State ex rel. Bradford v. Bracy

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[Cite as State ex rel. Bradford v. Bracy, 2023-Ohio-4519.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MAHONING COUNTY STATE OF OHIO EX REL. PELE K. BRADFORD, Petitioner, v. CHARMAINE BRACY, WARDEN, Respondent. OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Case No. 23 MA 0093 Writ of Habeas Corpus BEFORE: Cheryl L. Waite, David A. D’Apolito, Mark A. Hanni, Judges. JUDGMENT: Dismissed. Pele K. Bradford, Petitioner Atty. Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General and Atty. William H. Lamb, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Justice Section, 8040 Hosbrook Road, Suite 300, Cincinnati, Ohio 45236, for Respondent. Dated: December 7, 2023 –2– PER CURIAM. {¶1} Petitioner Pele K. Bradford has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking immediate release from the Ohio State Penitentiary (OSP) in Youngstown, Ohio, where he is presently incarcerated. The petition names as respondent Charmaine Bracy, Warden of the OSP. Bradford contends that his conviction is void, citing the Supreme Court of Ohio decision in State v. Gilbert, 143 Ohio St.3d 150, 2014-Ohio-4562, 35 N.E.3d 493, and this Court’s decision applying Gilbert in Driggins v. Bowen, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 22 MA 0039, 2023-Ohio-205. {¶2} In Gilbert, the Supreme Court addressed a trial court’s jurisdictional authority to reconsider a final sentence imposed on a defendant based on the defendant’s failure to comply with the terms of the plea agreement. A condition of Gilbert’s plea agreement was that he would testify against an accomplice in a murder case. Id. at ¶ 2. In exchange, the state dismissed some charges against Gilbert. Id. Without waiting for him to testify against his accomplice, as expected in the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Gilbert to a prison term of 18 years. Id. at ¶ 4. Subsequently, after he began serving his prison term, Gilbert refused to testify as promised. A year after the trial court initially sentenced him, the state filed a motion asking the trial court to vacate Gilbert’s plea because he failed to cooperate with the state as he had agreed. Id. at ¶ 5. The trial court granted the state’s request, withdrew the original plea agreement, and vacated the sentence. Gilbert then entered into a second plea agreement where he was sentenced to 18 years to life imprisonment. Id. {¶3} On Gilbert’s direct appeal, the First District Court of Appeals ordered briefing on whether the trial court had jurisdiction to grant the state’s motion to vacate the plea and then reconsider its own judgment and resentence the defendant. Id. at ¶ 5. The First District reversed the matter and remanded it to the trial court. It ordered the trial court to vacate its order granting the state’s motion to vacate the original plea and sentence, and ordered the court to reinstate its original sentence. Id. at ¶ 6. {¶4} The Supreme Court agreed with the First District, noting that Crim.R. 32(C) lists the requirements of a valid final judgment in a criminal case. The judgment must contain: (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge’s signature, and (4) Case No. 23 MA 0093 –3– the time stamp indicating that the clerk entered the judgment in the journal. Gilbert at ¶ 8. The Supreme Court held that “[o]nce a final judgment has been issued pursuant to Crim.R. 32, the trial court’s jurisdiction ends.” Id. at ¶ 9. The Supreme Court took note of the state’s argument that contract principles apply to the interpretation and enforcement of plea agreements, but concluded: “those principles are not so flexible to permit jurisdiction to be maintained in perpetuity to enforce such agreements.” Id., citing State v. Bethel, 110 Ohio St.3d 416, 2006-Ohio-4853, ¶ 50. Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that “[if] the trial court is concerned with the defendant abiding by the terms of the plea agreement, the solution is to postpone sentencing until after the defendant has performed the desired act.” Id. at ¶ 13. {¶5} This Court considered Gilbert when it was raised as the basis for a writ of habeas corpus in Driggins v. Bowen, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 22 MA 0039, 2023-Ohio205. Driggins pleaded guilty to reduced charges of murder and aggravated robbery in 2007 and was sentenced to 18 years to life in prison in exchange for his agreement to testify against an accomplice. Driggins reneged on the agreement, and the trial court granted the state’s motion to vacate the plea and advance the case for trial. In 2009, following a jury trial, Driggins was convicted of murder, aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary, and was sentenced to 38 years to life in prison. Driggins’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus argued that his 2009 reconviction and resentence were void because the trial court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to vacate his 2007 conviction. {¶6} We observed that the journal entry memorializing Driggins’ 2007 conviction and sentence satisfied the requirements of Crim.R. 32(C) for a final judgment: it contained the fact of the conviction, the sentence, the judge’s signature, and the time stamp indicating that the clerk entered the judgment in the journal. In