In re R.N.F.

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[Cite as In re R.N.F., 2021-Ohio-4442.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WASHINGTON COUNTY IN THE MATTER OF: : : R.N.F., : : Adjudicated Delinquent Child. : : : : Case No. 21CA8 DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY APPEARANCES: Angela A. Miller, Jupiter, Florida, for Appellant. Kelsey R. Riffle, Washington County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Marietta, Ohio, for Appellee. Smith, P. J. {¶1} Appellant, R.N.F., appeals the trial court’s decision that adjudicated her a delinquent child for committing disorderly conduct, a minor misdemeanor if committed by an adult. Appellant raises two assignments of error. First, Appellant asserts that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to show that she engaged in conduct that would constitute the offense of disorderly conduct if committed by an adult. Second, Appellant contends that the trial court’s delinquency adjudication is against the manifest weight of the evidence because Appellee failed to Washington App. No. 21CA8 2 disprove Appellant’s claim of self-defense. After our review of the record, we do not agree with either of Appellant’s arguments. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s two assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment. FACTS {¶2} On March 16, 2021, Linda Francis called 9-1-1 to report an altercation that was occurring between Appellant, Francis’s granddaughter, and Appellant’s mother. Washington County Sheriff’s Deputy Mathais Brown responded to the call. {¶3} Upon arrival, Deputy Brown spoke with Appellant. Appellant advised Deputy Brown that she and her mother had been arguing “about getting ready for school.” Appellant indicated that during the argument, her mother, Amy, “smacked [Appellant] in the face because of how [Appellant] was talking to [Amy].” Appellant informed Deputy Brown that “she bit [Amy] on the hand during this argument.” Appellant “was still being belligerent with officers” after the deputy arrived, so another deputy placed Appellant in the back of his cruiser. The deputies eventually arrested Appellant and took her to the Juvenile Center. Washington App. No. 21CA8 3 {¶4} The next day, a complaint was filed that alleged Appellant to be a delinquent child for committing domestic violence, a first-degree misdemeanor if committed by an adult. {¶5} On May 18, 2021, the court held an adjudication hearing. At the hearing Francis explained that she called 9-1-1 on March 16th because Appellant and Amy’s argument had escalated into a physical confrontation and Francis was unable to separate the two individuals. Francis stated that during the argument, Appellant and Amy “ended up on the floor at the base of [the] stairs” and that Amy was on top of Appellant. Francis indicated that she did not know how they ended up on the floor or whether one of them pushed the other. Francis also stated that she did not see Appellant bite Amy, but after the altercation ended, she noticed a red mark on Amy’s hand. {¶6} Amy testified that on the day of the incident, Appellant was “being very disrespectful” and did not want to go to school. Appellant was using expletives to refer to Amy and eventually called Amy “a F-ing B.” At that point, Amy slapped Appellant in the mouth, twice. Amy walked toward the front door of the house, and Appellant “kept running her mouth.” Amy told Appellant, “if you want to be an adult, and do this, let’s do it then.” Amy explained that at that point, Appellant “just stood up,” which was “an Washington App. No. 21CA8 4 instant shocker” to Amy. Amy indicated that she thought to herself, “did she just really stand up to me?” {¶7} Amy related that after Appellant “stood up,” Appellant appeared to stumble over an object on the floor. Amy explained, however, that in the heat of the moment, Amy’s instinct kicked in and she thought that Appellant “was lunging at [her].” Amy thus pushed Appellant and knocked Appellant to the ground. Amy stated that Appellant “was yelling get off me,” and Francis “was having a[n] oh-my-gosh moment, like what do I do.” Amy indicated that while Appellant was on the floor, Amy “had [her] hand on [Appellant’s] face.” While her hand was on Appellant’s face, Appellant bit her hand. Amy testified that after Appellant bit her hand the argument ended and the deputies arrived shortly thereafter. {¶8} Defense counsel played the statement that Appellant gave to one of the deputies who responded to Francis’s 9-1-1 call. Appellant told the deputy “that her Mother had slapped her as hard as she could, pulled her to the wall, pinned her on the floor, so [Appellant] bit her.” {¶9} Appellant testified and explained that she did not lunge at her mother. Instead, she tripped and fell towards her mother. Appellant stated that her mother then pushed Appellant to the floor. Appellant related that while they were on the floor, her mother’s “hand was on [her] face.” Washington App. No. 21CA8 5 Appellant explained that she has “asthma” and that her “heart was running to