Little v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation

Little v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation
1997 OK 57
938 P.2d 739
68 OBJ 1558
Case Number: 87877
Decided: 04/29/1997
Mandate Issued: 06/05/1997
Supreme Court of Oklahoma

HARLEY LITTLE, Petitioner,
v.
MUSCOGEE ( CREEK ) NATION, STATE INSURANCE FUND, and the WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT, Respondents.

PROCEEDING TO REVIEW AN ORDER OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT

¶0 Harley Little ( Little or claimant ) sought in the Workers' Compensation Court, James S. Porter, trial judge, an award for bodily injuries sustained in an automobile accident while employed by the Muscogee ( Creek ) Nation ( Nation). The State Insurance Fund ( Fund ), qua Nation's insurer, denied the injuries were employment-related and challenged the trial tribunal's cognizance of the proceeding. The trial judge ruled that the court "lacks subject-matter jurisdiction" over the claim. Claimant sought appellate review. The cause stands retained for this court's consideration and disposition.

THE ORDER OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT IS VACATED AND THE CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS PRONOUNCEMENT.

Tim Reese, Lawter & Pitts, Oklahoma City, OK For Petitioner
Ronald E. Hignight, McGivern, Scott, Gilliard, Curthoys, & Robinson, Tulsa, OK, For Respondents

Opala, J.

[938 P.2d 741]

¶1 The dispositive question we are asked to decide today is whether an insurer who has issued a compensation policy may contest ( before the Workers' Compensation Court ) the insured's status as a covered employer. We answer in the negative.

¶2 Harley Little ( Little or claimant ) sought benefits after he was broadsided by another motorist while driving back to work for the Muscogee ( Creek ) Nation ( Nation ). Nation had secured a workers' compensation policy from the State Insurance Fund ( Fund ). Fund's answer denies that ( a ) the accident arose out of and in the course of Little's employment and that ( b ) claimant is entitled to benefits. Fund admits Nation stood insured for compensation. At the hearing Fund challenged the trial tribunal's cognizance over the claim against Nation because of the latter's sovereign-entity status, but stipulated to the applicable rate of compensation ( "should its jurisdictional objection be overruled "). The trial tribunal ruled that it lacks "subject-matter jurisdiction" because Nation "has not unequivocally expressly waived sovereign immunity by the purchase of Workers' Compensation Insurance coverage through the State Insurance Fund."

¶3 We hold Fund is statutorily estopped

I.

¶4 The 65-year old claimant had worked for Nation more than six years. He occupied the position as one of four directors of community service, reporting to the principal chief of the tribe. On December 4, 1995 Little was asked to attend the funeral of a Creek citizen. Declining the chief's offer to ride with him, Little took his own car. While returning to the office he was hit by another vehicle. Claimant's pelvis was shattered and his left ear injured. Little brought a claim on December 27, 1995.

¶5 Fund's answer ( Form 10 ) admits Little's employment and Nation's compensation policy with Fund.

¶6 On April 30, 1996 the trial judge approved a $10,000.00 settlement between claimant and the driver of the other vehicle. Credit for this settlement against Fund's liability, if any it have, was to be decided at a later time. At the hearing, held on June 11, 1996, counsel stipulated the rate of compensation that applies to Little's claim.

¶7 Nation's benefits coordinator, who processed compensation claims for Nation's employees, testified that in her eight years of service, she was unaware of Nation ever interposing sovereign immunity to defeat a [938 P.2d 742] claim. At the time of the hearing, Fund was making payments on four claims by Nation's employees.

¶8 Claimant seeks review of the trial judge's July 2, 1996 adverse ruling. In his paperwork here Little urges that ( a ) the traffic accident occurred off the tribal premises and ( b) the Workers' Compensation Court has jurisdiction of his claim. Fund contends Nation ( a ) did not unequivocally waive its sovereign immunity for workers' compensation liability, ( b ) cannot be considered an "employer" within the meaning of 85 O. S. § 3 ( 3 )

II.
¶9 QUESTIONS CONCERNING AN EMPLOYER'S STATUS FOR COVERAGE UNDER WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW STAND ELIMINATED BY STATUTORY ESTOPPEL; AN INSURER WHO COLLECTS PREMIUMS UNDER AN ISSUED COMPENSATION POLICY(COMPUTED ON CLAIMANT'S WAGES) IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THE INSURED'S STATUS AS A COVERED EMPLOYER

¶10 Nation's status as a covered employer

III.
SUMMARY

¶16 The estoppel act , 85 O.S. 1991 §§ 65.2 and 65.3, which we invoke today sua sponte makes insurers liable-- regardless of the insured's status as a covered employer-- when it is established that--at the critical time of injury-- premiums computed on a claimant's wages were accepted under a policy insuring the employer against liability under the Workers' Compensation Act.

¶18 Fund's answer to Little's claim admits the existence of Nation's compensation insurance and claimant's employment by Nation. Implicit in Fund's stipulation as to Little's applicable compensation rate is its admission that premiums were paid on his wages at the time of the alleged accident. Fund's insistence that Little's injuries are not employment-related leaves that disputed issue to be decided in a post-remand adversary hearing. In short, the issue that remains to be settled on remand is whether Little's claimed accidental harm occurred in the course of and arose out of his employment with Nation.

¶19 THE ORDER OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT IS VACATED AND THE CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS PRONOUNCEMENT.

¶20 ALL JUSTICES CONCUR.

