Lawrence Taylor v. Pya/Monarch, Inc., et al
Annotate this CaseCourt Description:
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Robert E. Corlew, III, Chancellor
This case is before the Court upon motion for review pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(5)(B), the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference;
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE LAWRENCE E. TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PYA/MONARCH, INC. d/b/a SPECIALTY DISTRIBUTION, INC., Defendant-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) FILED February 29, 2000 Rutherford Chancery No. 97WC-962 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk Hon. Robert E. Corlew, III, Chancellor NO. M1999-01766-SC-WCM-CV Affirmed in part; Reversed in part and Remanded JUDGMENT ORDER This case is before the Court upon motion for review pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(5)(B), the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference; Whereupon, it appears to the Court that the motion for review is untimely and should be dismissed. It is, therefore, ordered that the Panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law are adopted and affirmed, and the decision of the Panel is made the judgment of the Court. Costs are taxed equally to both parties. It is so ORDERED. PER CURIAM Birch, J., Not Participating IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR TENNESSEE SPECIAL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS PANEL AT NASHVILLE LAWRENCE E. TAYLOR, Plaintiff/Appellant, vs. PYA/M ONAR CH, IN C. d/b/a SPE CIALTY DISTR IBUT ION, IN C., Defendant/Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) M1999-01766-SC-WCM-CV RUTHERFORD COU NTY Hon. R obert E . Corlew , III No. 97WC-962 FILED February 29, 2000 FOR THE APPELLANT: APPELLEE: FOR THE R. STEVE N WALD RON, Es quire LEWIS, Es quire 202 W est Main Street Murfreesboro, Tennessee 37130 8745 JOHN R. Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk P.O. Box 198745 Nashville, Tennessee 37219- MEMORANDUM OPINION MEMBERS O F PANEL: ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., JUSTICE LLOYD TATUM, SENIOR JUDGE CAROL L. MCCOY, SPECIAL JUDGE OPINION FILED: Affirmed in pa rt Reversed in part and Remanded. CAROL L. MCCOY Special Judge MEMORANDUM OPINION This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to T.C.A. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellate review is de novo upon the rec ord of the trial court accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the prepon deranc e of the ev idence is otherwis e. T.C.A . § 50-6-2 25(e). T o satisfy this stand ard of revie w, this Co urt mus t condu ct an inde pende nt exam ination to determ ine whe re the pre ponde rance o f the eviden ce lies. Williams v. Tecumseh Products Co., 978 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Tenn. 1998). There is no presumption of correctn ess acc ompa nying co nclusion s of law. Union Ca rbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W .2d 87, 91 (T enn. 1993 ). The employee, Lawrence E. Taylor (Taylor), has appealed from the trial court’s finding: 1) that he was subject to the cap of 2½ times the impairment rating as provided in T.C.A . § 50-6-2 41(a)(1) , 2) that interest on the judgment entered in favor of Taylor does not begin to accrue with the issuance of the Court’s Memorandum Opinion, but rather with the entry of the judgment order, and 3) that certain discretionary expenses were not recoverable from the defendant employer Specialty Distribution (Specialty) due to an offer of settlement m ade by Sp ecialty. Taylor w orked fo r appellee Specia lty as a truck driver from 1980 to March 13 , 1998. He h ad worked as a truck driver for Kra ft Foods for 15½ years before working for Specialty Distribution. On July 16, 1996, Taylor was unloading his truck when a stack of food cases fell on him caus ing a left shoulder rota tor cuff tear. Over the ne xt year, Taylor’s shoulder was operated on twice and he went back to work doing light duty until July of 1997. By April 23, 1997, Taylor had received maximum medical improvement and Dr. Phillips, his physician, gave him an 18% anatomical impairment. Dr. Phillips stated that he could not lift over 10 pounds with his left arm, or use his left arm in an ou tstretched or overh ead position. D r. Phillips stated that Taylor could not work as a driver of a tractor-trailer truck. On July 9, 1 997, S pecia lty offere d Ta ylor two jobs w hich it b elieved were w ithin Taylor’s job restrictions. One job was a driver trainer; the other was a hostler. He would have earned more as a driver trainer than he was earning as a truck driver 3 at the time of his injury. According to Thomas Brannon (Brannon), the Director of Com plianc e and Emp loyee D evelop men t at Spe cialty, T aylor w as un iquely qualified for this job because he had a good rapport with other drivers and customers and would instruct workers as to how to improve customer relations and their delivery skills. The compa ny also felt that Taylor, as a driver trainer, could help with the problem of high turnover in truck drivers. Taylor