State vs. Ricky Tucker
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON APRIL SESSION, 1997 RICKY TUCKER, Appellant vs. STATE OF TENNESSEE, Appellee ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. 02C01-9606-CR-00196 SHELBY COUNTY Hon. W. FRED AXLEY, Judge (Post-Conviction) FILED July 10, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr. For the Appellant: For the Appellee: RICKY TUCKER, Pro Se Register Number 99302 Rt. 1, Box 330 Tiptonville, TN 38079-9775 CHARLES W. BURSON Attorney General and Reporter Appellate C ourt Clerk CLINTON J. MORGAN Assistant Attorney General Criminal Justice Division 450 James Robertson Parkway Nashville, TN 37243-0493 WILLIAM GIBBONS District Attorney General ALANDA HORNE Asst. District Attorney General Criminal Justice Complex Suite 301 201 Poplar Street Memphis, TN 38103 OPINION FILED: AFFIRMED David G. Hayes Judge OPINION The appellant, Ricky Tucker, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The appellant asserts that the trial court s jury instruction on reasonable doubt was unconstitutional. After a review of the record, we affirm the trial court s judgment. The appellant contends that the reasonable doubt instruction provided by the trial court is constitutionally invalid due to the use of the term moral certainty combined with the mind rest easy language. He argues that these phrases together could have allowed a reasonable juror to find him guilty based on a lower standard of proof than that required for guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the Tennessee Supreme Court has recently held such jury charges to be constitutional, the appellant argues that those decisions do not apply to his case because the court did not specifically address the mind rest easy phrase. See State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 734 (Tenn. 1994) and Pettyjohn v. State, 885 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). This argument, however, is erroneous. In Nichols, the Tennessee Supreme Court held constitutionally valid an instruction which allowed moral certainty to be considered in conjunction with an instruction that [r]easonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of all the proof in the case and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easily upon the certainty of your verdict, Id. (emphasis added). The appellate courts of this state have repeatedly found this jury instruction constitutionally valid. See State v. Sexton, 917 S.W.2d 263, 265-266 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) and Covington v. State, No. 01C01-9606-CC-00250 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Sept. 30, 1996). This claim is without merit. 2 Therefore, we affirm the trial court s decision. ____________________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, Judge CONCUR: _____________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPTON, Judge _____________________________ WILLIAM M. BARKER, Judge 3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
