Timothy C. Harrington v. James Cardono
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS Filed January 8, 2010 PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT TIMOTHY C. HARRINGTON vs. JAMES CARDONO : : : : : C.A. PC-05-0891 DECISION RUBINE, J. This matter was tried to the Court, without a jury, and relates to a real estate purchase and sale agreement (the P&S ) for property located in Cumberland, Rhode Island, and identified as Plat 52l, Lot 262. The Plaintiff, Timothy C. Harrington ( Buyer ), signed a written P&S to buy the property from Defendant, James Cardono ( Seller ). The Buyer now seeks an order of specific performance to require the seller to perform under that P&S agreement (Count I of the Complaint). In the alternative, Buyer seeks damages for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. (Counts II and III of the Complaint.) In his counterclaim, Seller asserts that Buyer breached the contract and seeks to retain the deposit that Buyer made under the agreement. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 ยง 8-2-13. I Facts and Travel The material facts and documents as to this dispute have been agreed to, and set forth in, an Agreed Statement of Facts (introduced as a joint exhibit at trial). It is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. Accordingly, the Court need not make specific findings of fact 1 but will rely on the parties stipulation. Insofar as the Court relies on findings of fact not set forth in the stipulation, it will state them in this Decision. The property was undeveloped. In order for it to be buildable, an individual sewage disposal system permit ( ISDS ) had to be obtained from the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management ( DEM ). The P&S was entered into by the parties on March 17, 2001. The significant issue giving rise to this dispute is the Buyer s contingency contained in Section 22 of the P&S. Said contingency stated that the sale was subject to a successful percolation test, [and] subject to ISDS approval . . . . No specific time limit was agreed upon concerning the time within which Buyer had to obtain the ISDS permit or exercise his contingency. Successful application for an ISDS permit would require a successful percolation test (perc test), and a time frame of sixty days from the signing was set forth as the time for Buyer to obtain the perc test. The Buyer, however, if he chose to waive the contingency[,] could accept the property as is. The parties chose June 30, 2001, as the closing date. The P&S did not contain a time is of the essence clause. The property is situated above a significant amount of ledge, a fact of which the seller was aware because a prior sale was not completed due to the inability of that buyer to obtain ISDS approval. Although several perc tests came back indicating a problem with the ledge under the property, Buyer never exercised his option to cancel the agreement due to negative results pursuant to the contingency clause. However, Buyer was unable to obtain a successful perc test within sixty days, and he did not obtain ISDS approval from DEM until September 28, 2004, at which time DEM sent notice of approval to Buyer. That approval followed several demands by DEM, and several amended applications and requests for variances, which were filed by Buyer based on revised design and engineering. 2 The Buyer did not formally notify Seller of these demands, but Seller followed the applicant s ISDS journey through contacts with the broker, Mr. Thomas J. Bousquet (Mr. Bousquet or broker ). Furthermore, the status of the ISDS process was available online through the DEM website. The Buyer did not learn of the approval until on or about October 4, 2004, at which time Seller s lawyer, Mr. George M. Prescott (Mr. Prescott), advised Seller that approval from DEM had been received, and that Buyer wanted to schedule a closing on the property in accordance with a letter from Mr. Prescott to the broker dated July 24, 2001. It is clear from this chronology that the closing on the property did not occur on or before June 30, 2001, the date stipulated in the P&S. Apparently, due to the fact that the closing did not occur at the scheduled date, Seller was obligated to pay municipal taxes from that date forward amounting to $4,385.42. After Seller learned of the DEM approval and Buyer s desire to schedule a closing after the September 28, 2004 ISDS approval, Seller did not agree to schedule the closing at that time because he deemed Buyer to be in default of the P&S, and deemed the P&S of no further force and effect. However, Seller never notified Buyer or Mr. Bousquet that he considered the P&S to be terminated, nor did he instruct Mr. Bousquet to return the Buyer s $1,000 deposit. In fact, Buyer s attorney, Mr. K. Joseph Shekarski, wrote to Seller about scheduling a closing by letter dated October 14, 2004. Despite this demand for closing, Seller refused to close . Meanwhile, Seller did not stand by idly awaiting notice of the ISDS approval or the exercise by Buyer of termination due to failure of the contingency. The property is contiguous to the site of the CVS corporate headquarters in Cumberland, and a (non-residential) sale to CVS would not require ISDS approval. In August 2004, Seller was contacted by a representative of CVS expressing interest in the property. In