In re H.A.H.

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[Cite as In re H.A.H., 2018-Ohio-3446.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WASHINGTON COUNTY IN THE MATTER OF: H.A.H., A MINOR CHILD : : : : : : Case No. 17CA32 DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Released: 08/17/18 APPEARANCES: William B. Summers, Parkersburg, West Virginia, for Appellant.1 McFarland, J. {¶1} Tina Schwaigert appeals the final judgment of the Washington County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, entered September 14, 2017, which adopted the magistrate’s decision and modified the provision for companionship/shared parenting of her daughter, H.A.H. For various reasons, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in changing the shared parenting plan. Upon review of the record, we find no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court’s decision. Therefore, we find Appellant’s arguments are without merit and her sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 1 Appellee has not filed a brief or otherwise appeared in this matter. Washington App. No. 17CA32 2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND {¶2} Appellant Tina Schwaigert, f.k.a. Tina McPeek, and Appellee Justin Hughes are the biological parents of one minor child, H.A.H., who was born in August 2004. Appellant and Appellee never married. In March 2006, Appellee filed a complaint in the Washington County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to establish parental rights and responsibilities. He specifically sought an order to establish companionship/shared parenting. {¶3} In August 2006, the court approved an amended shared parenting plan. Appellant was designated the residential and legal custodian of H.A.H. Appellee was ordered to pay child support pursuant to an administrative order previously established by the Washington County Child Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA). {¶4} In October 2010, Appellee filed a motion to modify the designation of residential parent. The court appoint a guardian ad litem. On January 31, 2011, the court approved a shared parenting plan which was facilitated, in part, by the guardian ad litem, and which purported to represent a complete agreement of the parties. Both were designated the residential parent and legal custodian of H.A.H. It was also ordered that a child support order previously in effect was to be continued. Washington App. No. 17CA32 3 {¶5} In 2014, 2015, and 2016, the parties were before the court at various times to resolve child support issues. The record indicates the child support issues were resolved fairly amicably. {¶6} On April 12, 2017, Appellant filed a motion for change of parenting time. The matter came on for hearing on July 19, 2017, with both parties proceeding without legal representation. Both parties testified and presented evidence. Appellant presented additional witnesses and the magistrate subsequently interviewed H.A.H. {¶7} On July 31, 2017, the magistrate issued a decision which found that both parents would continue to be designated the residential parents of H.A.H. and both parents would continue to exercise shared parenting pursuant to the plan established on January 31, 2011. However, the magistrate also ordered the following modifications: 1. H.A.H. was ordered to be with her father during the period of Sunday evening through Thursday evening; 2. During the period of Thursday evening until Sunday evening, H.A.H. was ordered to alternate weekend parenting time with each parent; 3. During the weeks that mother did not get weekend parenting time, mother was allowed to exercise it on Tuesday and Thursday from after school until 8:00 p.m. {¶8} Appellant filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. Generally, she challenged the magistrate’s jurisdiction to modify the plan based on Appellee’s Washington App. No. 17CA32 4 verbal motion on the hearing date. She further objected to various matters included and omitted in the magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. {¶9} On September 14, 2017, the trial court journalized its decision and judgment entry on objections to the magistrate’s decision. The trial court overruled Appellant’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision. This timely appeal followed. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR {¶10} Here, Appellant has not set forth or argued separate assignments of error as required by App.R. 16(A). However, in the interests of justice, we proceed to consideration of the issues argued in her brief. We discern and set forth the issues raised as follows: 1. The trial court lacked authority to modify the parenting plan based upon Justin’s verbal request; 2. The trial court abused its discretion by admitting and relying upon hearsay evidence; 3. The trial court abused its discretion by relying largely upon H.A.H.’s in camera interview, without making the requisite findings; and, 4. The trial court abused its discretion by omitting findings of fact that were present in the transcript but not in the court’s order. Washington App. No. 17CA32 5 A. