James Laurent v. St. Michael's Country Day School
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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
WASHINGTON, SC.
SUPERIOR COURT
(FILED: April 30, 2013)
JAMES LAURENT
v.
ST. MICHAEL’S COUNTRY
DAY SCHOOL
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C.A. No. WC-2009-0545
DECISION
STERN, J. This case is before this Court on Plaintiff James Laurent‘s Motion to Amend his
Complaint. Oral arguments were entertained before this Court on October 19, 2012. The Court
now issues the following Decision.
I
Facts and Travel
This case arises from Plaintiff James Laurent‘s (Plaintiff) prior employment by
Defendant St. Michael‘s Country Day School (Defendant). Defendant is a private, non-profit
school in Newport, Rhode Island for students in preschool through eighth grade. Compl. ¶¶ 2-3.
Plaintiff was employed as a teacher at the school for twelve (12) years. Id. ¶ 4. In 2009, Plaintiff
accepted an offer for employment during the 2009-2010 academic year. Id. ¶¶ 7-9. Defendant
presented Plaintiff with two (2) copies of the employment contract. Id. ¶ 10. According to an
email from the Defendant‘s Headmaster dated May 9, 2009, all faculty were required to sign and
return these employment offers by May 22, 2009. Id. ¶ 13.
Not all teachers were extended an offer of employment prior to the Headmaster‘s email.
Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff was not one of those teachers and, in fact, he had executed his employment
offer on May 7, 2009, two (2) days prior to the Headmaster‘s email. Id. ¶ 16. Approximately
one month later on June 10, 2009, Plaintiff received a telephone call from the Headmaster,
indicating that Plaintiff had been terminated. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff alleges that he was not given an
opportunity to speak on his behalf either during the telephone conversation with the Headmaster
or subsequently before Defendant‘s Board of Trustees. Id. ¶ 19. The Headmaster, however,
allegedly indicated that the reason for Plaintiff‘s termination was a verbal disagreement that had
taken place between Plaintiff and a co-worker in the faculty lounge several days prior to
Plaintiff‘s termination. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff further alleges that the circumstances surrounding his
termination ―led to the circulation of untrue and scandalous rumors regarding [Plaintiff] in the
small community.‖ Id. ¶ 20.
Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint on August 7, 2009. The Complaint states three
Counts: (1) Count I – Breach of Contract; (2) Count II – Breach of Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing; and (3) Count III – Promissory Estoppel.
Through these Counts,
Plaintiff alleges that he had a binding contract with Defendant based on the executed
employment offer or, even if that employment offer was not binding, that Plaintiff detrimentally
relied on the promises contained therein.
Plaintiff now seeks to amend the Complaint. The proposed Revised First Amended
Complaint contains each of the three Counts alleged in the original Complaint but also seeks to
incorporate six additional Counts: (1) Count IV – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;
(2) Count V – Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; (3) Count VI – Libel, Slander and
Defamation; (4) Count VII – Intentional Destruction of Evidence; (5) Count VIII – Negligent
Destruction of Evidence; and (9) Count IX – For Punitive Damages. Plaintiff has not altered the
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factual allegations in the original Complaint. The Court entertained arguments on October 19,
2012.
II
Standard of Review
Amendment of pleadings is governed by Rule 15 of the Rhode Island Superior Court
Rules of Civil Procedure, which states, in pertinent part:
A party may amend the party‘s pleading once as a matter of course
at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the
pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and
the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar . . . .
Otherwise a party may amend the party‘s pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires.
Super. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (emphasis added). Despite this liberal standard, ―the final decision
whether to allow or to deny an amendment rests within the sound discretion of the trial justice.‖
Mainella v. Staff Builders Indus. Serv., Inc., 608 A.2d 1141, 1143 (R.I. 1992) (citations omitted).
―Reasons for denying leave to amend include undue prejudice, delay, bad faith, and failure to
state a claim.‖
Id. (citing Faerber v. Cavanagh, 568 A.2d 326, 329 (R.I. 1990) (citation
omitted)).