the point where I just couldn’t breathe, so [she] bit her [mother’s] hand.” Appellant declared that she “had to do something.” She stated that she “couldn’t breathe” and “was just so scared at that point.” {¶10} After the parties finished presenting evidence, the court announced its decision on the record. The court found that Appellant did not engage in conduct that would constitute the offense of domestic violence if committed by an adult. The court stated that Appellant “was not the aggressor,” but instead, “the Mother was.” The court remarked that Appellant’s mother “probably should ha[ve] been charged.” {¶11} The court concluded, however, that the evidence showed that Appellant engaged in conduct that would constitute the offense of disorderly conduct if committed by an adult. The court found that Appellant “did recklessly cause inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to another by doing any of the following[:] Engaging in fighting and threatening harm to persons or property, or in violent or turbulent behavior.” {¶12} The trial court subsequently adjudicated Appellant a delinquent child for committing the offense of disorderly conduct in violation of R.C. 2917.11(A)(1), a minor misdemeanor if committed by an adult. The court Washington App. No. 21CA8 6 committed Appellant to the Washington County Juvenile Center to complete a rehabilitation program. This appeal followed. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR I. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE JUVENILE COURT’S FINDING OF DELINQUENCY FOR MINOR MISDEMEANOR DISORDERLY CONDUCT. II. THE JUVENILE COURT’S FINDING THAT R.N.F. IS A DELINQUENT CHILD BY REASON OF DISORDERLY CONDUCT IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT R.N.F. DID NOT ACT IN SELF-DEFENSE. FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR {¶13} In her first assignment of error, Appellant argues that the state did not present sufficient evidence to support her delinquency adjudication for committing disorderly conduct. In particular, Appellant asserts that the state did not present sufficient evidence that she (1) acted recklessly, (2) engaged in fighting or violent or turbulent behavior, or (3) caused any “inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.” {¶14} Appellant first contends that the state failed to present sufficient evidence that she acted recklessly when Appellant “bit her mother’s hand.” Appellant claims that she bit her mother’s hand because Appellant has asthma and felt as though she could not breathe. Washington App. No. 21CA8 7 {¶15} Next, Appellant alleges that the state failed to present sufficient evidence that Appellant engaged in fighting or violent or turbulent behavior. Appellant contends that her conduct in biting her mother’s finger was a natural response to her mother’s initial aggression. {¶16} Appellant also asserts that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to show that she caused inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to her mother. Appellant argues that Appellant’s bite did not cause her mother any “inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, over and above that which she may have already been experiencing due to the heated argument over going to school.” Standard of Review {¶17} “ ‘In reviewing whether a juvenile adjudication of delinquency was supported by sufficient evidence * * *, we apply the same standard[] used in adult criminal cases.’ ” In re A.G., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C200402, 2021-Ohio-3185, ¶ 19, quoting In re A.P., 2020-Ohio-5423, 163 N.E.3d 116, ¶ 9, 18 (1st Dist.); accord In re Hardie, 4th Dist. Washington No. 02CA55, 2003-Ohio-1388, ¶ 7; In re Pollitt, 4th Dist. Adams No. 00 CA 687, 2000 WL 1528669 (Oct. 10, 2000), *2. {¶18} A claim of insufficient evidence invokes a due process concern and raises the question whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support Washington App. No. 21CA8 8 the delinquency adjudication as a matter of law.1 State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997) (stating that “a conviction based on legally insufficient evidence constitutes a denial of due process”) (citations omitted). “Whether the evidence is legally sufficient * * * is a question of law.” Id. {¶19} “When a court reviews a record for sufficiency, ‘[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12, 2014-Ohio-1019, 9 N.E.3d 930, ¶ 146, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); accord State v. Groce, 163 Ohio St.3d 387, 2020-Ohio6671, 170 N.E.3d 813, ¶ 7. A reviewing court is not to assess “whether the state’s evidence is to be believed, but whether, if believed, the evidence against a defendant would support a conviction.” Thompkins, supra, at 390, 678 N.E.2d 541 (Cook, J., concurring). Additionally, when reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, an appellate court must construe the 1 For this reason, we disagree with Appellee that Appellant’s failure to argue the insufficiency of the evidence during the trial court proceedings means that she forfeited