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR MODIFICATION TO A SHARED PARENTING PLAN {¶11} We begin by setting forth the appropriate standard of review for modification to a shared parenting plan. Provisions allocating parenting time constitute terms of a shared parenting plan. Modifications to a shared parenting plan are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Hall v. Hall, 4th Dist. Adams No. 16CA1030, 2017-Ohio-8968, at ¶ 19. Bishop, 2009–Ohio–4537, at ¶ 36, citing Picciano, 2009–Ohio–3780, at ¶ 25. An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court acted unreasonably, unconscionably, or arbitrarily. Lauer v. Positron Energy Resources, Inc., 4th Dist. Washington No. 13CA39, 2014–Ohio– 4850, ¶ 9. “[I]n applying the abuse of discretion standard, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.” Id. We are mindful, however, that no court has the authority, within its discretion, to commit an error of law. State v. Landrum, 4th Dist. Ross No. 17CA3607, 2018-Ohio-1280, at ¶ 10; State v. Boone, 2017-Ohio-843, 85 N.E.3d 1227, (10th Dist.), ¶ 9, citing State v. Moncrief, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-391, 2013-Ohio-4571, ¶ 7. See also 2–J Supply Co. Inc. V. Garrett & Parker, LLC, 4th Dist. Highland No. 13CA29, 2015-Ohio-2757, ¶ 9. {¶12} “Further, * * * the judgment of a trial court should not be overturned as being against the manifest weight of the evidence if some competent and credible evidence supports that judgment.” Hall, supra, at ¶ 20, quoting Yannitell v. Oaks, 4th Dist. Washington No. 07CA63, 2008–Ohio–6371, ¶ 9, citing C.E. Washington App. No. 17CA32 6 Morris Co. v. Foley Construction Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578 (1978), syllabus. “Factual findings of the trial court are to be given great deference on review because the trial court is in a better position ‘to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.’ ” Id., quoting Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). B. THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD STANDARD {¶13} A trial court may modify terms of a shared parenting plan if the modification is in the best interest of the child. R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b). In determining the best interest of a child, the court shall consider all relevant factors set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), including, but not limited to: (a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care; (b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers pursuant to division (B) of this section regarding the child’s wishes and concerns as to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities concerning the child, the wishes and concerns of the child, as expressed to the court; (c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest; (d) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and community; (e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the situation; Washington App. No. 17CA32 7 (f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved parenting time rights or visitation and companionship rights; (g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support payments, including all arrearages that are required of that parent pursuant to a child support order under which that parent is an obligor; (h) Whether either parent or any member of the household of either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any criminal offense involving any act that resulted in a child being an abused child or a neglected child; whether either parent, in a case in which a child has been adjudicated an abused child or a neglected child, previously has been determined to be the perpetrator of the abuse or neglectful act that is the basis for the adjudication; whether either parent or any member of the household of either parent previously has been convicted or of pleaded guilty to a violation of section 2919.25 of the Revised Code or a sexually oriented offense involving a victim who at the time of the commission of the offense was a member of the family or household that is the subject of the current proceeding; whether either parent or any member of the household of either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any offense involving a victim who at the time of the commission of the offense was a member of the family or household that is the subject of the current proceeding and caused physical harm to the victim in the commission of the offense; and whether there is reason to believe that either parent has acted in a manner