Additionally, Rule 15 permits the amendment of pleadings even where such amendment
seeks to add claims that would otherwise be barred by the relevant statute of limitations. The
rule states, in pertinent part:
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleadings
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment
relates back to the date of the original pleading.
Super. R. Civ. P. 15(c). ―The doctrine of relation back . . . is intimately connected with the
policy of the statute of limitations . . . [and] the purpose of [the doctrine] is to ameliorate the
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harsher aspects of limitations periods when this can be done without surprise or prejudice to the
opposing party.‖ 27A Federal Procedure Lawyer‘s Ed. § 62:332 at 121.
III
Analysis
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on August 7, 2009; however, the instant Motion to Amend
that Complaint was not filed until mid-2012. Thus, it is clear that this amendment could not
have been made ―as a matter of course.‖ Super. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Thus, Plaintiff filed the instant
Motion to Amend ―by leave of court.‖ Id. It is well-accepted that such ―leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires.‖ Id.; see Medeiros v. Cornwall, 911 A.2d 251, 253 (R.I. 2006)
(noting that the ―true spirit of the rule is exemplified in the words ‗. . . and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires‘‖) (quoting Ricard v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 113 R.I.
528, 540, 324 A.2d 671, 677 (1974)); see also Serra v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 463 A.2d 142,
150 (R.I. 1983) (reiterating ―that trial justices should liberally allow amendments to the
pleadings‖). Mindful of the liberal standard under Rule 15(a), this Court notes that ―the decision
to grant or to deny a motion to amend a complaint is confided to the sound discretion of [this
Court].‖ Harodite Indus., Inc. v. Warren Elec. Corp., 24 A.3d 514, 529 (R.I. 2011) (citations
omitted). As such, ―‗great deference [is given] to the trial justice‘s ruling on a motion to
amend.‘‖ Id. (quoting Catucci v. Pacheco, 866 A.2d 509, 513 (R.I. 2005)).
A
Proposed Counts IV—VI: Tort Claims
This Court must first determine whether ―justice so requires‖ amendment to add the tort
claims in Counts IV, V, and VI of the proposed Revised First Amended Complaint to the
existing three Counts of the original Complaint.
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Those claims state causes of action for:
(1) Count IV – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (2) Count V – Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress; and (3) Count VI – Libel, Slander and Defamation.
At the outset, the Court notes that these three proposed Counts ―asserted in the amended
pleadings arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set
forth in the original pleading.‖ Super. R. Civ. P. 15(c). Thus, these Counts relate back to the
date of the original Complaint and, therefore, there is no danger of these Counts being barred by
the relevant statutes of limitation. See id. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the
factual allegations contained in the original Complaint are unaltered by the proposed Revised
First Amended Complaint.
For example, the original Complaint states that Defendant‘s actions ―led to the circulation
of untrue and scandalous rumors regarding [Plaintiff] in the small community, which rumors
[Defendant] did nothing to stop or correct.‖ Compl. ¶ 20; Revised First Am. Compl. ¶ 20. The
inclusion of this factual allegation in the original Complaint could serve as support for the nowproposed Counts IV and V, alleging intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
See Revised First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-39. That same factual allegation could similarly serve as a
basis for the now-proposed Count VI, alleging ―Libel, Slander and Defamation.‖
See id.
¶¶ 40-43.
That single allegation, however, is not the sole support for the addition of the proposed
Counts IV, V, and VI.
Indeed, Plaintiff makes clear in those proposed Counts that the
circumstances underlying his claims arose from his ―termination from employment.‖
Id.
¶¶ 34, 37. The circumstances surrounding Plaintiff‘s termination were set forth in twenty-three
(23) numbered paragraphs in the original Complaint. Those twenty-three (23) paragraphs remain
unaltered in the Revised First Amended Complaint. Thus, it is clear that the proposed Counts
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IV, V, and VI ―arose out of the conduct . . . set forth . . . in the original pleading.‖ Super. R. Civ.
P. 15(c). As such, these Counts relate back to the date of the original Complaint and there is no
potential statute of limitations problem with permitting amendment as to these Counts. See id.
