State of Tennessee vs. Teresa G. Waters
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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
April 22, 2009 Session
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TERESA G. WATERS
Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Fentress County
No. 9224 Shayne Sexton, Judge
No. M2008-01262-CCA-R3-CD - Filed August 21, 2009
After the trial court denied her suppression motion, the Defendant, Teresa G. Waters, pled guilty to
multiple felonies and misdemeanors involving the possession of controlled substances, reserving
several certified questions of law pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2). On appeal, the Defendant
contests the validity of the search warrant used to find the controlled substances in the Defendant’s
residence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID H. WELLES and
JERRY L. SMITH , JJ., joined.
Billy P. Sams, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Teresa G. Waters.
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General;
Clarence E. Lutz, Assistant Attorney General; William Paul Phillips, District Attorney General; John
W. Galloway, Jr., Assistant District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
I. Background
In January 2007, a Fentress County grand jury indicted the Defendant on a total of eleven
counts: count one, felonious possession of 13.9 grams of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled
substance; count two, felonious possession of 129 tablets of methadone, a Schedule II controlled
substance; count three, felonious possession of 163 tablets of oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled
substance; count four, felonious possession of 12 tablets of dihydrocodeinone, a Schedule III
controlled substance; count five, felonious possession of 190 tablets of alprazolam, a Schedule IV
controlled substance; count six, possession of marijuana; count seven, attempt to destroy and conceal
evidence; count eight, bribing a civil servant; count nine, theft of property valued at more than
$1000; and counts ten and eleven, theft of property valued at less than $500.
II. Suppression Hearing
The Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized during a search of her residence. The
trial court subsequently held a hearing where the following evidence was presented: Sheriff Chuck
Cravens of Fentress County testified that, on Sunday, December 17, 2006, he executed a search
warrant for the Defendant’s residence. He recounted that a young man named Brent Hall was
brought to the police station by his father, Danny Hall, and that Brent Hall issued a statement to the
Sheriff.1 Then, both Brent Hall and the Sheriff swore to Magistrate Randy Wright about certain
events involving the Defendant.2 Accordingly, Magistrate Wright issued a search warrant for the
Defendant’s house.
Once Sheriff Cravens obtained the search warrant, which was after 9 p.m. on Sunday, he and
Detective Ronald Whited went to the Defendant’s residence to execute the warrant. The Defendant
lived in a building that was previously a beauty shop, and Sheriff Cravens recalled that the front door
was equipped with a security camera. The front entrance had both a storm door and a solid door.
Sheriff Cravens recalled, “I announced that it was the Sheriff’s Department and we had a search
warrant.” He elaborated, “I announced it loudly. I hollered it.” He said he knocked on the door, but
no one came to answer. At that point, Detective Whited pried open the storm door, and the Sheriff
continued to yell “Sheriff’s Department, search warrant.” Sheriff Cravens said that, even after they
had the storm door open, no one came to the door, so they beat on the solid door and forced it open.
Sheriff Cravens then testified that upon entering the house, he saw Jackie Ogden, one of the
residents of the house, in front of the bathroom door. The officers asked Ogden where the Defendant
was, and she did not respond. Sheriff Cravens then saw that the bathroom door was open a few
inches, so he pushed the door open further, and he saw the Defendant on her hands and knees on the
bathroom floor “putting stuff in the commode.” He asked her to come out of the bathroom, but she
refused. As he backed out of the bathroom, his shoulder hit the bathroom door, and it came off its
hinges. The door fell on the Defendant, and Sheriff Cravens fell on top of the door. Sheriff Cravens
said that while he and Detective Whited gained control of the Defendant, she was commanding
Ogden to flush the commode. Sheriff Cravens told Ogden not to move. Upon inspecting the
commode, Sheriff Cravens removed pills wrapped in cellophane wrappers. He said he removed
“several” pills, including methadone, morphine, and Xanax. He also found pills in a lock box in the
bathroom.
Sheriff Cravens recounted that the police arrested the Defendant and that they subsequently
1
W e will refer to Brent and Danny Hall by their full names for the sake of clarity.
2
In his direct testimony, Sheriff Cravens did not reveal what he and Brent Hall swore to Magistrate W right. The text
of the affidavit of both Sheriff Cravens and Brent Hall is included in our summary of Magistrate W right’s testimony.
2
searched the house. The Defendant’s father was present while the officers completed the search and
created an inventory of the items confiscated.