FOOTNOTES

1 For the provisions of 85 O.S. 1991 §§ 65.2 and 65.3, collectively known as the "estoppel act," see infra, note 6 .

2 In his opening remarks to the court at the June 11, 1996 hearing, Fund's counsel stated: "We would stipulate to rates of compensation without waiving our defense of sovereign immunity of $368.00 for temporary and $205.00 for permanent, that being the maximum rate of compensation for injuries dated December 4, 1995." ( Tr. at 3. )

3 The provisions of 85 O.S. 1991 § 3 ( 3 ) are:

"'Employer,' except when otherwise expressly stated, means a person, partnership, association, limited liability company, corporation, and the legal representatives of a deceased employer, or the receiver or trustee of a person, partnership, association, corporation, or limited liability company, departments, instrumentalities and institutions of this state and divisions thereof, counties and divisions thereof, public trusts, boards of education and incorporated cities or towns and divisions thereof, employing a person included within the term 'employee' as herein defined."

4 The pertinent part of 85 O.S. 1991 § 3 ( 4 ) provides:

"'Employee' means any person engaged in the employment of any person, firm, limited liability company or corporation covered by the terms of the Workers' Compensation Act." (Emphasis supplied. )

5 Compensation proceedings are considered public-law controversies in which an appellate court may change the theory pressed by the parties before the trial tribunal. When resolving a public-law question, this court is free to invoke sua sponte the correct theory applicable to the case even though an aggrieved party's brief advanced a different reason for vacation. Reynolds v. Special Indem. Fund, Okl., 725 P.2d 1265, 1270 (1986); Special Indemnity Fund v. Reynolds, 199 Okl. 570, 188 P.2d 841, 842 (1948).

6 The provisions of 85 O.S. 1991 § 65.2 are:

"Every employer and every insurance carrier who schedules any employee as a person employed by the employer for the purpose of paying or collecting insurance premiums on a Workmen's Compensation insurance policy or who pays, receives or collects any premiums upon any insurance policy covering the liability of such employer under the Workmen's Compensation Law by reason of or upon the basis of the employment of any such employee shall be estopped to deny that such employee was employed by the employer in a hazardous employment subject to and covered by the Workmen's Compensation Law if such person receives an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, during the period for which such premium was so received, regardless of the type of business in which the employer was engaged or the type of employment in which the employee was engaged at the time of such injury."

The provisions of 85 O.S. 1991 § 65.3 are:

"Every contract of insurance issued by an insurance carrier for the purpose of insuring an employer against liability under the Workers' Compensation Act shall be conclusively presumed to be a contract for the benefit of each and every person upon whom insurance premiums are paid, collected, or whose employment is considered or used in determination of the amount of premium collected upon such policy for the payment of benefits as provided by the Workers' Compensation Act regardless of the type of business in which the employer of such person is engaged or the type of work being performed by the employee at the time of any injury received by such employee arising out of and in the course of his employment, which contract may be enforced by such employee as the beneficiary thereof."

7 State Insurance Fund v. Brooks, Okl., 755 P.2d 653, 656 (1988).

8 Jot Davis Welding Service v. Davis, Okl., 376 P.2d 259, 260 (1962).

9 State Insurance Fund v. Brooks, supra, note 7 at 655.

10 State Insurance Fund v. Brooks, supra, note 7 at 656; Fox v. National Carrier, Okl., 709 P.2d 1050,1051 (1985); Miller v. Sears, Roebuck & Company Okl., 550 P.2d 1330, 1334 (1976); Young v. City of Holdenville, Okl., 384 P.2d 905, 906 (1963); Jot Davis Welding Service v. Davis, supra, note 8 at 260; Baldwin-Hill Company v. Lochner, Okl., 359 P.2d 228, 230 (1961); National Bank of Tulsa Building v. Goldsmith, 204 Okl. 45, 226 P.2d 916, 922 (1951).

11 Statutory estoppel would not be invocable here if Nation were not insured for compensation purposes. Miller v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, supra, note 10 at 1334; Sears, Roebuck and Company v. Baker, Okl., 286 P.2d 272, 273 (1955).

12 Young v. City of Holdenville, supra, note 10 at 906; Jot Davis Welding Service v. Davis, supra, note 8 at 260; National Bank of Tulsa Building v. Goldsmith, supra, note 10 at 921, 922.

13 See note 10, supra.

14 See the provisions of 85 O.S. 1991 § 65.2, supra, note 6.

15 Young v. City of Holdenville, supra, note 10 at 906; National Bank of Tulsa Building v. Goldsmith, supra, note 10 at 922.

16 Miller v. Sears, Roebuck and Company, supra, note 10 at 1333.

17 See note 15, supra.

18 National Bank of Tulsa Building v. Goldsmith, supra, note 10 at 920.

19 Young v. City of Holdenville, supra, note 10 at 906; Jot Davis Welding Service v. Davis, supra, note 8 at 260; National Bank of Tulsa Building v. Goldsmith, supra, note 10 at 921, 922.

20 Jot Davis Welding Service v. Davis, supra, note 8 at 260; Baldwin-Hill Company v. Lochner, supra, note 10 at 230.

21 See note 2, supra.

22 State Insurance Fund v. Brooks, supra, note 7 at 656.

23 Miller v. Sears, Roebuck and Company, supra, note 10 at 1334.

24 National Bank of Tulsa Building v. Goldsmith, supra, note 10 at 922.

25 Jot Davis Welding Service v. Davis, supra, note 8 at 260.