Because these Counts relate back to the date of the original Complaint—and mindful of
the liberal standard that this Court should freely grant leave to amend ―when justice so
requires‖—the Court grants Plaintiff‘s Motion to Amend as to Counts IV, V, and VI of the
proposed Revised First Amended Complaint. In reaching this decision, the Court notes that the
proposed Counts are intimately linked to the underlying factual circumstances proposed in the
original Complaint in such a way that there is no evidence of ―undue prejudice, delay, [or] bad
faith‖ that would require this Court to rule otherwise. Mainella, 608 A.2d at 1143 (citing
Faerber, 568 A.2d at 329 (citation omitted)). For these reasons, this Court grants Plaintiff‘s
Motion to Amend as to the following Counts: (1) Count IV – Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress; (2) Count V – Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (3) Count VI – Libel,
Slander and Defamation.
B
Proposed Counts VII and VIII: Spoliation
Having granted Plaintiff‘s Motion to Amend as to Counts IV, V, and VI of the proposed
Revised First Amended Complaint, the Court now turns to analyze the validity of the proposed
Counts for the intentional and negligent destruction of evidence, also known as spoliation.
Spoliation is simply ―[t]he intentional destruction, mutilation, alteration, or concealment of
evidence.‖ Black‘s Law Dictionary 1409 (7th ed. 1999). ‗―The doctrine of spoliation provides
that ‗the deliberate or negligent destruction of relevant evidence by a party to litigation may give
rise to an inference that the destroyed evidence was unfavorable to that party.‘‖ Mead v. Papa
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Razzi Restaurant, 840 A.2d 1103, 1108 (R.I. 2004) (quoting Tancrelle v. Friendly Ice Cream
Corp., 756 A.2d 744, 748 (R.I. 2000)). However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has yet to
recognize spoliation as an independent cause of action.
See Malinowski v. Documented
Vehicle/Drivers Sys., Inc., 66 Fed. Appx. 216, 222 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that ―[n]either the
Rhode Island legislature nor the Rhode Island Supreme Court has yet established or recognized
the existence of an independent tort for the spoliation of evidence‖). Because spoliation has yet
to be recognized as a cause of action in this State, this Court will now offer a brief overview of
why such a cause of action should be recognized.
1
History of Spoliation Remedies
Destruction of evidence has long been a serious problem in our judicial system. The
importance of preventing such spoliation is crucial to upholding a number of the judicial
system‘s key goals—most significantly, truth and fairness. See Gumkowski, Protecting the
Integrity, 10 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 795, 798 (2005) (citation omitted). Spoliation is
particularly threatening to these goals because ―relevant evidence is critical to the search for the
truth.‖ Id. at 796. Further exaggerating the threat of spoliation is the fact that it ―is truly a
nondiscriminatory offense capable of multiple permutations [and] affects the interests of not only
parties involved in litigation, but third parties as well.‖ Id. And to make matters worse, some
evidence indicates that spoliation is fairly prevalent in our modern judicial system. Id. at 799800 (citing a survey by Harvard Law Professor Charles R. Nesson concluding ―that half of all
litigators described problems with spoliation of evidence as ‗frequent‘ or ‗regular‘‖ in our
system).
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The dangers of spoliation, however, are not new. In fact, the first judicial attempt at
preventing spoliation of evidence is found in a 1722 case from England.
Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722).
See Armory v.
In that case, the court used a jury instruction
permitting the jury to presume the quality of a jewel that had allegedly been destroyed unless the
jeweler could produce the jewel. Id. This remedy ―remained the standard used by English and
American courts for over one hundred years‖ when dealing with the spoliation of evidence. See
Gumkowski, Protecting the Integrity, 10 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 795, 799 (2005) (citation
omitted). However, while the adverse inference in jury instructions remains a widely used
remedy for spoliation of evidence, courts have also imposed sanctions for such conduct. See id.
at 803-04.
The policy considerations behind any remedy for the spoliation of evidence are to
provide redress to those affected and to deter the spoliation in the first instance. Id. at 804. ―The
policy of redress . . . encompasses the idea that a prejudiced party ought to be restored to the
position they would have occupied had the spoliation not occurred . . . [while] deter[ence] . . . is
the punitive rationale that provides the other basis for the remedy.‖ Id. Regardless of the
particular rationale behind any given remedy, the overarching purpose of such remedies is to
lessen the impact of the destruction. See id.
