Pennsylvania v. Holmes (majority)
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In 2005, appellee was charged with two counts of criminal use of a communication facility, as well as single counts of delivery of cocaine, possession with intent to deliver cocaine, and simple possession of cocaine. Represented by retained private counsel, appellee proceeded to a jury trial in 2006, and was found guilty of all charges except one of the counts of criminal use of a communication facility. The trial court sentenced appellee to three to six years of imprisonment on the delivery charge and a concurrent sentence of two to four years on the criminal use of a communication facility conviction, both with credit for time served. The other drug convictions were merged for sentencing purposes. In 2007, appellee motioned for appointment of counsel in the trial court, which the trial court granted, appointing the Centre County Public Defender’s Office. Then, through counsel, appellee filed a PCRA petition seeking reinstatement of his appeal rights due to trial counsel’s failure to file a requested direct appeal. In 2008, following an earlier evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court reinstated appellee’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, without addressing the substantive ineffectiveness claims. Appellee subsequently filed a notice of appeal and a statement, identifying eleven issues of ineffectiveness of trial counsel. The the PCRA court issued its opinion briefly addressing the merits of those ineffectiveness claims. In his Superior Court brief, appellee pursued only three of the eleven claims of ineffectiveness; he raised no preserved, direct review claims. The Superior Court panel determined that appellee’s merits arguments were “misguided” because he should have argued that the PCRA court, in its opinion reinstating appellee’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, had erred by failing to consider the effect of appellee’s amended PCRA petition raising trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Following “Pennsylvania v. Liston,” (941 A.2d 1279 (Pa. Super.2008) (en banc)), the Superior Court remanded to the PCRA court with instructions to permit appellee to file post-sentence motions nunc pro tunc in which he could raise his ineffectiveness claims. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the reviewability of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on post-verdict motions and direct appeal under “Pennsylvania v. Bomar,” (826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1115 (2004)), and “Pennsylvania v. Grant,” (813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002)), including the question of whether ineffectiveness claims may be considered if accompanied by a waiver of review as of right under the Post Conviction Relief Act. The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings.
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