the argument for purposes of appeal. See In re Hardie, 4th Dist. Washington No. 02CA55, 2003Ohio-1388, 2003 WL 1423403, ¶ 6 (stating that “[t]he failure to raise a sufficiency argument at trial does not waive that argument on appeal”). Washington App. No. 21CA8 9 evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. See State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 205, 661 N.E.2d 1068 (1996); State v. Grant, 67 Ohio St.3d 465, 477, 620 N.E.2d 50 (1993). Disorderly Conduct {¶20} R.C. 2917.11(A)(1) states that “[n]o person shall recklessly cause inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to another by * * * [e]ngaging in fighting, in threatening harm to persons or property, or in violent or turbulent behavior.” {¶21} R.C. 2901.22(C) defines when a person acts recklessly: “A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person’s conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature.” {¶22} “Proof of inconvenience, annoyance or alarm may be demonstrated by the witnesses to the impact of the event on another.” Matter of J.S., 5th Dist. Delaware No. 18 CAF 06 0043, 2019-Ohio-35, ¶ 21. {¶23} “Turbulent behavior” involves “tumultuous behavior or unruly conduct characterized by violent disturbance or commotion.” State v. Reeder, 18 Ohio St.3d 25, 27, 479 N.E. 290 (1985). “[A] verbal berating of another individual may constitute turbulent behavior that causes Washington App. No. 21CA8 10 inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.” State v. Jackson, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 17128, 1998 WL 801367, *4 (Nov. 20, 1998) (concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support a disorderly conduct conviction when the defendant “had confronted the store manager and sheriff’s deputies loudly and hostilely,” “had not calmed down at the deputies’ request,” “had refused to leave the store when she was asked to do so and had grabbed at a deputy’s name tag”); accord State v. Jones, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2021-P0036, 2021-Ohio-3486 (concluding that the state presented sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s disorderly conduct conviction when the defendant used multiple vulgarities and homophobic language during a heated argument with another person); Middletown v. Carpenter, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2006-01-004, 2006-Ohio-3625, ¶ 17, citing State v. Rajeski, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2002-11-120, 2003-Ohio-2783, ¶ 8 (stating that “vulgar language, when accompanied by aggressive behavior, can be sufficient for a disorderly conduct conviction based on ‘turbulent behavior’ ”) . Analysis {¶24} In the case at bar, we do not agree with Appellant that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support her delinquency adjudication for committing disorderly conduct. First, we observe that Appellant’s Washington App. No. 21CA8 11 insufficiency argument rests upon a single moment during the sequence of events that occurred on the morning of March 16, 2021—the moment when she bit her mother’s finger. Appellant asserts that her action in biting her mother’s finger does not support a finding that she engaged in any act that would be disorderly conduct if committed by an adult. {¶25} We do not agree with Appellant that we should assess the adequacy of the evidence to support her delinquency adjudication by focusing upon one moment in time—the moment when Appellant bit her mother’s finger. Instead, we believe that we should consider all of the evidence that Appellee presented to determine whether sufficient evidence supports her delinquency adjudication. {¶26} The evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing shows that throughout the morning of March 16, 2021, Appellant was belligerent and combative. She refused to go to school, argued with her mother, and hurled profanities. The argument eventually escalated into a physical confrontation during which Appellant bit her mother’s finger. A reasonable person could conclude that Appellant’s conduct constituted fighting or turbulent behavior. {¶27} Moreover, Appellant’s conduct caused inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to another. Appellant’s grandmother became so alarmed about the circumstances that she called the police. When the Washington App. No. 21CA8 12 deputies arrived, they found it necessary to place Appellant in the back of the police cruiser. Furthermore, Appellant was being disrespectful and refusing to get ready for school. Appellant called her mother “a F-ing B,” which caused Appellant’s mother to slap Appellant in the face. A reasonable factfinder could have concluded that Appellant’s conduct thus caused alarm to her grandmother and inconvenience or annoyance to Appellant’s mother and the deputies. {¶28} Additionally, the evidence regarding Appellant’s conduct throughout the morning is legally adequate to support a finding that she acted recklessly. Appellant displayed a heedless indifference to the effect that her belligerence had on her mother and