TRASK v. JOHNSON

TRASK v. JOHNSON
1969 OK 57
452 P.2d 575
Case Number: 43009
Decided: 03/25/1969
Supreme Court of Oklahoma

EDITH R. TRASK, LOUISE WALLER, PETITIONERS,
v.
THE HONORABLE W. LEE JOHNSON, JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TULSA COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA, RESPONDENT.

Syllabus

¶0 1. The rule of construction of statutes and ordinances, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain the intention of the legislative body, and this should ordinarily be done by consideration of the language of the statute or ordinance, and the courts should not read into a statute or ordinance exceptions not made therein.
2. The provision in 37 O.S. 1961 § 531 that an appeal to the district court from an order of the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board shall consist of a trial de novo is in conflict with, and was superseded by, the provision in Section 21 of the 1963 Administrative Procedures Act (75 O.S. Supp. 1968 § 321) that the judicial review of orders of state agencies, provided for in Sections 18 through 22 of that act (75 O.S. Supp. 1968 §§ 318 through 322) shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record.

Appeal from the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board.

Original proceeding for writ of mandamus requiring judge of district court to proceed by trial de novo in an appeal from an order of the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board concerning licenses theretofore issued by that board to the petitioners herein. Writ denied.

Farmer, Woolsey, Flippo & Bailey, by Lawrence Johnson, Tulsa, for petitioners.
G.T. Blankenship, Atty. Gen., Duane Lobaugh, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, for respondent.

LAVENDER, Judge.

¶1 In this original proceeding, the petitioners ask this court to issue, to the respondent Judge of the District Court of Tulsa County, a writ of mandamus requiring him to hear their appeal from an order of the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (concerning licenses theretofore issued by that board to the petitioners) by trial de novo, as required by

¶2 The respondent judge overruled the petitioners' oral motion for a trial de novo, specifically ruling that the procedure for judicial review of such an order is governed by the "Administrative Procedures Act" of 1963, which provides, in Section 21 thereof (

¶3 It seems to be tacitly conceded by the respondent judge that, if the above-quoted provision of

¶4 The petitioners' contention herein is that

¶5 The respondent contends that the Administrative Procedures Act of 1963, of which the statute that appears as

¶6 As we understand it, the rule most favorable to the petitioners, set forth in cases such as Smith v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. et al. (1960), Okl.,

"In construing an Act of the Legislature the intention of such body should always be given effect and where an Act is complete within itself, it should be held to govern the issues involved."

¶7 The same basic principle, varied with the circumstances, quoted from Hemmer v. United States, 204 F. 898, 123 C.C.A. 194, is stated by this court in Crosbie v. Partridge (1922),

"`Privileges granted to a certain class by special act are not affected by inconsistent general legislation, unless a contrary intent of the legislative body is clearly expressed or indubitably inferable therefrom. But the special act and the general law stand together, the one as the law of the particular class and the other as the general rule.'" (Emphasis supplied here)

¶8 The basic principle of statutory construction, particularly where, as in the present instance, an exception from the operation of an act is claimed, is well-stated in the second paragraph of the court's syllabus to the case of Seventeen Hundred Peoria, Inc. v. City of Tulsa et al. (1966), Okl.,

"The rule of construction of statutes and ordinances, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain the intention of the enacting body, and this should ordinarily be done by consideration of the language of the statute or ordinance, and the courts should not read into a statute [or ordinance] exceptions not made therein." (Emphasis supplied)

¶9 The Administrative Procedures Act involved herein (House Bill No. 865 of the Twenty-ninth Oklahoma Legislature; Chapter

¶10 Section 27 of the Administrative Procedures Act expressly provides that "All laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith are hereby repealed to the extent of such conflict."

¶11 At the time of the enactment of the Administrative Procedures Act in 1963, there was a 1961 act in effect

¶12 From a consideration of all of the provisions of that 1963 act, we are convinced that the act is complete within itself and that it was the intent, purpose and object of the Legislature, in enacting it, to provide a uniform system of regulations concerning administrative procedures in and before, and judicial review of the actions of, all state boards, commissions, departments, authorities, bureaus and officers authorized by the Constitution or statutes to make "rules" or to formulate "orders" (as those terms are defined and used in the act) other than those specifically excepted, by the provisions of the act, from the operation thereof.

¶13 The Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board is authorized, by the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Act (

¶14 Because of the legislative intent, so clearly expressed in the Administrative Procedures Act, the subordinate rules of statutory construction relied upon by the petitioners do not come into play in this instance, and the cases cited by the petitioners in support of such subordinate rules are not in point.

¶15 Since the quoted portion of

¶16 It is the judgment and order of this court that the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners herein should be, and hereby is, denied.

¶17 All the Justices concur.