light of Gilbert, we concluded that the warden had not identified any authority granting a court of common pleas renewed subject-matter jurisdiction following entry of a final judgment. However, we were still compelled to deny the writ. Even if Driggins’ 2009 reconviction and resentence were unlawful, his 2007 conviction and sentence, which also had a maximum term of life imprisonment, was uneffected. Thus, Driggins could not demonstrate that he Case No. 23 MA 0093 –4– was entitled to immediate release from prison because his maximum sentence had yet to expire. {¶7} Turning to Bradford’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he avers that in 2004 he was indicted on aggravated murder with two firearm specifications and for having weapons while under disability in Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas case no. B 0400169. He alleges that he pleaded guilty to reduced charges of voluntary manslaughter, having a weapon while under disability, and two firearm specifications, and was sentenced to 14 years in prison in exchange for his agreement to testify in a separate, unidentified case. He further claims that he reneged on the agreement and that the trial court granted the state’s motion to vacate his plea and advance the case to trial. {¶8} Following his jury trial, Bradford states that he was “reconvicted” of aggravated murder, having a weapon while under disability, and two firearm specifications. (08/18/2023 Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ¶ 4, 9.) Attached to Bradford’s petition is a judgment entry stating that he was found guilty of those offenses, but the entry does not allude to any previous conviction for those offenses. In fact, the entry notes only that the trial by jury resulting in his conviction followed his plea of not guilty. {¶9} The entry addresses Bradford’s sentence, first finding that the firearm specifications merged for purposes of sentencing. The trial court sentenced Bradford to an aggregate 24 years to life in prison: consecutive terms of life in prison with parole eligibility after 20 years for aggravated murder, one year in prison for having a weapon while under a disability, and three years in prison for the firearm specification. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed Bradford’s convictions and sentences. State v. Bradford, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040382, 2005-Ohio-2208. Also attached to Bradford’s petition is a 2007 entry, showing he was convicted of escape, for which he received an additional two-year prison sentence. {¶10} This court is vested with original jurisdiction over a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Article IV, Section 3(B)(1)(c) of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2725.02. R.C. 2725.01 provides: “Whoever is unlawfully restrained of his liberty, or entitled to the custody of another, of which custody such person is unlawfully deprived, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment, Case No. 23 MA 0093 –5– restraint, or deprivation.” To prevail on a writ of habeas corpus, a petitioner must show they are being unlawfully restrained of liberty, R.C. 2725.01, and that the petitioner is entitled to immediate release from prison or confinement. State ex rel. Cannon, 155 Ohio St.3d 213, 2018-Ohio-4184, 120 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 10. {¶11} R.C. 2725.04 sets forth the statutory requirements for a habeas petition: Application for the writ of habeas corpus shall be by petition, signed and verified either by the party for whose relief it is intended, or by some person for him, and shall specify: (A) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned, or restrained of his liberty; (B) The officer, or name of the person by whom the prisoner is so confined or restrained; or, if both are unknown or uncertain, such officer or person may be described by an assumed appellation and the person who is served with the writ is deemed the person intended; (C) The place where the prisoner is so imprisoned or restrained, if known; (D) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person shall be exhibited, if it can be procured without impairing the efficiency of the remedy; or, if the imprisonment or detention is without legal authority, such fact must appear. {¶12} Subsection (D) contains a commitment papers requirement. To meet it, a petitioner must attach all pertinent papers regarding their commitment. State ex rel. Cannon v. Mohr, 155 Ohio St.3d 213, 2018-Ohio-4184, 120 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 6. A petition that fails to comply with this requirement is defective and requires dismissal. Farley v. Wainwright, 164 Ohio St.3d 441, 2021-Ohio-670, 173 N.E.3d 468, ¶ 6. The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained that “[t]hese commitment papers are necessary for a complete understanding of the petition.” Bloss v. Rogers, 65 Ohio St.3d 145, 146, 602 N.E.2d 602 (1992). {¶13} Here, Bradford has included the entries for his 2004 jury-trial conviction and sentence in Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas case no. B 0400169, and his Case No. 23 MA 0093 –6– subsequent 2007 conviction for escape. Conspicuously absent from the petition is an entry evidencing his purported initial plea agreement and 14-year sentence. Bradford claims the Hamilton County Clerk of Court informed him that the documents related to this alleged agreement had been “deleted and/or removed from the docket, or destroyed.” (08/18/2023 Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ¶ 12.) {¶14} According to Bradford, because his petition sets forth a facially valid claim, this Court is required to immediately order the warden to file a return of the writ under R.C. 2725.06. Bradford misconstrues the import of R.C. 2725.06. It states: “When a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is presented, if it appears that the writ ought to issue, a court or judge authorized to grant the writ must grant it forthwith.