grandmother. After Appellant’s mother slapped Appellant for calling her “a F-ing B,” Appellant continued to act belligerently and provoked her mother into a state of “instant shock[].” Despite the heated circumstances, Appellant continued to flame the fire. Appellant thus acted with heedless indifference to the consequences of her actions and disregarded an unjustifiable risk that her conduct would be likely to cause inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to another. We thus believe that the state presented legally adequate evidence to support a finding that Appellant acted recklessly. The entirety of Appellant’s conduct during the Washington App. No. 21CA8 13 morning of March 16, 2021, constitutes legally sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s delinquency adjudication. {¶29} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule Appellant’s first assignment of error. Second Assignment of Error {¶30} In her second assignment of error, Appellant contends that the trial court’s delinquency adjudication is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, she asserts that the evidence shows that she acted in self-defense and that Appellee failed to disprove her claim of self-defense. Appellant notes that she presented evidence to show that her mother was at fault in creating the situation and was the initial aggressor. Appellant further points out that she testified that she believed that she was in danger of bodily harm and that she bit her mother’s finger because she could not breathe. Appellant alleges that she suffers from asthma and that she was unable to breathe with her mother sitting on top of her and her mother’s hands covering Appellant’s face and mouth. Appellant testified that “she had to do something” and that she “did not want to lose [her] life.” Appellant also claims that she did not use more force than necessary. Washington App. No. 21CA8 14 Standard of Review {¶31} When an appellate court considers a claim that a delinquency adjudication is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court must examine the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, and consider the witness credibility. See State v. Dean, 146 Ohio St.3d 106, 2015-Ohio-4347, 54 N.E.3d 80, ¶ 151, citing Thompkins at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541; In re A.G., supra (stating that criminal manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard also applies to review of delinquency adjudication). A reviewing court must bear in mind, however, that credibility generally is an issue for the trier of fact to resolve. See State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001); State v. Murphy, 4th Dist. Ross No. 07CA2953, 2008Ohio-1744, 2008 WL 1061793, ¶ 31. “ ‘Because the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses and is particularly competent to decide “whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses,” we must afford substantial deference to its determinations of credibility.’ ” Barberton v. Jenney, 126 Ohio St.3d 5, 2010-Ohio-2420, 929 N.E.2d 1047, ¶ 20, quoting State v. Konya, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 21434, 2006-Ohio-6312, 2006 WL 3462119, ¶ 6, in turn quoting State v. Lawson, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL 476684 (Aug. 22, 1997). As the Court explained in Eastley: Washington App. No. 21CA8 15 “[I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment must be made in favor of the judgment and the finding of facts. * * * If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.” Eastley, supra, at ¶ 21, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273, fn. 3 (1984). {¶32} Accordingly, the weight to assign evidence and witness credibility are matters for the trier of fact to determine as long as a rational basis exists in the record for its decision. See State v. Picklesimer, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 11CA9, 2012-Ohio-1282, 2012 WL 1029466, ¶ 24; accord State v. Howard, 4th Dist. Ross No. 07CA2948, 2007-Ohio-6331, 2007 WL 4201355, ¶ 6 (“We will not intercede as long as the trier of fact has some factual and rational basis for its determination of credibility and weight.”). Once a reviewing court finishes its weight-of-the-evidence examination, the court may reverse the trial court’s judgment only if it appears that the factfinder, when resolving the conflicts in evidence, “ ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). A reviewing court should find a Washington App. No. 21CA8 16 delinquency adjudication against the manifest weight of the evidence only in the “ ‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against’ ” the court’s decision. Thompkins, at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting Martin, at 175, 485 N.E.2d 717; accord State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St.3d 479, 483, 721 N.E.2d 995 (2000). Self-Defense {¶33} R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) defines a self-defense claim and the burden of proof as follows: A person is allowed to act