response to that inquiry, Seller sent a letter to the CVS representative on August 23, 2004, offering to sell the property to CVS for $150,000 3 ($110,000 more than the amount stipulated in the P&S with Plaintiff), even though the original P&S had not been terminated and Buyer s deposit had not been returned. CVS did not respond to the proposal, and the inquiry never resulted in a P&S with CVS. On January 4, 2005, Buyer filed the instant action in Kent County Superior Court seeking to enforce the P&S through specific performance. In the alternative, he seeks damages for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. In response, Seller filed a counterclaim for breach of contract and he seeks to retain the $1000 deposit as liquidated damages. On February 28, 2005, an order was entered granting Buyer s Motion to Change Venue and Transfer the Case to Providence County Superior Court. II Analysis The question for this Court to determine is whether Buyer is entitled to relief by way of specific performance, and whether the P&S remains in full force and effect despite the passage of more than three years beyond the stipulated closing date. The answer to that question depends in part on whether the delay in Buyer s obtaining ISDS approval excused Seller s performance, or whether, after ISDS approval was obtained in September 2004, Buyer could require the Seller to complete the transaction by scheduling a closing. The Seller s position is that the P&S had expired by its terms and that he, as Seller, is no longer obligated to sell the property to Buyer. While it is clear the stipulated closing date of June 30, 2001, has not been met, the question is whether the demand for closing, by letter dated October 14, 2004 more than three years beyond the agreed closing date is reasonable under the circumstances. See Lajaya v. Fafiyebi, 860 A.2d 680, 688 (R.I. 2004) (stating that in the absence of an enforceable time is of the essence 4 provision, a party has a reasonable time to perform ) (citing Safeway System, Inc., v. Manuel Bros., Inc., 102 R.I. 16, 145-46, 228 A.2d 851, 856-57 (1967)). It is well settled that [t]he grant of a request for specific performance is not a matter of right but rests within the sound discretion of the trial justice. Lajaya, 860 A.2d at 686 (quoting Eastern Motor Inns, Inc. v. Ricci, 565 A.2d 1265, 1269 (R.I. 1989)). Furthermore, [a] grant of specific performance is appropriate when a party to a real estate agreement unjustifiably refuses or fails to perform under the agreement. Id. (quoting Yates v. Hill, 761 A.2d 677, 679 (R.I. 2000)). The duty of good faith and fair dealing, implied in every contract, would require some communication by Seller if he chooses to call off the sale[], since buyer may be incurring expenses [in this case engineering and legal costs] in anticipation of acquiring the properties. Lajaya, 860 A.2d at 687. In general, contract provisions relating to time do not by their mere presence in an agreement make time of the essence thereof so that a breach of the time element will excuse nonperformance. . . . However, this principle does not mean that a party can be completely oblivious to a stipulation in a contract relating to time, but it assumes that a party to a contract will proceed in good faith towards the completion of his undertaking. Also, generally, in contracts for the sale of land, payment or conveyance at the exact time specified in the agreement is not required because the injury caused by delay is little or nothing. Delays are frequent in these transactions; and it is the custom of [people] to overlook them, even though they may have stated in advance that they would not. Lajaya, 860 A.2d at 688 (internal citations and quotations omitted). However, [i]t is well established that the party who wishes to avail himself of the unique remedy of specific performance must show that he was ready, able and willing to perform his part of the contract. Jakober v. E. M. Loew s Capitol Theatre, Inc., 107 R.I. 104, 114, 265 A.2d 429, 435 (1970). 5 In the instant matter, the parties did not stipulate in the P&S to the period within which Buyer had to obtain ISDS approval. Certainly, had Seller wanted to put time parameters on the ISDS contingency, such a provision could have been included to avoid the dilemma in which the parties find themselves now. In the absence of such agreed upon deadline for the Buyer s exercise of such a contingency, it appears to the Court that it must now consider what a reasonable time would be for the Buyer s performance. See Safeway System, Inc., 102 R.I. at 145, 228 A.2d at 856. (Observing that [a] contract is not to be construed like a railway timetable. The parties to it need not be punctual to a minute, unless the contract calls for that degree of punctuality to carry out its purposes; but it is enough that they are on hand so as to keep their agreement, as regards the time, according to its substance and spirit; and it is the duty of each party to conduct with good faith and reasonable liberality towards the other. ) No evidence was presented to this Court as to the normal processing time for an ISDS application. However, in light of the difficult topography, of which the parties were aware at the time of the agreement, it appears to the Court that the parties should have expected a substantial passage of time for