Rendell Corey Jones vs. James T. Fortner, Warden
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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
Assigned on Briefs June 23, 2009
RENDELL COREY JONES v. JAMES T. FORTNER, WARDEN
Appeal from the Circuit Court for McMinn County
No. 08-469
Amy A. Reedy, Judge
No. E2009-00233-CCA-R3-HC - Filed October 20, 2009
The Petitioner, Rendell Corey Jones, appeals pro se from the McMinn County Circuit Court’s
summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus in which he contends that his
sentences have expired and that he is entitled to immediate release. We affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
JOSEPH M. TIPTON , P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., and
NORMA MCGEE OGLE , JJ., joined.
Rendell Corey Jones, Only, Tennessee, Pro Se.
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Leslie E. Price, Assistant Attorney General;
and Robert Steve Bebb, District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
The Petitioner was convicted on November 14, 2000, on his guilty pleas to the following
Sumner County offenses:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Facilitation of Aggravated Robbery, a Class C felony, five-year sentence to
be served as one year of confinement and four years of community
corrections consecutive to Count (3);
Facilitation of Aggravated Robbery, a Class C felony, six-year sentence to be
served in the Department of Correction (DOC) consecutive to Count (3);
Aggravated Assault, a Class C felony, four-year sentence to be served in the
DOC consecutive to Counts (1) and (2).
The Petitioner was convicted on his guilty pleas on October 12, 2005, of the following McMinn
County offenses:
(1)
(2)
Statutory Rape, a Class E felony, three-year sentence to be served in the DOC
consecutively to the Sumner County sentences in which he had violated
parole;
Sexual Battery, a Class E felony, three-year sentence to be served in the DOC
consecutively to the Sumner County sentences in which he had violated
parole.
The Petitioner, who was incarcerated in Hickman County, filed a pro se petition for the writ
of habeas corpus in McMinn County Circuit Court on December 29, 2008, in which he alleged that
his sentences had expired and that he was being incarcerated illegally. He attached documents which
purport to be Tennessee Offender Management Information System (TOMIS) printouts from the
DOC reflecting his progress in completing his sentences. The Petitioner also alleged that should the
trial court treat the petition as one for post-conviction relief, the statute of limitations should not be
applied because his grounds for relief arose after the expiration of the limitations period. The trial
court entered an order on January 12, 2009, dismissing the petition. The court found that “nothing
on the face of the judgments of the record . . . [gave] rise for relief under a writ of habeas corpus in
this jurisdiction” and that the petition neither raised a constitutional issue cognizable as a postconviction matter nor alleged a proper basis for avoiding the post-conviction statute of limitations
bar.
In this appeal, the Petitioner claims the trial court erred in denying habeas corpus relief, in
dismissing his petition without appointing counsel and conducting a hearing, and in denying relief
under the post-conviction statute. The State responds that the trial court correctly dismissed the
petition. We agree with the State.
In Tennessee, the grounds upon which habeas corpus relief may be granted are very narrow.
Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999). The writ will issue only when the petitioner has
established lack of jurisdiction for the order of confinement or that he is otherwise entitled to
immediate release because of the expiration of his sentence. See Ussery v. Avery, 222 Tenn. 50, 432
S.W.2d 656 (1968); State ex rel. Wade v. Norvell, 1 Tenn. Crim. App. 447, 443 S.W.2d 839 (1969).
The purpose of the habeas corpus petition is to contest a void, not merely a voidable, judgment.
State ex rel Newsome v. Henderson, 424 S.W.2d 186, 189 (1969). A void, as opposed to a voidable,
judgment is “one that is facially invalid because the court did not have the statutory authority to
render such judgment.” See Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tenn. 2007). A petitioner
bears the burden of establishing a void judgment or illegal confinement by a preponderance of the
evidence. See Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tenn. 2000). A court may summarily dismiss
a petition for habeas corpus relief, without the appointment of counsel and without an evidentiary
hearing, if the petition does not state a cognizable claim. See Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 20
(Tenn. 2004).
The Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition as not stating a claim
for relief “in this jurisdiction.” He argues that the petition was properly filed in McMinn County,
even though he was incarcerated in Hickman County, because McMinn County entered the
judgments of conviction that were under attack.
-2-
The trial court’s order dismissing the petition states that the judgments and the record “reflect
nothing . . . that give[s] rise for relief under a writ of habeas corpus in this jurisdiction.” We believe
that this finding is ambiguous with respect to whether it addresses the venue in which the petition
was filed.
The Code states, “The application should be made to the court or judge most convenient in
point of distance to the applicant, unless a sufficient reason be given in the petition for not applying
to such court or judge.” T.C.A. § 29-21-105 (2000). However, this court has said that a habeas
corpus petitioner states a sufficient basis for filing his petition in the county of conviction, rather
than the court that is the closest point of distance, when his petition alleges that his sentence is illegal
and that the records of the conviction are in the county in which the petition has been filed. Davis
v. State, 261 S.W.3d 16 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008), app. denied (Tenn. June 30, 2008). Whether the
trial court intended this as a free-standing basis for dismissing the petition, any error was harmless
because, as discussed below, the petition was properly dismissed on substantive grounds.
According to the judgment documents attached to the petition, the Petitioner was sentenced
in November 2000 to an effective ten-year sentence, for which his parole was revoked. He was later
sentenced to serve an additional three years consecutively to the 2000 sentences. On the face of the
judgments, the Petitioner’s sentences have not expired. Rather, it appears that the true nature of the
Petitioner’s complaint is with the DOC’s calculation of sentencing credits.
A petitioner may seek relief from an illegal sentence through a petition for the writ of habeas
corpus, the denial of which is appealable as of right. See generally T.C.A. §§ 29-21-101 to -130
(2000) (Habeas Corpus). However, disputes over sentence reduction credits which accrued during
a petitioner’s incarceration in the custody of the DOC are cognizable under the Administrative
Procedures Act. Carroll v. Raney, 868 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) (holding that
sentence time credits are internal matters of the DOC and are properly addressed through the
Administrative Procedures Act). See generally T.C.A. §§ 4-5-101 to -325 (2005) (Uniform
Administrative Procedures Act). We conclude that the trial court properly determined that the
petition should be dismissed.
We consider next the Petitioner’s claim that the trial court should have appointed counsel and
conducted a hearing on the petition. As noted above, summary dismissal without the appointment
of counsel and without an evidentiary hearing is appropriate if the petition does not state a
cognizable claim. See Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 20.
Finally, we consider the Petitioner’s complaint that the trial court erred in failing to consider
his petition as one for post-conviction relief and allow tolling of the post-conviction statute of
limitations. Post-conviction relief is available “when the conviction or sentence is void or voidable
because of the abridgement of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the
Constitution of the United States.” T.C.A. § 40-30-103 (2006). A complaint of improper sentence
calculation does not fall within this category. As stated above, the proper redress in such a situation
is through the Administrative Procedures Act. Thus, post-conviction relief was not available,
without regard to tolling of the statute of limitations.
-3-
In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of the trial court
is affirmed.
___________________________________
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, PRESIDING JUDGE
-4-
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