in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person’s residence. If, at the trial of a person who is accused of an offense that involved the person’s use of force against another, there is evidence presented that tends to support that the accused person used the force in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person’s residence, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused person did not use the force in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person’s residence, as the case may be. {¶34} In order to disprove a claim of self-defense, the state must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, one of the following: (1) the defendant was at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray; (2) the defendant lacked a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm or that another means of escape from such danger existed negating the need for the use of deadly force; or (3) the defendant violated a duty to retreat or avoid the danger. State v. Jacinto, 2020-Ohio- Washington App. No. 21CA8 17 3722, 155 N.E.3d 1056, ¶ 46 (8th Dist.); see also State v. Thompson, 141 Ohio St.3d 254, 2014-Ohio-4751, 23 N.E.3d 1096, ¶ 258. Analysis {¶35} In the case at bar, we first point out that the trial court appears to have agreed with Appellant that she acted in self-defense when she bit her mother’s finger. The trial court found on the record that Appellant’s mother was the aggressor and, as a result, declined to find Appellant delinquent for committing domestic violence. Instead, the trial court determined that Appellant’s conduct would constitute the offense of disorderly conduct if committed by an adult. {¶36} We further observe that the trial court did not enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain its rationale for finding Appellant delinquent for committing disorderly conduct. The court’s decision thus does not indicate whether it found Appellant delinquent for committing disorderly conduct due to her action in biting her mother’s finger or due to her entire conduct over the course of the morning, culminating in Appellant being placed in a police cruiser. Consequently, we cannot know whether the trial court found Appellant delinquent due to using force against her mother or due to her verbal assaults and general belligerence throughout the morning. Washington App. No. 21CA8 18 {¶37} We hasten to add that unless Appellant requested the court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law as provided in Juv.R. 29(F)(3), the trial court had no obligation to set forth specific factual findings. Instead, Juv.R. 29(F)(3) states that “[u]pon a determination of the issues” at an adjudicatory hearing, the court need only enter “written findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Civ.R. 52” “[u]pon request.” Civ.R. 52 states: When questions of fact are tried by the court without a jury, judgment may be general for the prevailing party unless one of the parties in writing requests otherwise before the entry of judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 58, or not later than seven days after the party filing the request has been given notice of the court’s announcement of its decision, whichever is later, in which case, the court shall state in writing the findings of fact found separately from the conclusions of law. {¶38} The purpose of Civ.R. 52 findings of fact and conclusions of law is “ ‘ “to aid the appellate court in reviewing the record and determining the validity of the basis of the trial court’s judgment.’’ ’ ” Harper v. Neal, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 15CA25, 2016-Ohio-7179, 2016 WL 5874628, ¶ 18, quoting In re Adoption of Gibson, 23 Ohio St.3d 170, 172, 492 N.E.2d 146 (1986), quoting Werden v. Crawford, 70 Ohio St.2d 122, 124, 435 N.E.2d 424 (1982). Thus, a party may file a Civ.R. 52 request in order “to ensure Washington App. No. 21CA8 19 the fullest possible review.” Cherry v. Cherry, 66 Ohio St.3d 348, 356, 421 N.E.2d 1293 (1981). {¶39} In the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law, we presume that the trial court applied the law correctly and will affirm its judgment if evidence in the record supports it. Harper, at ¶ 19; Bugg v. Fancher, 4th Dist. Highland No. 06CA12, 2007-Ohio-2019, ¶ 10, citing Allstate Fin. Corp. v. Westfield Serv. Mgt. Co., 62 Ohio App.3d 657, 577 N.E.2d 383 (12th Dist.1989). The reason for this rule is that “[i]t is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the basis of the trial court’s ruling without findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Leikin Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Spofford Auto Sales, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2000-L-202, 2002-Ohio-2441, ¶ 17; accord Yocum v. Means, 2nd Dist. Darke No. 1576, 2002-Ohio-3803, ¶ 7 (“The lack of findings obviously circumscribes our review.”). As the court explained in Pettet v. Pettet, 55 Ohio App.3d 128, 130, 562 N.E.2d 929 (5th Dist.1988): [W]hen separate facts are not requested by counsel and/or supplied by the court the challenger is not