resulting in a child being an abused or neglected child; (i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to a shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied the other parent’s right to parenting time in accordance with an order of the court; (j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is planning to establish a residence, outside this state.2 2 See also Bishop, 2009–Ohio–4537, at ¶ 37 (applying best-interest factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) to a R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b) modification); Picciano, 2009–Ohio–3780, at ¶ 27 (also applying best-interest factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) to a R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b) modification). Washington App. No. 17CA32 8 C. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1. The trial court lacked authority to modify the parenting plan based upon the Father’s verbal request. {¶14} In In re Lane, 4th Dist. Washington No. 02CA61, 2003-Ohio7055, we stated: “[B]ecause the trial court should have some latitude in deciding such a motion, we review its decision under an abuse of discretion standard.” Id. at ¶ 6. We observed that Juv.R. 19 provides, in part, “[a]n application to the court for an order shall be by motion. * * * It shall be supported by a memorandum containing citations of authority and may be supported by an affidavit.” Id. at ¶ 8. The purpose of Juv.R. 19 is to provide the nonmoving party notice of the allegations in the motion so that they can respond appropriately. Lane, supra, citing, Fink, Greenbaum and Wilson, Guide to the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure (2003 Ed.), Section 7.9. In Lane, we affirmed the trial court’s decision to dismiss an oral motion because it was untimely. {¶15} Appellant argues that Appellee made his request for the change in the residential parent designation at the hearing and not in a motion before the hearing, which is not only violative of the criminal rule but “ambushed” her at the hearing, where she was ill-prepared to respond to his arguments. The transcript reflects that Appellee’s verbal request came about as follows: THE MAGISTRATE: Okay. Now, sir, you have the opportunity to - and in your situation, since you did not file this, you can say you Washington App. No. 17CA32 9 don’t want to see any changes whatsoever, but I think through your testimony, you were kind of hinting at the idea that you would like to see more week days or all of the week days or something like that, so * * *. MR. HUGHES: Yes. THE MAGISTRATE: So, since she has filed, you also have the opportunity to argue what you’d like to see happen, and like I said, it can either be, I don't want to see anything changed, or it can be I want to see a change like this, because I believe it’s in the best interests because of * * *. *** MR. HUGHES: I’ve already agreed, I don’t mind every other weekend. She’s asked twice now for every other weekend. Fine. You can have every other weekend. I want my child Monday through Friday. You get every other weekend. That’s specifically what you asked for. I will give that. I think that is in the best interests of my child. * * * Weekends are fine. Every other weekend is fine. I want her throughout school. And as you can see, school is my issue. *** THE MAGISTRATE: So your proposal is, that, you would have the child Monday through Friday, and they you would alternate weekends, is that your proposal? MR. HUGHES: Yes. Yes, sir. THE MAGISTRATE: Okay. And ma’am, your proposal is he has her Monday and Tuesday, you have her Wednesday and Thursday and then you alternate weekends, correct? MS. SCHWAIGHERT: Yes. {¶16} Here, Appellant filed the motion for modification had presented her case. The record reflects that in Appellee’s testimony, he responded to issues Washington App. No. 17CA32 10 Appellant had raised through her witnesses’ testimony. Then Appellee began testifying as follows: MR. HUGHES: Then the other problems I have are with school. As of right now, my kid is failing school. F’s in everything. As her Mom says, she has her Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday * * * and she has developed straight F’s. Do I need to admit these as evidence? THE MAGISTRATE: Yes, you can. * * * MR. HUGHES: There are various teacher conference reports, attendance records… THE MAGISTRATE: If you like, what we can do, you can label them all as one exhibit.” {¶17} He continued testifying, essentially requesting that he have parenting time with H.A.H. throughout the week for school, further explaining that he lived near the school. He also emphasized that the reports demonstrated H.A.H. was not doing her school work, but placing the blame on Appellant because he did not have H.A.H. during the school week. At no time during his testimony did she object to his testimony