In Rhode Island, spoliation has been addressed as an evidentiary matter warranting jury
instruction1 containing an adverse inference. See, e.g., Youngsaye v. Sussett, 972 A.2d 146, 150
1
The relevant model jury instruction states:
During this trial you have heard testimony that one of the
parties destroyed/mutilated evidence. When evidence is destroyed
we call it ―spoliation‖ of that evidence.
Under certain
circumstances the spoliation of evidence may give rise to an
adverse inference that the destroyed/mutilated evidence would
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(R.I. 2009) (holding that there was ―no error in the trial justice‘s explanation of the law of
spoliation‖); Mead v. Papa Razzi, 899 A.2d 437, 443 (R.I. 2006) (concluding ―that the trial
justice‘s decision to charge the jury with respect to spoliation was appropriate‖); Tancrelle, 756
A.2d at 749 (noting that the Court was ―satisfied that the jury instruction pertaining to spoliation
was appropriate‖). Indeed, the Rhode Island Supreme Court first addressed spoliation in 1996.
See R.I. Hosp. Trust. Nat‘l Bank v. E. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 674 A.2d 1227, 1234 (R.I. 1996).
Since that time, it has become well-established that ―the deliberate or negligent destruction of
have been unfavorable to the position of the party who
destroyed/mutilated it.
Spoliation of evidence may be innocent or intentional, or
somewhere between the two. It is the unexplained and deliberate
destruction/mutilation of relevant evidence that gives rise to an
inference that the thing destroyed/mutilated would have been
unfavorable to the position of the spoliator. If you find that [party
A] destroyed/mutilated [identify evidence at issue] and did so
deliberately then you are permitted to infer that the jury‘s
consideration of that evidence would have been unfavorable to
[party A]‘s position in this case.
In deciding whether the destruction/mutilation of [identify
evidence at issue] was deliberate you may consider all of the facts
and circumstances which were proved at trial and which are
pertinent to that item of evidence. You may consider who
destroyed it, how it was destroyed, the legitimacy or lack of
legitimacy in the reasons given for its destruction, the timing of the
destruction, whether the individual destroying the evidence knew
the evidence might be supportive of the opposing party, whether
the spoliation was intended to deprive the court of evidence, and
any other facts and circumstances which you find to be true. You
may also consider the extent to which it has been shown that the
spoliated evidence would, indeed, have been unfavorable to [party
A]‘s position. If the spoliation of the evidence is attributable to
carelessness or negligence on the part of the spoliator you may
consider whether the carelessness or negligence was so gross as to
amount to a deliberate act of spoliation.
R.I. Bar Ass‘n Super. Ct. Bench/Bar Comm., Model Civil Jury Instructions for Rhode Island §
402.3 (R.I. Bar Ass‘n 2003).
9
relevant evidence by a party to litigation may give rise to an inference that the destroyed
evidence was unfavorable to that party.‖ Tancrelle, 756 A.2d at 748.
As previously discussed, such adverse inferences in jury instructions are the most
common remedies against the spoliation of evidence and have been used since the Armory v.
Delamirie decision in the year 1722.
See Gumkowski, Protecting the Integrity, 10 Roger
Williams U. L. Rev. 795, 805 (2005) (citation omitted). Such an inference is justified because
―[w]hen a party is once found to be fabricating, or suppressing, documents, the natural, indeed,
the inevitable, conclusion is that he has something to conceal, and is conscious of guilt.‖ Warner
Barnes & Co. v. Kokosai Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 102 F.2d 450, 453 (2d Cir. 1939), modified,
103 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1939).
Our Supreme Court has also permitted the imposition of sanctions for the spoliation of
evidence. ―The force and finality of these civil sanctions vary greatly.‖ Gumkowski, Protecting
the Integrity, 10 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 795, 809 (2005).
However, regardless of a
sanction‘s severity, the goal of sanctions for the destruction of evidence is ―to deter spoliation
and restore the prejudiced party to the same position he or she would have been in absent the
destruction of evidence by the opposing party, as well as to shift the burden of an erroneous
judgment to the spoliator.‖ Id. (citation omitted).
