Gold Key Lease, Inc. vs. Mary S. Hood, et al.

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STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY IN THE COURT OF APPEALS SEVENTH DISTRICT GOLD KEY LEASE, INC., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. MARY S. HOOD, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO. 00 C.A. 185 O P I N I O N CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from Mahoning County Court No. 4, Case No. 98CVF984 JUDGMENT: Affirmed APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: Attorney Michael D. Slodov Javitch, Block, Eisen & Rathbone, PLL Bond Court Building 14th Floor 1300 East 9th Street Cleveland, Ohio 44114 For Defendants-Appellees: Attorney William Paul McGuire Bank One Building, Suite 705 106 East Market Street P.O. Box 1243 Warren, Ohio 44482-1243 JUDGES: Hon. Gene Donofrio Hon. Cheryl L. Waite Hon. Mary DeGenaro Dated: September 20, 2001 - 1 - DONOFRIO, J. Plaintiff-appellant, Gold Key Lease, Inc., appeals from the judgment of enforcement Mahoning of a County settlement Court No. agreement 4, which between ordered appellant and defendants-appellees, Mary S. Hood and Kevin S. Hood. On January 24, 1995, appellees leased a 1995 Dodge Dakota pick-up truck from Eastwood Dodge. Eastwood Dodge assigned the lease to appellant. Appellees allegedly breached the lease agreement to by failing make required lease payments. On October 13, 1998, appellant filed a complaint against appellees for the alleged breach seeking $3,855.00 in damages. Appellees filed an answer to the complaint on November 4, 1998, denying all allegations and asserting that appellant had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The case was set for pretrial to take place on January 27, 1999. Whether the parties met on that date is unclear. On or about January 31, 1999, appellant and appellees entered into a tentative settlement agreement, which would be completed upon appellees paying appellant a sum within ten days of journalizing the judgment entry. of $800.00 Counsel for appellant prepared a consent judgment entry, which stated the terms. - 2 - On February 1, 1999, appellees deposited $800.00 into an IOLTA account held by their attorney. Check Number agreement. 635 was executed to Appellees claim that satisfy the settlement To date, Check Number 635 has not cleared that account. On February 4, 1999, appellees counsel sent a letter to appellant s counsel, which stated: Enclosed herein please find an executed Consent Judgment Entry for filing with the Court. Also enclosed is a check in the amount of $800.00 made payable to Javitch, Block, Eisen & Rathbone in complete satisfaction of the settlement of the above captioned case. Appellant s counsel claims it never received the letter, the consent judgment entry or the $800.00 check. On January 28, 2000, appellant s counsel wrote a letter to appellees counsel, which stated in pertinent part: While your clients did have a one-time opportunity to settle this matter, that was nearly a year ago and no funds were ever sent to us. As a result there is no longer any offer on the table. Therefore, we intend to proceed with this action for the full amount due and owing. On February 2, 2000, appellees filed a motion to enforce the settlement. A hearing was held before a magistrate. The magistrate ruled in favor of enforcing the settlement and also - 3 - added that appellees owed appellant 10 percent interest on the $800. Appellant filed objections to the magistrate s decision. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing. The court overruled appellant s objections and granted appellees motion to enforce the settlement agreement. This appeal error, which followed. Appellant raises a single assignment of states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE PLAINTIFF AND COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING DEFENDANT S MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. The standard of review applied to a ruling on a motion to enforce a settlement agreement is derived from contract law. A reviewing court must determine whether the trial court s order is based on an erroneous standard or a misconstruction of the law. Continental W. Condominium Unit Owners Assn. v. Howard E. Ferguson, Inc. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 501, 502. The hearing trial court relating to is required the existence to of conduct a an evidentiary disputed settlement agreement. Rulli v. Fan Co. