D. Britt, 2007 WL 171768 (Tenn. Jan. 24,
2007). In this case our review of the record indicates that Mr. Shoulders gave no notice to the
employer of the gradual occurrence of his hearing loss. Mr. Shoulders had not received an expert
6
medical opinion that his hearing loss was work-related nor did he know the permanent nature of the
injury until after he left his employment. The statute of limitations did not begin to run on his claim
until his last day worked in February 2003, making his lawsuit which was filed in January 2003
timely. We find that the trial court did not err in determining that the Shoulders’ claim was timely.
IV. Trial Court Error in Prohibiting the Reading of
Selected Portions of Mr. Shoulders’ Deposition
During the trial, counsel for TRW attempted to read potions of Mr. Shoulders’ discovery
deposition into evidence to establish the fact that Mr. Shoulders had knowledge of his hearing loss
and that he had a belief that the hearing loss was attributable to his work several years prior to the
filing of the workers’ compensation lawsuit. The purpose of the reading of this portion of Mr.
Shoulders’ deposition was in order to convince the court that the statute of limitations should be
considered to have run and the case be dismissed.
The exchange in which TRW complains was as follows:
THE COURT:
Next Witness.
MR. MOORE:
Judge, the next thing we would like to do is
read into evidence portions of Mr. Shoulders’
deposition.
THE COURT:
You cross-examined him, and that deposition
is not going to be read in here. You had an
opportunity to ask him questions right up here.
I don’t want to hear the deposition.
MR. MOORE:
Can I at least say it for, to make a record, the
pages?
THE COURT:
You can make a record. Don’t read it. Just
tell me what page numbers it is.
MR. MOORE:
I will. I will. From Page 54, Lines 9 through
20. Page 55, Lines 17 through 25. Page 56,
Lines 1 through 3. Page 57, Line 15 through
17. Page 82, Line 13 through 17. Page 87,
Line 11 through 18. And for identification
purposes to save time, Judge, we will just
make his original, that way we don’t have to
7
read it out loud.
THE COURT:
You can make it an exhibit.
MR. MOORE:
Can I make it an exhibit, or for identification?
THE COURT:
Right. Just make it an exhibit.
MR. MOORE:
All right. We’ll make his deposition an
exhibit, the portions I just listed out loud.
(EXHIBIT 8, DEPOSITION PORTION, RICKY SHOULDERS.)
THE COURT:
And the Court’s ruling is that you had a
witness on the witness stand. The proper use
of a deposition is not to read from it, but you
ask the witness questions. If he answers the
questions differently than you’ve got in the
deposition, you have a right to read it to him.
But you have to bring it to his attention and let
him look at it before than can occur. And the
Court is not going to get into this reading parts
of the deposition after somebody has already
testified. Go ahead. Next?
Our review of this colloquy leads us to conclude that the trial court prohibited the reading
of the depositions requested by TRW because of its belief that this was an improper use of the
deposition and should have been used when Mr. Shoulders was cross-examined.
Clearly, Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 32.01, Use of Depositions, controls this issue.
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 32.01(2) provides:
The deposition of a party or of anyone at the time of taking the
deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent, or a person
designated under Rule 30.02(6) or 31.01 to testify on behalf of a
public or private corporation, partnership or association, government
agency or individual proprietorship which is a party may be used by
an adverse party for any purpose.
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 32.01(2).
This rule is clear in all respects and allows the reading of the deposition passages. It was
error for the trial court to have prohibited counsel from being able to read the selected portions of
8
the plaintiff’s deposition. We have reviewed those portions of the deposition cited in the above
colloquy and find that the substance of those passages were covered in other parts of the proof during
the trial. Basically, those issues were that Mr. Shoulders was knowledgeable in 1993 that he had
some hearing loss, that he suspected that the hearing loss was work-related, and that Dr. Chauvin had
suggested to Mr. Shoulders that he take up his concern about any hearing loss with TRW on June
28, 2000. However, after reviewing these passages, we have to conclude under Tennessee Rules of
Appellate Procedure 36(b) that the effect of this error is harmless as it appears that all of the facts
supported by the deposition were in other parts of the record, and based on our
conclusion concerning the statute of limitations, the error did not affect the ultimate trial
determination.