Among the available civil sanctions are ―issue preclusion, dismissal, summary judgment,
default judgment, or the exclusion of expert testimony or other evidence.‖ Id. (citation omitted).
In determining which sanction to impose, courts have often considered the following factors:
―‗(1) whether the defendant was prejudiced * * *; (2) whether the prejudice can be cured; (3) the
practical importance of the evidence; (4) whether the [despoiler acted] in good faith or bad faith;
and (5) the potential for abuse if the evidence is not excluded.‘‖ Farrell v. Connetti Trailer Sales,
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Inc., 727 A.2d 183, 187 (R.I. 1999) (quoting Northern Assurance Co. v. Ware, 145 F.R.D. 281,
282-83 (D. Me. 1993) (quotation omitted)). Our Supreme Court has even deemed these factors
appropriate for consideration.
Id.
Yet, while courts balance a number of factors when
determining the severity of the sanction to be imposed, the most important two factors are
typically: (1) the mental state of the person responsible for the spoliation; and (2) the prejudice
or injury faced as a result of the spoliation. Gumkowski, Protecting the Integrity, 10 Roger
Williams U. L. Rev. 795, 809-10 (2005) (citing Margaret M. Koesel et al., Spoliation of
Evidence: Sanctions and Remedies for Destruction of Evidence in Civil Litigation 33 (2000)).
However, courts are unlikely to use the extreme sanctions of dismissal or default judgment
―because courts have a strong desire that cases be decided on the merits.‖ Id. at 810.
Sanctions have also developed to prevent non-parties from destroying relevant evidence.
For example, attorneys remain subject to sanctions for their action under Rhode Island‘s Rules of
Professional Conduct insofar as spoliation has been directly addressed therein. Specifically,
lawyers in this State are prohibited under Rule 3.4(a) from ―unlawfully obstruct[ing] another
party‘s access to evidence or unlawfully alter[ing], destroy[ing] or conceal[ing] a document or
other material having potential evidentiary value.‖ Sup. Ct. Art. V R. 3.4(a). This is based on
the model rule and many states have adopted similar provisions, subjecting lawyers found to be
in violation of the rule ―to fines, suspension, or liability for malpractice.‖
Gumkowski,
Protecting the Integrity, 10 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 795, 811-12 (2005) (citation omitted).
But, despite the wide range of severity encompassed by existing remedies through jury
instructions or sanctions, those traditional remedies remain inadequate to achieve the ultimate
goals of redress and deterrence.
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2
Inadequacy of Traditional Remedies
The inadequacies inherent in the traditional remedies for spoliation are two-fold. First,
sanctions are limited by the very rules that permit their imposition. Second, courts are limited by
jurisdictional requirements from imposing any remedy against a non-party.2
As these
inadequacies are not easily rectified within the confines of the existing remedies, an independent
cause of action for the spoliation of evidence is needed in Rhode Island to accomplish the
ultimate goals of redress and deterrence.
To elaborate as to the first issue, many of the sanctions mentioned in the preceding
section of this memorandum—such as default judgment, summary judgment, and others—arise
from the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thus, the imposition of
sanctions under the Rules of Civil Procedure is inherently limited to the extent provided for
therein. For example, Rule 37(b) provides for the imposition of sanctions during discovery for
failure to comply with a court order. See Super. R. Civ. P. 37(b). However, this rule limits the
court‘s ability to impose sanctions, insofar as it applies only where a party to the litigation
violates a direct order of the court. See id.; see also Gumkowski, Protecting the Integrity, 10
Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 795, 814 (2005) (noting that ―a party only can be sanctioned for
direct violations of a court order or a discovery request‖) (quotation omitted). As a result of
these limitations, parties could actually be encouraged to destroy evidence prior to litigation or
2
This, of course, does not apply to attorneys insofar as they may be sanctioned under Rule 3.4 of
the Rhode Island Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits lawyers from ―unlawfully
obstruct[ing] another party‘s access to evidence or unlawfully alter[ing], destroy[ing] or
conceal[ing] a document or other material having potential evidentiary value.‖ Sup. Ct. Art. V
R. 3.4(a).
12
discovery so as not to be subject to these sanctions. Gumkowski, Protecting the Integrity, 10
Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 795, 815 (2005) (citation omitted).