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 374; Burrell Industries, Inc. v. Central Allied Ent. (Dec. 15, 1998), Belmont App. Nos. 96-BA-18, 96-BA-25, unreported, 1998 WL 896534. Where a trial court conducts an evidentiary hearing on a motion to enforce a settlement agreement and sufficient evidence is - 4 - presented to support the finding of settlement will not be overturned. the settlement, the Vawters v. Borror Corp., Inc. (Dec. 5, 1991) Franklin App. No. 91 AP-761, unreported, 1991 WL 256092. This court, in Holmes v. Central Ins. Co., (Mar. 16, 1993), Mahoning App. No. 92 C.A. 43, unreported, 1993 WL 78788 at *1, held [w]hen parties to a lawsuit agree to a settlement offer, this agreement cannot be repudiated by either party. To settlement permit agreement a party would to unilaterally render the repudiate entire a settlement proceedings a nullity, even though * * * the agreement is of binding force. (Omission added.) Id., quoting Spercel v. Sterling Industries (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d. 36, 40. Appellant maintains that the settlement agreement constituted a unilateral contract offer wherein appellees, as offerees, were required to fully perform within ten days of making the offer for acceptance to take effect. Appellant argues that since it never received the consent judgment entry and the $800 check, appellees failed to accept its settlement offer. A unilateral contract is one in which no promisor receives a promise as consideration for his promise. A bilateral contract is one in which there are mutual promises between two parties to the contract; each party being both a promisor and a - 5 - promisee. Bretz v. The Union Central Life Ins. Co. (1938), 134 Ohio St. 171, 174, quoting Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 10, § 12. In the outside present of this case, court s appellant cites authority. to several Appellant s cases points are reasonable and very well taken, however they do not constitute binding authority for this court. Appellant argues that receipt, not dispatch, connotes acceptance. Santos v. Dean (Wash.App.1999), v. 982 P.2d 632, 635; Crane Village, Ltd. (Utah App.1989), 774 P.2d 3, 5. Timberbrook In support of appellant s argument that an offer for a settlement agreement is an offer for a unilateral contract, appellant also argues that a bilateral connotes contract, an as exchange of opposed to promises a unilateral where the contract, parties have communicated in some manner the terms to which they agree to be bound, whereas a performance only. unilateral contract involves acceptance by Appellant s Brief, p. 4, citing Cuyahoga Cty. Hospitals v. Price (1989), 64 Ohio App.3d 410, 415; Bretz v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. (1938), 134 Ohio St. at 174. Appellant s sole contention in this case is that appellees never fully performed, because appellant never received the executed Consent Judgment Entry or the $800.00 check, therefore appellant and appellees never formed a contract. - 6 - Appellees claim appellant extended the offer in the form of preparing the consent judgment entry and forwarding it to them. The acceptance took place on or about February 4, 1999, when appellees deposited $800.00 into their attorney s IOLTA account and executed the consent judgment entry. Appellees maintain they mailed the $800.00 check along with the consent judgment entry to appellant. Appellant insists it never received the check or consent judgment entry, and therefore no contract was formed. The mailbox rule is the acceptance in the state of Ohio. law governing offer and Appellees properly cite to the case of Casto v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991), 72 Ohio App.3d 410, 413, in that an acceptance transmitted in a form invited by the offer is operative as soon as it is put out of the offeree s possession, regardless of whether it ever reaches the offeror. The mailbox rule states that in the absence of any limitation to the contrary in the offer, an acceptance is effective when mailed because the offeror has the power condition the acceptance of the offer on actual receipt. to Id. At a hearing held on June 27, 2000, evidence was introduced to support appellees argument that they had executed the consent judgment entry and the check for $800.00 to satisfy the claim. Appellee, Kevin Hood, testified that he gathered the - 7 - $800.00 to satisfy the claim, gave it to his attorney and they deposited the money into the IOLTA account. Appellees presented a deposit slip as evidence to support this claim. Appellee, Kevin Hood, also testified that, to the best of his knowledge, the consent judgment entry and the $800.00 check were submitted to appellant s counsel. Although magistrate s counsel report, for when appellant asked for filed objections supporting to evidence the or testimony for those objections, appellant s counsel responded that he had nothing further to offer. Appellant s only argument occurred during its closing statement when counsel conceded that appellees deposited the $800.00 and signed the consent judgment entry. Appellant s lone claim is that its office never received the money and the consent judgment. Accordingly, appellant s sole assignment of error is without merit. Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. Waite, J., concurs DeGenaro, J., concurs

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