rejected the offer of trainer because he did not feel he could perform this job, he did not want to fly (a travel requirement of this job) and he did not want to work with the supervisor of this job. He accepted the hostler job which paid less per hour than he had be en receiving at the time of his injury. In March of 1998, Specialty closed the facility where Taylor was working when its o nly custom er elected not to rene w its contra ct with Sp ecialty. Brannon testified that Taylor was given the option to transfer and Taylor denied he was ever offered this option. Both Brannon and the vocational consultant called on behalf of Specialty, Michael Halloway, testified that the driver trainer job offered to Taylor was within his m edical restrictions. Reb ecca W illiams, the vocational exp ert called on behalf of Taylor, did not state whether or not the driver trainer job was within Taylor’s medical restrictions. Taylor testified that it was not. Although Taylor would have had to use his left arm in a limited way, the primary focus of the job was to pass on his significant knowledge of the delivery business and dealing with customers that he had learned over 30 years in the trucking busin ess. T he co urt foun d that th e em ployer had o ffered a job to T aylor w ithin his restrictio ns an d awa rded T aylor a vocatio nal dis ability eq ual to 2 ½ tim es his impairment rating. To secure the limitation of a cap of 2 ½ times the impairment rating, th e em ployer mus t prove by a pre pond eranc e of the eviden ce tha t it offered a job to the disabled employee within the medical restrictions of the emplo yee. Ogren v. Housecall Health Care, Inc., 1998 WL 202325 (Tenn. 1998) First, Taylor seeks a review of the court’s determination of the credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence. Considerable deference must be accorded the trial court’s factual findings when issues of credibility and weight of oral testim ony is involve d. Krick v. City of Lawren ceburg, 945 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tenn. 1997). Given the substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that the job was within Taylor’s restrictions and the deference which is to be given to the court’s determination of credibility and weight, this Court does not find that 4 the evide nce pre ponde rates ag ainst the trial c ourt’s dete rminatio n that Sp ecialty had offered Taylor a meaningful return to work, that he rejected this offer, and that his vocational disability is therefore limited to the statutory cap of 2½ times the impairm ent rating as provide d in T.C.A. § 5 0-6-241(a)(1). Taylo r’s argu men t that the offer of th e drive r-traine r job wa s not va lid becau se it didn’t exis t is based on spe culation. T he job did not exist prio r to its offer to T aylor, a nd wh en he rejecte d it, it was not filled by any one e lse. Bu t this does n ot prove th at the offer w as for a ph antom job. The emplo yer testified a s to the reasons why Taylor was uniquely qualified and the trial court’s determination of credibility on this issue is, again, entitled to considerable deference. The record does not preponderate against the court’s findings. The s econd issue qu estions th e date fro m whic h interest b egins to accrue on a judgment; is it the date of the trial court’s memorandum and opinion or the date of entry of the judgment. While the controlling statute, T.C.A. § 47-14122 is not a model of clarity, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that interest does accrue on a non-jury civil case on the date of a trial court’s letter setting out the findings of fact and conclusions of law and not the date of entry of the judgm ent. Davis v. Davis , 924 S.W.2d 351 (Tenn. 1996). Accordingly, the judgment in this matter will be modified to provide that interest began to run on the date of the trial court’s memorandum letter of August 26, 1998. The third iss ue co ncern s the tria l court’s denia l of certa in discretionary costs. The trial court denied Taylor’s application for the trial appearance fee for his vocational expert, Ms. Williams, and the $84 deposition copy fee for two witnesses. These fees were incurred after Specialty’s offer of settlement equal to 2½ times the anatomical impairment, the amount of the final judgment. The trial court has discretion in awarding or denying costs not included in the bill of costs prepared by the court clerk. Speciality’s settlement offer was not an o ffer of judgm ent and therefore T.R.C .P. Rule 6 8 does not app ly. However, the costs in question are discretionary. The fact that they were incurred after a settlement offer was made in the amount of the final judgment precludes this court from finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying these costs. The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this order. Costs of the appeal 5 are taxed equally to both parties. It is so ORDERED. ________________________________ Carol L. McCoy, Special Judge CONCUR: ______________________________ Adolpho A. Birch, Associate Justice ___________________________ Lloyd Tatum, Senior Judge 6
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