Even without the restrictions contained in the various Rules of Civil Procedure, this
Court is further limited by jurisdictional requirements, insofar as it can only ―hold a party
responsible for spoliation if that party is before the court.‖ Id. at 816 (citing Jay E. Rivlin, Note,
Recognizing an Independent Tort Action Will Spoil a Spoliator‘s Splendor, 26 Hofstra L. Rev.
1003, 1016 (1998)). Thus, if a non-party is responsible for the spoliation, the court is unable to
hold that party directly responsible because ―all the traditional remedies must be connected to the
underlying lawsuit.‖ Id. This limitation is significant because it prohibits courts in this State
from according adequate relief to those harmed by the destruction of relevant evidence.
Based on the shortcomings of the traditional remedies for spoliation where ―[t]he risk of
being caught is low, and even if caught, the penalties are so lenient that compared to the
significant potential for large benefits from spoliating evidence, . . . the [spoliator] will opt for
the withholding or destruction of evidence.‖ Gumkowski, Protecting the Integrity, 10 Roger
Williams U. L. Rev. 795, 815 (2005) (citation omitted). For this reason, each of the inadequacies
inherent in the traditional remedies for spoliation weighs in favor of recognizing independent
causes of action for the intentional or negligent spoliation of evidence in this State.
To date, every state recognizes the dangers of spoliation; however, only slightly more
than one-quarter of the states have recognized an independent cause of action for spoliation,3
while the others4 continue to ―deal with spoliation of evidence as a rule of evidence rather than a
3
As of December 1, 2008, fifteen jurisdictions across the country had recognized spoliation of
evidence as an independent cause of action. 40 Causes of Action 2d, Causes of Action for
Spoliation of Evidence § 11 (2009).
4
As of December 1, 2008, nineteen other jurisdictions had expressly rejected an independent
cause of action for spoliation of evidence, either in whole or in part. Id.
13
substantive claim or defense.‖ 40 Causes of Action 2d, Causes of Action for Spoliation of
Evidence § 4 (2009). However, spoliation was first recognized as an independent cause of action
in the mid-1980s. Id. § 7 (citing Smith v. Super. Ct., 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829
(2d Dist. 1984), overruled by Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998)).
Since that time, the reasoning set forth in the seminal decision from California ―has been relied
upon by a number of subsequent courts in fashioning the independent tort.‖ Id. As such, it is
clear that the scope of available remedies for spoliation is slowly expanding to address the
inadequacies inherent in the traditional remedies for spoliation.
3.
Failure to State a Claim
In the preceding sections of this Decision, this Court has noted the substantial public
policy interests that weigh in favor of recognizing a cause of action for spoliation in this State.
Furthermore, in ruling on the instant motion, this Court reiterates that amendment of pleadings
under Rule 15 requires that ―leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.‖ Super. R. Civ.
P. 15(a). However, as previously stated, a motion to amend may be denied when the newly
proposed claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Mainella, 608 A.2d at
1143 (citing Faerber, 568 A.2d at 329 (citation omitted)) (―Reasons for denying leave to amend
include undue prejudice, delay, bad faith, and failure to state a claim.‖). Here, there is no
recognized cause of action in Rhode Island for the intentional or negligent destruction of
evidence. See Malinowski, 66 Fed. Appx. at 222 (noting that ―[n]either the Rhode Island
legislature nor the Rhode Island Supreme Court has yet established or recognized the existence
of an independent tort for the spoliation of evidence‖).
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It is true that ―[n]ew and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and the progress
of the common law is marked by many cases of first impression.‖ Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832
(quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 1 at 3 (4th ed. 1971)). However,
our Supreme Court has instructed that ―the creation of new causes of action should be left to the
Legislature.‖ Ferreira v. Strack, 652 A.2d 965, 968 (R.I. 1995) (citations omitted). As such, it is
not the role of this Court to create new causes of action in this State for the destruction of
evidence, despite the strong public policy considerations that weigh in favor of creating such
causes of action.