On cross-examination, Sheriff Cravens testified that he met Brent Hall at the jail on
December 17, 2006. He interviewed Brent Hall that evening for about thirty to forty-five minutes,
and Sheriff Cravens said that Brent Hall was sober. After speaking with Brent Hall, Sheriff Cravens
called General Galloway and requested a search warrant. Magistrate Wright came to the jail and
signed the search warrant after hearing Sheriff Cravens and Brent Hall’s sworn statements. Sheriff
Cravens did not remember Magistrate Wright asking any questions during the five minutes he was
there to consider the warrant. Once the warrant was issued, about seven or eight officers went to the
Defendant’s house. Sheriff Cravens said he was looking for the items Danny Hall had reported
stolen.
Concerning the execution of the search warrant, Sheriff Cravens testified that the Defendant
and her parents knew that he had a search warrant. He recounted, “I showed [the search warrant]
to [the Defendant]. I told her that – when I gained entry to the house that I was there with a search
warrant.” Moreover, he remembered that once they “got [the Defendant] under control, [he] showed
her the search warrant.” Sheriff Cravens also testified that Detective Whited left a copy of the search
warrant at the Defendant’s house and that he knew the Defendant was given a copy of the warrant
while in jail.
Sheriff Cravens testified that Danny Hall filed an incident report of stolen knives and other
items a few weeks prior to the date the search warrant was issued. After filing the report, Danny Hall
had set up a camera, which filmed his son, Brent, stealing the items. Brent Hall, in fact, admitted
to Sheriff Cravens that he traded some of his dad’s possessions at the Defendant’s house. The
Sheriff verified that Brent Hall swore in an affidavit that he went to the Defendant’s house on
December 16, 2006, with the intent to purchase Oxycontin tablets. Sheriff Cravens said that he did
not think he relied on Brent Hall for a previous search warrant. No charges were filed against Brent
Hall for the theft of his father’s items.
Detective Whited testfied that he helped execute the search warrant. He recalled, “We
stopped at the edge of the road . . . walked to the door, and the Sheriff announced ‘Sheriff’s
Department’ there as he knocked on the door. And no one was coming . . . so I made three attempts
before I could even get [the latched storm] door open.” Detective Whited said he believed Sheriff
Cravens said he had a search warrant. Because no one was coming to the door, Sheriff Cravens then
hit the solid door with a battering ram. Once they were inside the house, Detective Whited saw
Ogden standing in the back corner near the closed bathroom door. When he got to the bathroom,
he saw the Defendant kneeling by the commode and “dropping medicines and things inside the
commode.” Detective Whited completed an inventory of the items of the house that the police
confiscated. He also said that he gave the Defendant a copy of the search warrant and the inventory
of the items the police removed from the Defendant’s house when she was in jail. He added that
someone also took a copy of the search warrant to her house.
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On cross-examination, Detective Whited said that he did not hear anyone ask Sheriff Cravens
to produce the search warrant. Additionally, Detective Whited explained that the officers had to
restrain the Defendant in order to take her to the police station.
Magistrate Wright, a Judicial Commissioner of Fentress County, testified that he met with
Sheriff Cravens at the jail on December 17, 2006, and that he issued a search warrant for the
Defendant’s house. Magistrate Wright related that both Brent Hall and Sheriff Cravens spoke with
him and swore to the truth of their statements. In the supporting written affidavit attached to the
search warrant, Magistrate Wright summarized what Brent Hall and Sheriff Cravens told him:
On 16 December 2006, Brent Hall, the son of Dan[n]y Hall, took the above
items to the above location where he traded them to Teresa Waters for [O]xycontin
tablets, which are Schedule II controlled substances. Brent Hall took the said
property from his father, Danny Hall, without his permission. Waters told Brent Hall
that she was going today to pick up a load of 40 mg [O]xycontin tablets. Hall has
been to the above location on several previous [occasions] and has seen marijuana,
methamphetamine, methadone, and morphine. Hall has obtained [O]xycontin from
Waters on numerous [occasions] in the recent past. Waters keeps the drugs in a
locked chest. Brent Hall took the knives and money from Danny Hall’s residence.
Teresa Waters was convicted on 9-9-2002 in the Criminal Court for Fentress
County of the offense of felonious possession of Schedule II controlled substances
(methamphetamine) with the intent to sell. This was case #8328.
