Byers v. Coppel
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[Cite as Byers v. Coppel, 2003-Ohio-3407.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ROSS COUNTY Jill Byers, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. Richard Coppel, et al., Defendants-Appellees. : : : : Case No. 02CA2678 : : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY : : RELEASED: 6-24-03 : APPEARANCES James L. Mann, MANN & PRESTON, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellants. Richard M. Lewis and Andrew T. White, The Law Firm of Richard M. Lewis, Jackson, Ohio, for appellees. Kline, J.: {¶1} Jill and William Byers appeal the decision of the Ross County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment to Richard W. Coppel. Because no genuine issue of material fact whether exists materials in as to constructing Coppel s the Byers substitution home was of either approved by the Byers or was a substitution of equal or greater value, we disagree. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. I. In 1996, the Byers filed a complaint against Coppel {¶2} alleging that construction Coppel of a home breached and their violated Sales Practices Act ( CSPA ). the contract Ohio for Consumeer In particular, the Byers alleged that Coppel s intentional substitution of inferior materials than intentionally that called deviating specifications in the for from by the the contract drawings, construction of and plans the and residence dwelling constitute deceptive and unconscionable actions in violation of the [CSPA]. Coppel filed a counterclaim court granted alleging partial non-payment. At {¶3} the jury trial, the trial a directed verdict to Coppel on the CSPA claim, finding that the CSPA does not apply to the construction of a new home. The jury returned on the breach of contract claim and on Coppel s counterclaim. The jury the answered negative: evidence Byers]? that you find favor of Coppel interrogatories by breached a in preponderance his contract of with the [the (2) Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence for construction damage? Do in following [Coppel] [Coppel] provided verdict the (1) that a substituted in of the the materials parties[ ] home thereby other agreement causing than those during [the his Byers] {¶4} The Byers appealed the trial court s decision in Byers v. Coppel, Ross App. No. 01CA2586, 2001-Ohio-2392. We affirmed the trial court s judgment with respect to the breach of However, contract we reversed claim the and Coppel s directed verdict counterclaim. on the CSPA claim, because the CSPA does apply to the construction of a new home. {¶5} On remand, Coppel filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the Byers CSPA claim rests upon the same factual basis as their breach of contract claim, and that relitigation of those issues would be contrary to the doctrine of res judicata. granted The Byers appeal, asserting the following assignment of error: The trial summary court judgment erred in in The trial court agreed, and Coppel s granting favor. summary judgment to [Coppel]. II. {¶6} The Byers assert that the granting summary judgment to Coppel. trial court erred in Summary judgment is appropriate only when it has been established: (1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party. Civ.R. 56(A). See Bostic v. Connor (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 144, 146; Morehead v. Conley (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 409, 411. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the record and all inferences therefrom in the opposing party s favor. Doe v. First United Methodist Church (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 531, 535. {¶7} In reviewing whether an entry of summary judgment is appropriate, an appellate court must independently review the record and the inferences that can be drawn from it to determine if the opposing Morehead, 75 Ohio App.3d deference to afford no party at can 411-12. possibly the trial answering that legal question. prevail. Accordingly, court s decision we in Id. See, also, Schwartz v. Bank-One, Portsmouth, N.A. (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 806, 809. {¶8} In his motion for summary judgment, Coppel asserted that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the Byers cannot prevail under any theory because a jury already determined that he did not breach the contract and did not cause damage to the Byers by substituting materials other assert than that those provided determination in the of their contract. CSPA claim The Byers requires resolution of different factual issues than those already decided by the jury. The parties agree that a fact or point that was {¶9} actually and directly at issue in a previous action, and was passed upon jurisdiction, and may determined not be by a drawn court competent question into of in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies whether the cause of action in the two actions be identical or different. Fort Frye Teachers Assn. v. State Employment Relations Bd. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 392, 395, citing Norwood v. McDonald (1943), paragraph three of the syllabus. 142 Ohio St. 299, If the same evidence would sustain both issues, then the two issues are the same for purposes of applying collateral estoppel. Fort Frye at 396, citing Norwood at paragraph four of the syllabus. The parties disagree regarding whether the same evidence would sustain both issues in this case. {¶10} The CSPA R.C. 1345.02(A). prohibits unfair However, the or CSPA deceptive provides acts. that a supplier may use similar merchandise of equal or greater value as a good faith substitute. {¶11} In this case, the R.C. 1345.02(B)(5). Byers alleged in their complaint that Coppel committed an unfair or deceptive act by substituting their house. to the inferior materials when he constructed The Byers admit that the jury answered no interrogatory that asked, Do you find by a preponderance of materials other agreement during the evidence than those his that [Coppel] provided construction causing the [Byers] damage? for of in the substituted the parties home thereby However, the Byers contend that because the interrogatory is a compound question, the possibility remains that the jury believed either that Coppel substituted materials or that Coppel caused damage. The Byers further contend that a positive finding regarding either one of these factual issues could sustain a CSPA claim. {¶12} While we recognize that the jury s answer to the interrogatory could be interpreted as the Byers suggest, we nonetheless agree with the trial court that in any event, the jury s Coppel verdict violated necessarily the CSPA. precludes If the a jury finding that answered the interrogatory in the negative because it found that Coppel substituted materials but did not cause damage, then it implicitly found that the substitution was with materials of an equal or greater value, which is permissible pursuant to R.C. 1345.02(B)(5). Alternatively, if the jury answered the interrogatory in the negative because it found that Coppel did not substitute materials, but that the materials used caused damage, then it implicitly found that the Byers agreed upon the materials actually used, and therefore that Coppel did not deceive them. Finally, if the jury answered the interrogatory in the negative because it found that Coppel did not substitute materials or cause damage, then Coppel did not commit an unfair or deceptive act. In conclusion, we find that the jury determined {¶13} the factual issues raised by the Byers in their CSPA claim when it considered against Coppel. the Byers breach of contract claim Therefore, the trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of Coppel. Accordingly, we overrule the Byers only assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. JUDGMENT ENTRY It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and that Appellees recover of Appellants costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of this entry. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 for the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. Evans, P.J. and Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion. For the Court BY: Roger L. Kline, Judge NOTICE TO COUNSEL Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.
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