Buyer to obtain the proper engineering to support the application for an ISDS permit, and that DEM was likely to require detailed plans and testing before it would approve a septic permit on this site. Rather than afford the Buyer an unlimited amount of time to obtain the permit, this Court must interpret the agreement to impose upon the Buyer a reasonable amount of time to exercise its ISDS contingency. What is reasonable must be tested by the facts and circumstances of the particular case. See Augustine v. Chateau Homes, Inc., 324 N.E.2d 633, 634 (Ill. App. 2d 1975) (recognizing that unless tender of title is to be of the essence, a reasonable time for tender of title will be implied and what is reasonable is a matter of proof under the circumstances and 6 conditions ). Furthermore, in certain instances, a Seller s rights even may be deemed waived. See Beck v. Strong, 572 S.W.2d 484, 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that even where time was of the essence, the requirement that buyers exercise their purchase option within a specified time was waived where Seller allowed buyers to pay to improve the property and where they accepted monthly interest payments on the purchase price). The agreement in the case at bar imposed a sixty-day time frame for Buyer to obtain a percolation report and a report regarding septic system design. Although the sixty-day time frame was not agreed to as the time frame for the exercising of the ISDS contingency, it appears that if the design had to be completed within sixty days, it seems reasonable that the ISDS contingency would have to be exercised within a reasonable time thereafter to allow sufficient time for DEM to process and review the application and design. Failure of the contingency would excuse Buyer s performance, but Seller had to afford the Buyer a reasonable time to obtain the permit called for in the contingency. It appears to the Court that Buyer exercised due diligence in his attempt to obtain ISDS approval, and reacted promptly to the need for a revised design by hiring a new engineer, which design ultimately proved successful in obtaining the ISDS permit. 1 The Court must also weigh the equities as to Seller s actions. See Griffin v. Zapata, 570 A.2d 659, 661 (R.I. 1990) ( Specific performance is an equitable remedy. ) The Seller clearly knew that the ISDS process would be difficult and prolonged. Although he testified that at some point before the ISDS permit was granted, he deemed the 1 Given this finding of due diligence, the Court concludes that Buyer did not abandon the P&S agreement as alleged by Seller. See Jakober v. E.M. Loew s Capital Theatre, Inc., 107 R.I. 104, 110, 265 A.2d 429, 433 (1970) ( Whether the vendee s equitable title has been extinguished by abandonment depends upon the concurrence of two factors-an intent to abandon together with some act or failure to act which warrants the conclusion that the vendee no longer claims or retains any interest in the subject matter. ) In this case, there was no evidence of Buyer s intent to abandon or failure to act. 7 P&S to be of no further force and effect, he never notified the broker or the Buyer of such a conclusion, and he never instructed the broker to return Buyer s deposit. Rather, Seller embarked on a concerted effort to sell the property to CVS at a price substantially higher than that which was agreed to with Buyer. Furthermore, although Seller has counterclaimed for the taxes he paid while awaiting the conclusion of the ISDS process, no such provision was contained in the P&S. Under the circumstances, it appears to the Court that Buyer exercised due diligence in his effort to obtain ISDS approval, and obtained such approval within a reasonable time. Having reached that conclusion, Buyer has a contractual right to require Seller to perform, and a closing should be scheduled forthwith because the equities favor the Buyer under the circumstances. The Court, therefore, orders specific performance of the P&S. Since no legal or equitable grounds exist to award Defendant Seller the taxes he paid during the period awaiting ISDS approval, the Court will not award Seller any damages for those costs. 2 Judgment for specific performance shall enter in favor of Plaintiff Buyer consistent with the conclusions set forth in this Decision. 2 The Seller did not assert this claim until he made an oral motion at trial. Pursuant to Rule 7(b)(1) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, [a]n application to the court for an order shall be by motion . . . , shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought. Rule 6(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: A written motion, other than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than 10 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Before 1995, only five days notice was required for service of a motion before its hearing date; however, [e]xperience has taught that 5 days . . . was insufficient time in which to prepare for a hearing on a motion . . . . Super. R. Civ. P. 6 Advisory Committee Notes. Tucker v. Kittredge, 795 A.2d 1115, 1118 (R.I. 2002). Considering that Seller did not provide the required written notice to Buyer of his claim for property taxes, the oral motion also is denied on this alternative ground. 8
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