Affiant, Sheriff Chuck Cravens has personally interviewed Brent Hall and his
father, Danny Hall. He also knows based on his experience and training that persons
who sell drugs normally keep records and other documents pertaining to the sale of
controlled substances.
Waters and a girlfriend, Jackie, live at the above location.
Magistrate Wright then issued the search warrant, and he kept one copy of it for his own records.
He also stated that in the past he has denied arrest warrants but not any search warrants.
On cross-examination, Magistrate Wright testified that the county commissioner appointed
him the judicial magistrate in September 2006. He believed that his duties included issuing search
warrants, and he stated he had issued twelve search warrants. Magistrate Wright acknowledged that,
if he received any education on probable cause, he would have received it twenty-five years ago. He
said he does not have a physical office, but he does keep copies of the warrants he issues in his
briefcase. Magistrate Wright acknowledged that he did not use the Jacumin or Melson tests when
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he issued the search warrant.3
The Defendant testified that she was arrested the evening of Sunday, December 17, 2006.
She said that the following Tuesday morning, while still in jail, she was given a copy of the search
warrant and an inventory of the items the officers took from her house. The Defendant stated that
she asked the officers for a search warrant when they came into her house but that they did not give
her one. She testified that she did not receive a copy of the search warrant until Tuesday, December
19, 2006.
Bobby Waters, the Defendant’s father, testified that he owned the house in which the
Defendant lived. He stated that he saw the officers pull up to the house in the evening of Sunday,
December 17, 2006, and that when he went to the house to investigate, Detective Whited told him
that he could not approach the scene. Waters said that he then saw the officers “dragging [the
Defendant] across the parking lot,” where they subsequently put her into a patrol car. Waters noticed
that the Defendant’s foot was bleeding, and she told him that her back hurt. Waters stated that he
was not given a search warrant. On cross-examination, Waters said that the Defendant and Ogden
lived together in the house. Waters then stated that he did not ask the Sheriff whether he had a
search warrant.
After hearing this evidence, the trial court found that the officers properly attained and
executed the search warrant for the Defendant’s house and that the evidence gained from that search
was admissible. The Defendant pled guilty to all eleven counts, and she was sentenced to serve an
effective sentence of eight years. Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Defendant reserved her right to appeal four certified questions of law. It is from those
judgments that the Defendant now appeals.
III. Analysis
On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the trial court erred when it admitted the evidence seized
during the December 17, 2006, search of her house. More specifically, she claims: (1) Brent Hall
was a criminal informant, and as a result, his statement did not provide probable cause for the
issuance fo the search warrant; (2) Magistrate Wright failed to comply with the requirements of Rule
41(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure; (3) the officers executing the warrant violated
the “knock and announce” rule; and (4) the Defendant was not given a copy of the search warrant
at the time of the search.
A. Certified Question of Law
3
See State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W .2d 430 (Tenn. 1989) and State v. Melson, 638 S.W .2d 342 (Tenn. 1982). The twopart test to determine whether an informant has provided probable cause for a search warrant was adopted in these
two cases. The Magistrate’s testimony did not include any more information about the test than name references.
W e discuss the two-part test adopted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Jacumin in detail in the analysis portion of
this opinion.
5
Because this appeal comes before us as a certified question of law, pursuant to Rule 37(b)
of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, we must first determine whether the questions
presented are dispositive. An appeal lies from any judgement of conviction upon a plea of guilty if
the defendant entered into a plea agreement under Rule 11(a)(3) but explicitly reserved with the
consent of the State and the court the right to appeal a certified question of law that is dispositive of
the case. Tenn. R. Crim. Proc. 37(b)(2); see State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Tenn. 1988).
Further, the following are prerequisites for an appellate court’s consideration of the merits of a
question of law certified pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2):
(i) The judgment of conviction, or other document to which such judgment refers that
is filed before the notice of appeal, contains a statement of the certified question of
law reserved by the defendant for appellate review;
(ii) The question of law is stated in the judgment or document so as to identify clearly
the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved;
(iii) The judgment or document reflects that the certified question was expressly
reserved with the consent of the state and the trial judge; and
(iv) The judgment or document reflects that the defendant, the state, and the trial
judge are of the opinion that the certified question is dispositive of the case . . . .
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv).