V. Award to “Scheduled Hearing Loss” Rather than
Award to the “Body as a Whole”
It is TRW’s contention that the trial court erred in making an award to Mr. Shoulders for a
scheduled hearing loss to both ears as opposed to making an award to the body as a whole. The trial
court made an award of benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(A)(ii)(r)
which provides, “For the complete permanent loss of hearing in both ears, sixty-six and two-thirds
percent (66 2/3%) of the average weekly wages during one hundred fifty (150) weeks.” The trial
court’s award was 54.75 percent of the scheduled member loss of hearing in both ears. The trial
court in making this award, explained the award as a two and one-half (2½) times multiplier times
the 21.9 percent finding testified to by Dr. David Scott Haynes. Dr. Haynes had ascribed the hearing
loss as 20.9 percent for loss of hearing in both ears and 1 percent for the tinnitus. Due to the fact that
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207 does not specifically list tinnitus as a scheduled injury,
any tinnitus award must be associated and made to the body as a whole pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(F).
It is the contention of TRW that the court erred in failing to make an award solely to the body
as a whole because of the concurrent finding of both injury to a scheduled member as well as to a
nonscheduled member. It is their position that these are concurrent disabilities and under the
provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(C) that the court was obligated to
make a concurrent injury determination to the body as a whole as opposed to making an award to
the scheduled member because of the tinnitus finding. We would be more inclined to concur in
TRW’s analysis if in fact Mr. Shoulders had complained of injuries both to a scheduled member as
well as a nonscheduled member, i.e., hearing loss and tinnitus. Cf. Crump v. B & P Const. Co., 703
S.W.2d 140 (Tenn. 1986). However, our review of the medical proof which was presented
exclusively by deposition fails to reveal at any place where Mr. Shoulders had complained of an
occasional episode of tinnitus which he related to his work activity with TRW. Dr. Chauvin, Mr.
Shoulders’ personal physician, received no complaint of tinnitus nor had Dr. Speyer received any
complaint of tinnitus by Mr. Shoulders. Only Dr. Hayes had a finding of some occasional tinnitus
based on a statement of Mr. Shoulders. Our review of the record fails to reveal any proof that relates
the tinnitus to/or caused by Mr. Shoulders’ employment at TRW. Dr. Haynes’ deposition leads us
9
to conclude that he had never made a written report concerning tinnitus as it relates to Mr.
Shoulders’ employment and only made these findings at the time of his deposition at the inquiry of
TRW’s counsel. Of course, the whole basis for TRW advancing this argument that any award be
to the whole body is an effort to obtain the limitations of any award by the multiplier provisions of
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1).1 We conclude that in situations such as
presented by these facts that the trial court did not err in limiting the award to the scheduled member.
Construction of the workers’ compensation laws require courts to recognize the remedial nature of
the statutes and equitably construe the law to the end that objects and purposes of the law may be
realized. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116. Those purposes entail an adequate and complete recovery
for the complaint of the covered worker.
VI. Trial Court Award Computation
TRW complains on appeal that the trial court erred in making a 54.75 percent vocational
disability award for the hearing loss as the proof fails to preponderate in favor of such an award.
Principal in this complaint is the manner in which this award was determined. In announcing the
award the court explained how it had reached its determination by stating,
I don’t think he had any worsening after he left employment. The
difference in the evaluations is just a difference in doctors, the
examiners. I really think we ought to keep this as a scheduled
member as to the ears. And that he’d get, left ear would be a
multiplier of 2.5. So I think if we get the whole thing, 54.75 percent
to each ear is what the Court is going to award.
Inquiring further to clarify the finding the following exchange occurred between counsel and
the court.
Mr. Moore:
The Court:
Mr. Moore:
The Court:
Judge, there’s one or two things we would like a
ruling on. What do you find the impairment rating to
be on binaural for Mr. Shoulders? Is it –
21.9
And one other thing, Judge. The way the statute’s
worded - - I think Mr. Butler will agree with me on
this. The scheduled member is 150 weeks for both
ears. So what we do is multiply 54.75 percent times
150 weeks, and that’s what we come up with?
Right.
These passages demonstrate that the court added the impairment ratings testified to by Dr.
1
For injuries occurring after July 1, 2004, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A)
excludes permanent hearing loss in both ears from the 1.5 times multiplier.