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, a court is to grant the writ only if it appears that the writ must issue. The Supreme Court of Ohio has endorsed the practice of sua sponte dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus when warranted. State ex rel. Martre v. Watson, Slip Opinion No. 2023Ohio-749 ¶ 13. For example, sua sponte dismissal by a court of appeals is appropriate “if the complaint ‘is frivolous or the claimant obviously cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint.’” State ex rel. Kerr v. Pollex, 159 Ohio St.3d 317, 2020-Ohio-411, 150 N.E.3d 907, ¶ 5, quoting State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 324, 2006-Ohio6573, 859 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 14. {¶15} A review of Bradford’s petition, the attachments to the petition and contemporaneous filings, including his R.C. 2969.25(A) affidavit of prior civil actions, clearly shows that he cannot prevail on the facts as alleged in the petition. At least two of the cases listed in his affidavit of prior civil actions support finding that Bradford’s petition, here, is frivolous. {¶16} In 2020, Bradford filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus in this Court, claiming his 2004 convictions were void because he was 17 years old at the time of the offenses and had not been bound over from a juvenile court. He relied on a form 1099-C he received in 2011 from the United States Department of Education reporting the cancellation of debt on a student loan and a notice he received from the Internal Revenue Service in 2017, both of which list his date of birth as November 25, 1986. He also relied on a “Christian Baptismal Certificate” that allegedly lists the same birthdate, but he did not file a baptismal certificate with his petition. However, a certified copy of Case No. 23 MA 0093 –7– Bradford's birth certificate established that Bradford was 25 years old. Thus, the adult court had jurisdiction over his criminal case. State ex rel. Bradford v. Bowen, 2023-Ohio1105, reconsideration denied, 170 Ohio St.3d 1443, 2023-Ohio-1830, 210 N.E.3d 553. {¶17} More recently, on June 16, 2023, Bradford filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Ohio claiming the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas in case no. B 0400169 lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the offenses took place in Kentucky and not in Ohio. The Supreme Court sua sponte dismissed the petition in a merit decision without opinion. State ex rel. Bradford v. Bracy, 08/01/2023 Case Announcements #2, 2023-Ohio-2664. {¶18} Notably, Bradford never mentioned the alleged defect in territorial jurisdiction in the petition he advanced before this Court in 2020. Likewise, Bradford made no reference to the defect in subject matter jurisdiction he now alleges in his recent petition to the Supreme Court. This illustrates the most problematic part of Bradford’s current petition. {¶19} In Hudlin v. Alexander, 63 Ohio St.3d 153, 156, 586 N.E.2d 86 (1992), the Supreme Court of Ohio specifically held that the doctrine of res judicata applies to successive habeas corpus petitions. Bradford has previously filed at least two habeas actions in which he could have raised his present claim. See also State ex rel. Childs v. Lazaroff, 90 Ohio St.3d 519, 520, 739 N.E.2d 802 (2001) (“We have since consistently applied res judicata to bar petitioners from filing successive habeas corpus petitions.”); Freeman v. Tate, 65 Ohio St.3d 440, 441, 605 N.E.2d 14 (1992) (“In this case, the record demonstrates that appellant has previously filed at least one habeas corpus action * * * in which [his successive habeas corpus claim] could have been raised”). Therefore, res judicata bars Bradford from filing successive habeas corpus petitions, including his current petition. {¶20} Based on all of the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that Bradford’s Motion to Issue Alternative Writ Pursuant to R.C. 2725.06 is hereby DENIED and Bradford’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby DISMISSED. Writ denied. Any and all unresolved motions and filings not specifically addressed herein are hereby dismissed as moot. Case No. 23 MA 0093 –8– {¶21} IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to Civ.R. 58, that the Clerk of the Mahoning County Court of Appeals shall immediately serve upon all parties (including unrepresented or self-represented parties) notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. Costs assessed to Bradford. JUDGE CHERYL L. WAITE JUDGE DAVID A. D’APOLITO JUDGE MARK A. HANNI Case No. 23 MA 0093

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