The Defendant’s issues on appeal all meet these requirements. She pled guilty, and the first
page of the judgment forms stated:
Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure the defendant
explicitly reserves the right to appeal the certified question of law as contained in the
attachment to the defendant’s plea agreement with the consent of the State and this
Court; and all the parties and the Court are of the opinion that the certified question
is dispositive of the case. The said defendant’s statement of the certified question is
incorporated by reference herein.
We agree that the questions attached to the Defendant’s plea agreement are dispositive of the case.
According to Rule 41 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, if the search warrant was issued
without probable cause, the magistrate failed to comply with record-keeping requirements, the
officers violated the “knock and announce” rule, or the defendant was not given a copy of the search
warrant at the time of the search of her house, then any evidence gathered from the search could be
excluded. We conclude that the issues the Defendant raises on appeal through her certified questions
of law are properly before this Court.
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B. Search Warrant’s Issuance and Execution
In general, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s finding that the search warrant executed
at her house on December 17, 2006, was legally issued and executed. According to State v. Odom,
“a trial court’s findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be upheld unless the evidence
preponderates otherwise.” 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). Additionally, the prevailing party in
the trial court is “entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression
hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.”
Id. Furthermore, “[q]uestions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence,
and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.”
Id. Despite the deference to the trial court for factual issues, this Court reviews the trial court’s
application of the law to the facts de novo, without any deference to the trial court’s determinations.
State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001).
1. Warrant’s Issuance
a. Brent Hall’s Affidavit Supporting the Search Warrant
The Defendant first contends that, because Brent Hall was a criminal informant and because
Magistrate Wright admittedly did not apply the Jacumin test, Brent Hall’s statements were not
reliable and could not have given the Magistrate probable cause to issue the search warrant. The
State counters that, because Brent Hall delivered his sworn statement to Magistrate Wright in person,
the Magistrate was able to make a credibility finding. Furthermore, the State argues, Sheriff Cravens
corroborated Brent Hall’s statement. As such, the State posits, the Magistrate properly decided that
there was probable cause that the Defendant received stolen property in exchange for drugs, and thus
probable cause to issue the search warrant.
We began our analysis with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that citizens have a right
in their homes against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, will not be violated, and no warrants will
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). Similarly, Article I, Section 7 of
the Tennessee Constitution provides that:
[T]he people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from
unreasonable searches and seizures; and that general warrants, whereby an officer
may be commanded to search suspected places, without evidence of the fact
committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offences are not
7
particularly described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and not to
be granted.
Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7. “[A] search warrant shall be issued only on the basis of an affidavit, sworn
before a ‘neutral and detached’ magistrate, which establishes probable cause of its issuance.” State
v. Stevens, 989 S.W.2d 290, 293 (Tenn. 1999) (citing State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn.
1989) and State v. Moon, 841 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)). The Tennessee Supreme
Court has stated that “probable cause requires, generally, reasonable grounds for suspicion,
supported by circumstances indicative of an illegal act.” Stevens, 989 S.W.2d at 293.
When a court reviews an affidavit for probable cause, the court must first determine whether
the informant was a citizen informant, a criminal informant, or neither. Williams, 193 S.W.3d at
507. A citizen informant is a citizen or bystander who “acts with an intent to aid the police in law
enforcement because of his concern for society or for his own safety.” Id.; Stevens, 989 S.W.2d at
294 (quoting State v. Smith, 867 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)). Additionally, a citizen
informant “does not expect any gain or concession in exchange for his information.” Id. The
information provided by the citizen informant is presumed reliable. Id. at 293. In contrast, a
criminal informant is someone from the criminal milieu, or, in other words, a “citizen with ties to
the criminal community.” Williams, 193 S.W.3d at 507; Melson, 638 S.W.2d at 355; State v. Marcus
Richards, No. M2006-02179-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 343150, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville,
Feb. 6, 2008), perm. app. granted (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2008). Often, a criminal informant is described
as a citizen who supplies information to the police “in exchange for some concession, payment, or
simply out of revenge against the subject.” Stevens, 989 S.W.2d at 294. Since the criminal
informant might have a “motive to exaggerate, falsify, or distort the fact to serve [personal] ends,”
the information must be examined by a magistrate under a two-part analysis: (1) the affidavit must
show the basis for the informant’s knowledge; and (2) the affidavit must show the reliability of the
informant or the information (“Jacumin test”). Id. at 293-94 (citing State v. Cauley, 863 S.W.2d
411, 417 (Tenn. 1993)); Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 436 (adopting the tests enunciated in Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S.108 (1964) and Spinelli v. U.S., 393 U.S. 410 (1969)); Williams, 193 S.W.3d at 507
(quoting State v. Marcus, 660 N.W.2d 837, 842 (2003)). If the informant is neither clearly a citizen
informant nor clearly a criminal informant, then “absent ‘additional particularized information in the
affidavit’ to bolster or corroborate that the information was supplied by a concerned citizen
informant, the affidavit must satisfy the two-pronged ‘basis of information’ and ‘reliability’ test for
information supplied by a criminal informant. State v. Siliski, 238 S.W.3d 338, 367 (Tenn. Crim.
