BURKE v. WEBB BOATS, INC.

BURKE v. WEBB BOATS, INC.
2001 OK 83
37 P.3d 811
72 OBJ 2940
Case Number: 95154
Decided: 10/09/2001
Mandate Issued: 11/09/2001

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

TAYLOR BURKE, Plaintiff/Petitioner
v.
WEBB BOATS, INC., and ARROWHEAD INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC., OF OKLAHOMA, Defendants/Respondents

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI FROM CERTIFIED INTERLOCUTORY ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF CRAIG COUNTY, HONORABLE JAMES D. GOODPASTER, DISTRICT JUDGE

¶0 The District Court of Craig County, Hon. James D. Goodpaster, granted a motion of the defendants/respondents for an interlocutory order and certified the order for interlocutory review pursuant to

THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERLOCUTORY ORDER IS AFFIRMED;
THE CAUSE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

G. Steven Stidham, Brian T. Inbody, Brian S.Gaskill, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Petitioner,
James K. Secrest, Edward J. Main, SECREST, HILL & FOLLUO, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Respondents.

WINCHESTER, J

¶1 The plaintiff/petitioner, Taylor Burke, (Burke) filed his second amended petition against the defendants/respondents, Webb Boats, Inc., and Arrowhead Investment and Development Corporation, Inc., of Oklahoma, (Arrowhead), on November 21, 1997, alleging injury as a result of a boating accident on August 20, 1994. At the time of the accident, Burke was fifteen years old, and on an outing with a youth group from The First Presbyterian Church, U.S.A. of Tulsa, Oklahoma. The church leased a boat from Arrowhead, and one of the church's employees or agents drove the boat.

¶2 Burke settled his claim against the church and the boat's operator, releasing them both from further liability for the accident, but specifically excepted from the release his claims against Arrowhead. Burke then sought relief from Arrowhead in this action, relying on

The owner of a vessel shall be liable for any injury or damage occasioned by the negligent operation of such vessel, whether such negligence consists of a violation of the provisions of the statutes of this state, or the violation of any municipal ordinance, or neglecting to observe such ordinary care and such operation as the rules of the common law require. The owner shall not be liable, however, unless such vessel is being used with his express or implied consent. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to relieve any other person from any liability which he would otherwise have.

¶3 In January 1999, Arrowhead filed "Defendant Arrowhead's First Motion for Partial Interlocutory Summary Adjudication and Brief in Support." Arrowhead argued that under § 4215 its liability was vicarious, and therefore Burke's release of the operator of the boat released Arrowhead as a matter of law. The trial court granted Arrowhead's motion and by order filed July 26, 2000, the court certified the interlocutory order for immediate appeal. On October 9, 2000, this Court granted certiorari. The issue is whether the trial court erred in concluding that the release of the operator of the boat also served as a release of Arrowhead from vicarious liability, even though Arrowhead was specifically excluded in the release.

I. COMMON LAW RULE

¶4 The parties agree that the common law rule governing this case is found in Mid-Continent Pipeline Co. v. Crauthers,

¶5 This Court first observed that any liability of the company existed only by virtue of the doctrine of respondeat superior, that is, a master is liable for injury to the person or property of another proximately resulting from the acts of his servant done within the scope of the servant's employment. Mid-Continent Pipeline Co.,

II. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT

¶6 After acknowledging the common law rule found in Mid-Continent Pipeline Co., the plaintiff argues that the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA),

"H. When a release, covenant not to sue, or a similar agreement is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death:

"1. It does not discharge any other tort-feasor from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless the other tort-feasor is specifically named; but it reduces the claim against others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is greater. . . ."

¶7 The plaintiff alleges that the boat operator and Arrowhead are two persons "liable in tort," as the terms are used in subsection H. When the plaintiff released the boat operator he specifically excepted Arrowhead from the release. The plaintiff believes that these facts satisfy the conditions of UCATA, and therefore the release of the boat operator does not release Arrowhead.

¶8 The plaintiff acknowledges that the issue before this Court is one of first impression. He asserts that Oklahoma's version of UCATA was intended to abolish the old harsh rule that the release of one tort-feasor released all other tort-feasors jointly liable for the tort, and cites Moss v. City of Oklahoma City,

¶9 While a party who is vicariously liable for an injury in a tort action may be described as "liable in tort," that designation does not resolve the issue. In both Moss and Shadden, the defendants were alleged to have committed negligent acts and to be actual tort-feasors. A tort-feasor is a wrong-doer, that is, one who is guilty of a tort. Theophelis v. Lansing General Hospital, 430 Mich. 473, 483, 424 N.W.2d 478, 483 (1988), citing Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.). "Vicarious liability is imposed by law when one person is made answerable for the actionable conduct of another." Braden v. Hendricks,

¶10 When construing statutes, this Court considers the whole act in light of its general purpose and objective, and not just the individual provisions separately. Community Bankers Assoc. v. Oklahoma State Banking Board,

¶11 In construing statutes the terms are given their plain and ordinary meaning, except when a contrary intention plainly appears. Neer v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Com'n,

¶12 Section 832 of title 12 does not express any intent of the Legislature to change the common law rule found in Mid-Continent Pipeline Co. The Legislature could have easily accomplished such a result by defining the word "tort-feasor" to include one who is vicariously liable for the tort of another, but it did not do so. Title

THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERLOCUTORY ORDER IS AFFIRMED;

THE CAUSE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

¶13 HARGRAVE, C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, OPALA, BOUDREAU, WINCHESTER, JJ., concur.