Having determined that Plaintiff‘s motion must be denied as to the two Counts alleging
the intentional or negligent destruction of evidence, this Court need go no further in discussing
those two Counts. However, this Court notes that—even if the proposed spoliation Counts did
state a valid cause of action—this Court would nonetheless be required to deny the instant
motion as to those two Counts for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
First, even if spoliation was a recognized cause of action in this State, Plaintiff‘s Revised
First Amended Complaint nonetheless fails to state a claim as to the spoliation Counts. If faced
with a subsequent dispositive motion as to the spoliation Counts, this Court would ―examine[]
the allegations contained in the plaintiff's complaint, assume[] them to be true, and view[] them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.‖ Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144, 149 (R.I. 2008)
(citing Ellis v. R.I. Pub. Transit Auth., 586 A.2d 1055, 1057 (R.I. 1991)). In determining
whether such allegations state a claim, this Court need ―look no further than the complaint.‖ R.I.
Affiliate, ACLU, Inc. v. Bernasconi, 557 A.2d 1232, 1232 (R.I. 1989) (citation omitted). Notice
pleading requires only that a pleading setting forth a claim for relief contain ―a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief‖ and ―a demand for judgment
15
for the relief the pleader seeks.‖ See Super. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A complaint need not state all the
possible facts or legal theories to be proven at trial. Arruda v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 273 B.R.
332, 339-40 (D.R.I. 2002); Hyatt v. Village House Convalescent Home, Inc., 880 A.2d 821, 824
(R.I. 2005). Generally, ―a generalized statement of facts is adequate so long as it gives the
defendant sufficient notice to file a responsive pleading.‖ Langadinos v. American Airlines, Inc.,
199 F.3d 68, 72-73 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S. Ct. 99,
102-03 (1957)).
In this matter, the proposed Counts VII and VIII clearly fail to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. A review of the Revised First Amended Complaint reveals that there is not
a single factual allegation as to the destruction of evidence. As such, there are no allegations for
the Court to view ―in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.‖ Palazzo, 944 A.2d at 149
(citation omitted). Furthermore, the total lack of factual allegations as to the destruction of
evidence does not ―give[] the defendant sufficient notice to file a responsive pleading.‖
Langadinos, 199 F.3d at 72-73 (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48, 78 S. Ct. at 102-03). Thus,
Plaintiff‘s proposed spoliation Counts contained in the Revised First Amended Complaint fail to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As previously discussed, a motion to amend may
be denied when the newly proposed claim fails to state a claim. See Mainella, 608 A.2d at 1143
(citing Faerber, 568 A.2d at 329 (citation omitted)). Therefore, even if spoliation was recognized
as a valid cause of action in Rhode Island, the Revised First Amended Complaint would
nonetheless fail to state a claim for spoliation based on a complete lack of factual allegations to
support those claims. As such, Plaintiff‘s proposed spoliation claims fail to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted and, therefore, this Court denies Plaintiff‘s Motion to Amend as to
16
those two Counts: (1) Count VII – Intentional Destruction of Evidence; and (2) Count VIII –
Negligent Destruction of Evidence.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this Decision, this Court grants Plaintiff‘s Motion to Amend
his Complaint as to the following proposed Counts: (1) Count IV – Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress; (2) Count V – Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; (3) Count VI –
Libel, Slander and Defamation; and (4) Count IX – For Punitive Damages.
This Court finds that the remaining two Counts—Counts VII and VIII, alleging the
intentional and negligent destruction of evidence—fail to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. For this reason, this Court denies Plaintiff‘s Motion to Amend his Complaint as to those
two Counts.
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RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT
Decision Addendum Sheet
TITLE OF CASE:
James Laurent v. St. Michael‘s Country Day School
CASE NO:
WC-2009-0545
COURT:
Washington Superior Court
DATE DECISION FILED:
April 30, 2013
JUSTICE/MAGISTRATE:
Stern, J.
ATTORNEYS:
For Plaintiff:
Stephen A. Rodio, Esq.
Michelle L. Felix, Esq.
For Defendant:
Matthew C. Reeber, Esq.
18
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