or the admission of his exhibits. {¶18} It is well-established that pro se litigants are held to the same rules, procedures, and standards as litigants who are represented by counsel. Gould v. Gould, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 16CA30, 2017-Ohio-6896, at ¶ 52; Seymour v. Hampton, 4th Dist. Pike No. 11CA21, 2012–Ohio–5053, ¶ 30, citing Crown Asset Washington App. No. 17CA32 11 Management, LLC, v. Gaul, 4th Dist. Washington No. 08CA30, 2009–Ohio–2167, ¶ 15, citing Selvage v. Emnett, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 08CA3239, 2009–Ohio–940, ¶ 13. Litigants who choose to proceed pro se are presumed to know the law and correct procedure, and are held to the same standards as other litigants. Capital One Bank, v. Rodgers, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2009–0049, 2010–Ohio–4421, ¶ 31. {¶19} Accordingly, under these circumstances, Appellant invited any error in the admission of the exhibits. See Matter of K.W. 4th Dist. Highland No. 17CA8, 2018-Ohio-1933, at ¶ 93 and In re A.S., 4th Dist. Pike No. 16CA878, 2017-Ohio-1166, ¶ 41 (stating that appellant invited any error by acquiescing to the court's procedure); accord State v. Jackson, 149 Ohio St.3d 55, 2016-Ohio-5488, 73 N.E.3d 414, ¶ 108, quoting State ex rel. Kline v. Carroll, 96 Ohio St.3d 404, 2002-Ohio-4849, 775 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 27 (“ ‘Under [the invited-error] doctrine, a party is not entitled to take advantage of an error that he himself invited or induced the court to make’ ”). Additionally, she did not object to his testimony, to which she now asserts she did not have opportunity to respond. As a result, Appellant waived all but plain error. {¶20} And, she did not suggest that we review her arguments using a plain error analysis, and we decline to do so sua sponte. Matter of K.W., supra, at ¶ 94; In re Z.R., 9th Dist. Summit No. 26860, 2016-Ohio-1331, at ¶ 11; accord State v. Washington App. No. 17CA32 12 Steers, 4th Dist. Washington No. 11CA33, 2013-Ohio-3266, at ¶ 20; State v. Suman, 4th Dist. Athens No. 10CA11, 2010-Ohio-6204, at ¶ 43. As such, we cannot find an abuse of the trial court’s discretion in this matter, due to his failure to file a written motion for modification of shared parenting. 2. The trial court abused its discretion by admitting and relying upon hearsay evidence. {¶21} Generally, we will not disturb the trial court's decision to admit or exclude relevant evidence absent an abuse of discretion. Lane, supra, at ¶ 11; State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 510 N.E.2d 343 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. A trial court's discretion to admit or exclude relevant evidence does not include the discretion to admit hearsay. “ ‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Evid.R. 801(C). In re Brown, 4th Dist. Athens No. 06CA3, 2006-Ohio-2865, at ¶ 28. Evid.R. 802 mandates the exclusion of hearsay unless any exceptions apply. Lane, supra; State v. Barney (June 7, 1999), Meigs App. No. 97CA12. We undertake a de novo review of the trial court's interpretation of Evid.R. 801. Id. See also State v. Sorrels, 71 Ohio App.3d 162, 165, 593 N.E.2d 313 (1st Dist.1991). {¶22} Appellant argues the trial court’s decision was based upon “unfounded hearsay by Appellee, as well as a discounting of many aspects of her own evidence that were pertinent to the case.” She also argues the hearsay Washington App. No. 17CA32 13 statements lacked foundation and the hearsay evidence undoubtedly influenced the Magistrate in his questioning of H.A.H. By way of summary, she claims the trial magistrate improperly admitted these examples of alleged hearsay during his testimony: 1. “The child does not want to be there all the time.” 2. “The child was texting [Justin] during the night asking to be picked up because she was hot and hungry.” 3. “The child was waiting at a soccer game, and would be made to wait at McDonald’s alone, for two hours, rather than being allowed to walk down to her Father’s house near the soccer fields because those two hours were not his to have with the child.” {¶23} First, we pause to observe: “ ‘[H]earsay is not admissible in adversarial juvenile court proceedings. * * * [Because] the judge acts as the factfinder and is presumed to be able to disregard hearsay statements, the person against whom the hearsay statements were admitted in such a case must show that the statements were prejudicial or were relied upon by the judge in making his decision.’ In re Lucas, 29 Ohio App.3d 165, 172, 504 N.E.2d 472, (3rd Dist.1985) quoting In re Vickers Children, 14 Ohio App.3d at 206, 470 N.E.2d 438 (12th Dist.1983), and citing In re Sims, 13 Ohio App.3d 37, 468 N.E.2d 111 (12th Dist.1983).” {¶24} However, again, review of the transcript reveals that Appellant failed to object to Appellee’s testimony which she now argues as error, and has, therefore, waived all but plain error. Matis v. Matis, 9th Dist. Medina No. 04CA0025-M, 2005-Ohio-72, ¶ 18. See State v. Leonard, 140 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004- Washington App. No. 17CA32 14 Ohio-6235, at ¶ 41. As she does not argue plain error, we decline to do consider the matter sua sponte. 3. The trial court abused its discretion by relying largely upon the child’s in camera interview without making the sufficient findings. {¶25} Appellant further argues that the trial court relied heavily on H.A.H.’s wishes when rendering the shared parenting modification decision. She asserts the trial court erred in that it made no specific finding that H.A.H. was of sufficient age or maturity to express a preference. Initially we observe that a child's wishes “are but a single factor” for the court to consider in allocating parental rights and responsibilities. Harmon v. Radcliff, 12th Dist. Butler No. 2017-04-047, 2017-Ohio 8582, at ¶ 50. See, e.g., Thornton v. Thornton, 70 Ohio App.317, 320 (3rd Dist.1990) and Rees v. Rees, 3rd Dist. Marion NO. 9-2000-22, 2000 WL 1824889 (Dec. 13, 2000) at Fn.3. A court is required to weigh the child's wishes alongside other relevant factors in making its best interest determination. {¶26} We also observe that she did not provide a transcript of the in camera interview. As the appellant, that duty fell to her. See App.R. 9(B). See also, Coe v. Schneider, 4th Dist. Washington No. 05CA26, 2006-Ohio-44, at ¶ 3; Rhoads v. Rhoads (Aug. 24, 1998), Highland App. No. 97CA944, citing Columbus v. Hodge, 37 Ohio App.3d 68, 523 N.E.2d 515 (10th Dist.1987) and Bates & Springer, Inc. v. Stallworth, 56 Ohio App.2d 223, 382 N.E.2d 1179, (8th Dist.1978). Here, we are unable to review the transcript of the magistrate’s in Washington App. No. 17CA32 15 camera interview with H.A.H. In the absence of a complete record, we must presume the validity of the trial court's findings. Ostrander v. Parker-Fallis Insulation, 29 Ohio St.2d 72, 74, 278 N.E.2d 363 (1972). {¶27} Furthermore, the record does not reflect Appellant made a written request, pursuant to Civil Rule 52, for findings of fact and conclusions of law. In the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law, we generally must presume that the trial court applied the law correctly and must affirm if some evidence in the record supports its judgment. In re S.S., 4th Dist. Jackson Nos. 16CA7, 16CA8, 2017-Ohio-2938, at ¶ 131, citing Bugg v. Fancher, 4th Dist. Highland No. 06CA12, 2007-Ohio-2019, ¶ 10, citing Allstate Fin. Corp. v. Westfield Serv. Mgt. Co., 62 Ohio App.3d 657, 577 N.E.2d 383 (12th Dist.1989); accord Yocum v. Means, 2nd Dist. Darke No. 1576, 2002-Ohio-3803, 2002 WL 1729892, ¶ 7 (“The lack of findings obviously circumscribes our review * * *.”) Accordingly, although the trial court did not make an express finding as to H.A.H.’s age and maturity, we presume the trial court properly considered her age and maturity and we are constrained to presume validity of the findings that the trial court did make regarding H.A.H. 4. The trial court abused its discretion by omitting findings of fact that were present in the transcript but not in the court’s order. {¶28} She argues there are no specific findings regarding her police log exhibit, showing that he would not return phone calls and would hang up the phone Washington App. No. 17CA32 16 even when law enforcement called. She also pointed out there was no specific finding that H.A.H. was in soccer, which affected her grades because he wanted her in soccer league. Finally, Appellant submits there was no finding regarding hiss “mixed testimony” about direct and indirect communication. As set forth previously, Appellant’s failure to request findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to Crim.R. 52, leads us to none other than the conclusion that the trial court correctly applied the law. 5. Brief analysis of the trial court’s decision. {¶29} In Shaffer v. Wagaman, 2nd Dist. Clark No. 2012-CA-53, ¶ 13, the appellate court wrote: “The trial court ‘has discretion in determining which factors are relevant,’ and ‘each factor may not necessarily carry the same weight or have the same relevance, depending upon the facts before the trial court.’ Brammer, 2013–Ohio-2843, at ¶ 41, citing Hammond v. Harm, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23993, 2008–Ohio-2310, ¶ 51. Although the trial court must consider all relevant factors, there is no requirement that the trial court set out an analysis for each of the factors in its judgment entry, so long as the judgment entry is supported by some competent, credible evidence. Meachem v. Meacham, 3rd Dist. Marion No. 9-10-43, 2011–Ohio–519, at ¶ 30, citing Portentoso v. Portentoso, 3rd Dist. Seneca No. 13–07–03, 2007–Ohio–5770, ¶ 22. ‘[A]bsent evidence to the contrary, an appellate court will presume the trial court considered all of the relevant ‘best interest’ factors listed in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1).’ Meachem at ¶ 32, citing Goodman v. Goodman, 3rd Dist. Marion No. 9–04–37, 2005–Ohio–1091, ¶ 18. Krill v. Krill, 3rd Dist.Defiance No.4-13-15, 2014-Ohio-2577, ¶ 29.” {¶30} Here, based upon our review of the record provided, we find that the trial court’s judgment entry which adopted the magistrate’s decision is supported Washington App. No. 17CA32 17 by some competent, credible evidence. Appellee testified H.A.H.’s grades were failing and he wanted the parenting time modified to give him Monday through Friday, the school week. The exhibits Appellee offered verified his testimony regarding her poor grades. And, Appellant did not object to this evidence. Through her own testimony, it was clear her parenting time was exercised during the school week. {¶31} Furthermore, the trial court was in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses who testified in this matter. Deferring to the trial court on matters of credibility is “crucial in a child custody case, where there may be much evident in the parties' demeanor and attitude that does not translate to the record well.” In re A.M., 4th Dist. Athens No. 17CA43, 2018-Ohio-2072, at ¶ 422, quoting, Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 419, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997); accord In re Christian, 4th Dist. Athens No. 04CA10, 2004–Ohio–3146, ¶ 7. As the Supreme Court of Ohio long-ago explained in Trickey v. Trickey, 158 Ohio St. 9, 13, 106 N.E.2d 772 (1952) “In proceedings involving the custody and welfare of children the power of the trial court to exercise discretion is peculiarly important. The knowledge obtained through contact with and observation of the parties and through independent investigation cannot be conveyed to a reviewing court by printed record.” {¶32} Finally, a trial court is not required to provide a detailed analysis of the child's best interest before modifying the terms of a shared parenting plan. Hall, Washington App. No. 17CA32 18 supra, at ¶ 33; Bishop at ¶ 38. Rather, “a trial court substantially complies with R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b) if its reasons for modifying the terms of a shared parenting plan are apparent from the record; i.e., if it is apparent from the record that the modification is in the child's best interest.” Id. In this matter, it is apparent from the record that some competent, credible evidence exists to support the conclusion that the court-ordered modification providing shared parenting to Appellee during the school week is in H.A.H.’s best interest. {¶33} Here, the trial court's judgment entry demonstrates it used the “best interest” test in modifying the shared parenting agreement. The entry set forth as follows: “The Court having undertaken an independent review as to the objected matters, included listening to the recorded hearing held on July 19, 2017, reviewing the exhibits and reviewing the Objection, hereby fully adopts the Magistrate’s decision. Pursuant to R.C. 3109.04€(2)(b), a Court may modify the terms of the Plan for Shared Parenting approved by the Court * * * if the Court determines that the modifications are in the best interest of the children * * *. Clearly the Court had the right to modify said parenting terms dealing with companionship/parenting time set forth in Section 2 of the plan as long as it was in the best interest of the child. * * * The Court finds that the Magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and applied the correct law. The Court therefore finds that the Magistrate’s decision should be adopted and the mother’s objections should be overruled.” D. CONCLUSION {¶34} We recognize, as pro se litigants in the underlying modification Washington App. No. 17CA32 19 proceeding, it can be challenging. However, having reviewed the record in its entirety, we cannot find an abuse of discretion. The trial court’s decision was based on substantial credible evidence contained in the record. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Washington App. No. 17CA32 20 JUDGMENT ENTRY It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and that costs be assessed to Appellant. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Washington County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution. Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of this entry. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Hoover, P.J. & Harsha, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion. For the Court, BY: ______________________________ Matthew W. McFarland, Judge NOTICE TO COUNSEL Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.

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