App., 2007) (quoting Williams, 193 S.W.3d at 507-08).
After considering the testimony and the issues, the trial court found that the search warrant
was supported by probable cause:
The search warrant affidavit established probable cause to search for the items
named in the search warrant as the reliability of the informant and his information
was sufficiently supported even though he was not a citizen informant as (a) the
informant was named in the search warrant; (b) the information he provided was
8
against his penal interest and was directly related to the criminal activity on the part
of the defendant[]; (c) the information was detailed as to the type and location of the
drugs in the residence; (d) the informant personally appeared before the Magistrate
and swore to the information contained in the affidavit; and (e) the defendant, Ms.
Waters, had a criminal conviction in September 2002 for the felonious possession of
a Schedule II Controlled Substance.
In this case, the affiant, Brent Hall, had been caught on videotape by his father stealing his
father’s property. His father then took him to the police station, where Brent Hall admitted to Sheriff
Cravens and to the Magistrate that he stole the items to trade them with the Defendant for controlled
substances. The affiant had ties to the criminal community, and he was from the criminal milieu.
See Williams, 193 S.W.3d at 507; see also Melson, 638 S.W.2d at 355.
Since Brent Hall was a criminal informant, the Magistrate needed to determine the basis and
reliability of the information Hall presented. Stevens, 989 S.W.2d at 293-94. Although the
Magistrate acknowledged that he did not know the Jacumin test by name, there was sufficient
probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant. Brent Hall spoke against his own
interest by divulging that he had stolen property from his father and exchanged that property for
drugs at the Defendant’s house. Brent Hall said that he had done this several times and that when
he was at the Defendant’s house, he saw several types of drugs. Sheriff Cravens’s statement that the
Defendant has a previous conviction for possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with the
intent to sell corroborated Brent Hall’s claim that the Defendant was selling drugs from her house.
Additionally, since Brent Hall spoke directly with Magistrate Wright, the Magistrate could make a
credibility determination about Hall and the information he provided. We conclude that the affidavit
used to support the search warrant showed the basis for the informant’s knowledge and the
Magistrate was able to verify the reliability of the informant and the information. See Jacumin, 778
S.W.2d at 436. Consequently, the Magistrate had probable cause to authorize the search warrant.
The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.
b. Record-Keeping Requirement under Rule 41(d)
The Defendant next alleges that the evidence seized from the search should be suppressed
because the Magistrate did not comply with the record-keeping rule, as prescribed in the Tennessee
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Specifically, the Defendant objects to the Magistrate storing his copy
of the search warrant in his briefcase and not in an office.
Rule 41(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the magistrate who signs
a search warrant to keep a copy of that warrant: “The magistrate shall prepare an original and two
exact copies of each search warrant. The magistrate shall keep one copy as a part of his or her
official records.”
After considering this issue, the trial court succinctly stated, “The issuing magistrate properly
retained an exact copy of the search warrant.”
9
The issue on appeal is whether storing copies of search warrants in a briefcase amounts to
“keep[ing] one copy as part of his . . . official records.” The Rules of Criminal Procedure do not
require a magistrate to keep copies of search warrants in any specific manner. Rather, as this Court
has discussed in the past, the purpose of this Rule is to “protect[] against any post-issuance alteration
of the original warrant” and to “give[] the judge control to insure that the warrant is executed and
returned to the magistrate in a timely manner.” State v. Brewer, 989 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1997) (citing State v. Gambrel, 783 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989)). In our view,
a briefcase is adequate to store a magistrate’s copy of a search warrant. We agree with the trial
court’s finding, and we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.