entitled to be elevated to a position superior to that he would have enjoyed had he made his request. Thus, if from an examination of the record as a whole in the trial court there is some evidence from which the court could have reached the ultimate conclusions of fact which are consistent with [the] judgment the appellate court is bound to affirm on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. Washington App. No. 21CA8 20 The message should be clear: If a party wishes to challenge the * * * judgment as being against the manifest weight of the evidence he had best secure separate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Otherwise his already “uphill” burden of demonstrating error becomes an almost insurmountable “mountain.” {¶40} Here, because Appellant did not request findings of fact and conclusions of law, we can only speculate as to the trial court’s rationale. Reviewing Appellant’s claim that the state failed to disprove her claim of self-defense would require us to speculate that the trial court found Appellant delinquent for disorderly conduct involving the use of force. See Katz, Martin, and Macke, Ohio Criminal Law, Section 88.2 (3d ed.) (stating that “[t]he basis of self-defense is the perceived necessity of the use of force to protect oneself”). The lack of a specific written factual finding on the issue obviously circumscribes our review. We cannot read the trial court’s mind so we must presume the regularity of the trial court’s decision and affirm its decision so long as the record contains some evidence to support it. See Cleveland v. Laborers Internatl. Union Local 1099, 2018-Ohio-161, 104 N.E.3d 890, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.) (explaining that failing to request findings of fact and conclusions of law means reviewing court must affirm trial court’s judgment if some evidence supports it); Roberts v. Roberts, 5th Dist. Morgan No. 88-6, 1988 WL 119973, *1 (Oct. 24, 1988) (stating that asking appellate court to review rationale for trial court’s decision without “Civ.R. Washington App. No. 21CA8 21 52 findings of fact and conclusions of law * * * is like asking [appellate court] to read the [trial] court’s mind”). {¶41} As we explained in our discussion of Appellant’s first assignment of error, some evidence supports the trial court’s delinquency adjudication for disorderly conduct. Some evidence exists that Appellant recklessly caused inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to her mother, her grandmother, and the deputies by engaging in fighting or violent or turbulent conduct. Appellant (1) argued with her mother about going to school, (2) used profanities, (3) called her mother “a F-ing B,” (4) ended up in a physical altercation with her mother during which Appellant bit her mother’s finger, and (5) continued to be disruptive enough that the deputies found it necessary to place Appellant in the back of one of their cruisers. {¶42} Even if Appellant acted in self-defense when she bit her mother’s finger, Appellant was not acting in self-defense when she argued with her mother about going to school, used profanities, called her mother “a F-ing B,” and continued to be disruptive enough that the deputies found it necessary to place Appellant in the back of one of their cruisers. Moreover, without an act of force against another, the self-defense statute does not apply. See R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) (stating that statute applies “at the trial of a person who is accused of an offense that involved the person’s use of force Washington App. No. 21CA8 22 against another”). Even if it did, the evidence suggests that Appellant’s belligerence about going to school and calling her mother “a F-ing B” created the ensuing argument. Had Appellant not instigated the situation by refusing to get ready for school, the argument may have been completely avoided. Thus, even if the self-defense statute would apply in a situation that did not involve the use of force against another, the evidence establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant was the initial aggressor by refusing to get ready for school and being belligerent and disrespectful with her mother. Consequently, Appellant’s delinquency adjudication for disorderly conduct is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶43} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule Appellant’s second assignment of error. CONCLUSION {¶44} Having overruled Appellant’s assignments of error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Washington App. No. 21CA8 23 JUDGMENT ENTRY It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and that costs be assessed to Appellant. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Washington County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Hess, J. and Wilkin, J., concur in Judgment and Opinion. For the Court, ______________________________ Jason P. Smith Presiding Judge NOTICE TO COUNSEL Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.

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