10
David Scott Haynes for impairment to the scheduled member, hearing loss to both ears, Tenn. Code
Ann. § 50-6-207(3)(A)(ii)(r), with a rating to the body as a whole for the tinnitus which is an
unscheduled member to be calculated as an impairment to the body as a whole. Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 50-6-207(3)(F). Thereafter, the court used a 2.5 multiplier of this blended impairment to make the
finding of 54.75 percent to the scheduled member hearing loss to both ears. The trial court was not
limited to 2.5 multiplier for injury to a scheduled member prior to July 1, 2004. All of the medical
testimony in this case is presented by way of deposition and we are able to make our own
independent assessment of the medical proof to determine where the preponderance of the evidence
lies. Cleek v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 19 S.W.3d at 774. We have agreed with the trial court in
concluding that the insignificant occasional tinnitus should be disregarded as it was not complained
of by Mr. Shoulders or shown to be work-related by the proof. However, it was error for the court
to add the rating for tinnitus to the impairment rating for the scheduled member to calculate the
award for a scheduled member award. Dr. Haynes ascribed an impairment of 20.9 percent to the
loss of hearing in both of Mr. Shoulders’ ears. Both Dr. Haynes and Dr. Speyer concurred that part
of the loss of hearing was not work-related but the result of ageing or other processes. Dr Speyer
could not quantify which was attributed to the exposure to work-related noise and that which was
not work-related. However, Dr. Haynes was of the opinion, based on his experience and training,
that 60 percent of the hearing loss was work-related. Our review of the record demonstrates that Dr.
Haynes is a physician that specializes in the treatment of ear disorders. He is board-certified in
otolaryngology with a specialty certification in otology and neurotology. He is a board examiner
with respect to board certifications in this area and is an associate professor and director of
otology/neurotology department at Vanderbilt University. Our review of this record demonstrates
that there was a significant difference in the ratings of Dr. Speyer and Dr. Haynes as to the hearing
loss. TRW insisted that the additional loss demonstrated by Dr. Haynes report a few months after
that of Dr. Speyer was evidence that Mr. Shoulders’ hearing loss was attributed to something other
than work as he had retired prior to seeing Dr. Speyer. However, Dr. Haynes dismissed that point
of view and justified the difference as being related to different testers and different audiograms.
In evaluating the relative persuasiveness of the testimony of the physicians, courts should consider
the “qualifications of the experts, the circumstances of their examination, the information available
to them, and the evaluation of importance of that information by other experts.” Orman v. Williams
Sonoma, Inc., 803 S.W.2d 672, 677 (Tenn. 1991).
We conclude that Dr. Haynes medical proof preponderates and that Mr. Shoulders suffered
a 20.9 percent loss of hearing to both ears of which 60 percent was caused by exposure to noise in
his work environment at TRW. In order to prevent the delay associated with a remand to the trial
court to redetermine the award based on these conclusions, we have determined to follow the same
rationale demonstrated by the trial court and make an award of 31.35 percent to the scheduled
member loss of hearing both ears or for forty-seven weeks of compensation.
VII. Compensation Rate
TRW takes the position in this appeal that the trial court erred in applying a compensation
rate as of February 28, 2003, when Mr. Shoulders retired, as opposed to the rate that was established
11
based on his work history in January 1994, when he obtained a hearing aid for his right ear and had
a belief that his hearing loss was work-related.
This issue is resolved by our finding that Mr. Shoulders’ hearing loss was a gradual work
injury that is compensable under the rationale of Barnett, 197 S.W.3d at 721. Therefore, we find that
the trial court did not err in determining the compensation rate applicable to this injury based on Mr.
Shoulders’ work history just prior to his retirement.
VIII. Conclusion
After a careful review, we hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that the claim of
Mr. Shoulders was timely. However, we find that the trial court erred in refusing to allow counsel
to read portions of Mr. Shoulders’ deposition but find that error harmless. We also conclude that
the trial court erred in the determination of the disability to the scheduled member, loss of hearing
both ears, and we reverse and modify those findings. This case is remanded to the trial court for the
entry of an order consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellant, Trw
Commercial Steering Division, and its surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.
_____________________________
J. S. DANIEL, SENIOR JUDGE
12
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
SPECIAL WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS PANEL
NOVEMBER 27, 2006 SESSION
RICKY SHOULDERS v. TRW COMMERCIAL STEERING DIVISION
Circuit Court for Trousdale County
No. 03-1-D-37
No. M2006-00300-WC-R3-CV - Filed - April 3, 2007
JUDGMENT
This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special
Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its
findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference.
Whereupon, it appeals to the Court that the Memorandum Opinion of the Panel should be
accepted and approved; and
It is, therefore, ordered that the Panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law are adopted and
affirmed, and the decision of the Panel is made the judgment of the Court.
Costs will be paid by the Appellant, TRW Commercial Steering Division, and its surety, for
which execution may issue if necessary.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
PER CURIAM
13
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.