2. Search Warrant’s Execution
a. “Knock and Announce” Compliance
The Defendant claims that the officer executing the warrant for the search of her home did
not wait a sufficient amount of time before entering her home. The State disagrees, claiming that
the Defendant had plenty of time to open the door. Additionally, the State argues that the officers
were acting appropriately because the Defendant had contraband that was in danger of being
destroyed.
Rules 41(e)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure prescribes how an officer is to
execute a search warrant:
If, after notice of his or her authority and purpose, a law enforcement officer
is not granted admittance . . . the peace officer with a search warrant may break open
any door or window of a building or vehicle, or any part thereof, described to be
searched in the warrant to the extent that it is reasonably necessary to execute the
warrant and does not unnecessarily damage the property.
In sum, an officer who is to execute a search warrant “must give: (1) notice of his authority; and (2)
the purpose of his presence at the structure to be searched.” State v. Perry, 178 S.W.3d 739, 745
(Tenn. Crim. App., 2005) (citing State v. Lee, 836 S.W.2d 126, 128 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) and
State v. Fletcher, 789 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)). These requirements may be met
by a “knock and announce” procedure, where the officer knocks on the door and announces that he
has a search warrant to search the house. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 933-34 (1995).
The “knock and announce” procedures are unnecessary where exigent circumstances exist
before or during a search. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997); State v. Henning, 975
S.W.2d 290, 299-300 (Tenn. 1998). For example, when an officer observes actions or sounds
“indicative of the destruction of evidence [such as] running, scuffling, or toilet flushing,” the police
may be able to enter a dwelling without knocking. Fletcher, 789 S.W.2d at 566 (citing Keith v.
State, 542 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976)); Henning, 975 S.W.2d 299-300.
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This Court has held that Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g), which requires
exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence, required suppression of evidence seized in violation
of “knock and announce” procedures. State v. Curtis, 964 S.W.2d 604, 609 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1997); see Tenn. R. Crim. P. 41(g)(1). We note, however, that the United States Supreme Court
recently held that the United States Constitution does not require exclusion of material seized in
violation of “knock and announce” procedures. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006).
Because we conclude in this case that the law enforcement personnel complied with the “knock and
announce” requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, it is not necessary for us to
address Hudson’s effect upon the admissibility of evidence seized in violation of “knock and
announce” procedures.
The trial court found that “[t]he officers serving the search warrant gave the defendant[]
adequate notice of the search warrant before making forcible entry of the residence and that such
entry was further necessitated by evidence of exigent circumstances.”
In this case, we conclude that the trial court appropriately denied the Defendant relief on this
issue. The officers knocked on the door and announced that they had a search warrant. They noticed
surveillance equipment was set up to see who was at the door. The police then spent time prying
open the storm door while continuing to announce their presence. Still no one answered the door.
The police then forced their way into the house by ramming open the solid door. The Defendant had
adequate time to respond to the police officer’s clearly announced arrival. Given our holding, any
analysis on whether exigent circumstances existed is unnecessary. The Defendant is not entitled to
relief on this issue.
b. Service of Warrant upon the Defendant
Finally, the Defendant claims that she was not given a copy of the search warrant at the time
of the search, which is required by Rule 41 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State
counters that this is an issue of credibility, because the officers testified that they did give the
Defendant a copy of the search warrant, and that this Court is bound by the trial court’s credibility
findings.
Rule 41(e)(4) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure directs that the officer who
executes a search warrant “shall: (A) give to the person from whom or from whose premises the
property was taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property; or (B) shall leave the copy
and receipt at a place from which the property was taken.” If the police officer fails to leave a copy
of the warrant with the person on who the search warrant was served, then the evidence gathered
during the seizure may be excluded from trial. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 41(g)(6).
The trial court found that “[t]he [D]efendant was properly and timely served with a copy of
the search warrant and a receipt for the items seized.”
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Our review of the evidence shows that Sheriff Cravens showed the Defendant the search
warrant when he entered her house to conduct the search. Then, a police officer left a search warrant
at her house when the officers were finished searching. Additionally, the Defendant received a copy
of the search warrant and the inventory while she was in jail. The Defendant has not presented any
proof that preponderates against the trial court’s finding that she was given a copy of the search
warrant in a timely fashion. Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23. As such, the Defendant is not entitled to
relief on this issue.
III. Conclusion
After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court
properly found that the search warrant was issued and executed lawfully and that the evidence seized
from the Defendant’s house was admissible. As such, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
_________________________________
ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE
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